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Building the Military State:
United States Army Architecture and Planning, 1890-1945
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My dissertation consists of an historical analysis of the United States Army's early-twentieth century (1890-1945) stateside built environment. This is not to be a history of American military space. Rather, I understand the Army's construction of military bases and industrial plants at home as the spatial manifestation of a political and ideological project to define the role of a standing army in a decentralized democracy. Ultimately, I contend, the story of the (literal) building of the modern Army reveals the definitive role played by preparations for war in the shaping of the twentieth-century American political economy. At the same time, the history of Army planning and architecture shows the military basis of the modern American state to exactly depend on its masking via the civilian-military binary. This dissertation will thus both outline the political and economic dynamics behind the United States military's twentieth-century expansion, and reveal the means by which that expansion was rendered invisible to the American people.

In 1890 the United States Army was in a state of ideological flux. Though armed conflicts with Native Americans would recur throughout the decade, Army officers recognized that the era of Indian-fighting was drawing to a close. The substantial settlement of the West, furthermore, limited the Army's other traditional duties--clearing land and protecting settlers. Military planners were thus left with the critical task of redefining the Army's mission. The choices were few: Army regulars could prepare for defensive duty, guarding against an attack by sea; offensive duty, training and equipping soldiers for the new mode of warfare being practiced

abroad; or internal duty, namely, to serve as labor police in American cities. The question of the military's new role in American society, first posed in the mid-1870s, remained an open one in 1890.¹

The Army's built environment reflected this institutional confusion. Some trends were evident: As troops transitioned out of frontier duty, the number of posts dropped from 255 in 1869, to ninety-six in 1892. While consolidating, the Army was also moving east; of the posts operative in the early 1890s, one-third were located east of the Mississippi.² Nonetheless, the environmental conditions confronting many among the Army's 25,000 enlisted men and officers remained poor. A prohibition against the construction of any but temporary quarters on military installations predictably resulted in the proliferation of drafty, wooden shacks on frontier posts. The arrangement and quality of Army buildings in the West was further rendered unpredictable by a lack of centralized planning; individual Commanding Officers shouldered sole responsibility for their post's construction. Those men stationed along the coasts hardly fared better, living as they did--sometimes with their families--in damp, dark casements never meant for prolonged inhabitation.

Thus in 1890 the United States Army's built environment analogized the situation of the military in American society more generally as neglected or forgotten. Officers complained of their inability to fill the meager ranks of the service with any but the most embarrassing social misfits, because of the Army man's rough living conditions and public ostracism. Yet change was on the horizon. In part in an attempt to attract better recruits, but more importantly out of military planners' recognition of the changing global balance of power, military and government

¹ Abrahamson, chapter 1, "The Turning Point," 3-18, and chapter 2, "The Debate over Missions," 19-40.

² Foner, 2

officials instituted a series of reforms. A program to build--for the first time--permanent structures on operative Army posts received Congressional authorization in 1887; a sizeable seacoast fortification project would follow one decade later. If the future of the Army was uncertain, the possibility of its earning a more substantial place in American society nevertheless existed.

In the fifty years between the close of the frontier and the end of World War II, the United States Army was transformed from a rough-and-tumble constabulary into a specialized expeditionary force. Though anti-militarism persisted in both the public imagination and the halls of Congress, the function of the military in American society seemed clear. Their institution no longer a candidate for internal police duty, Army officials looked outward, building an increasing number of overseas bases from which to project the United States' military might. At the same time, the Army had a larger stateside presence than ever. Though its overall size (200,000 officers and men in 1939) was small compared to European standing armies, during the previous half-century the United States Army had grown twice as fast as the nation's population.³ In addition, the military's center of gravity had shifted to the east and south: Just over half of the 117 World War II Army mobilization training camps were located east of the Mississippi; one out of every four was in a southeastern state.⁴ The West, historically home to the majority of the soldiers stationed within the continental United States, meanwhile was coming into its own as the locus of arms manufacturing and defense research. Thus a new geographical division of the

³ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-ww2-intro.htm>; <http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/hiscen>

⁴ Define regions, and describe how this pattern doesn't seem to have been dictated by immediate mobilization needs--compare to through-1939 data set. Data from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-ww2.htm>

nation's defense work accompanied the specialization and territorial expansion of America's twentieth-century armed forces.

"Home" for the soldier of 1945 hardly resembled the unpredictable and often roughshod quarters of his nineteenth-century predecessors. The Army bases of the mid-twentieth century were built according to standardized plans and consistent sanitary requirements. Military contractors experimented with prefabrication to speed the construction process. Embedded in the form of the new military installations, moreover, was a message about the proximity of soldiering and civilian life in the United States. A domestic architectural vocabulary was applied to even the largest barracks. More significantly, gone were the days of tiny posts dependent on the (civilian) post trader for supplies and entertainment. The men drafted into the Army of the 1940s would report to, in the words of Secretary of War Stimson, "veritable cities," built for between 10,000 and 60,000 inhabitants and containing within their boundaries "recreation buildings, theaters, service clubs, chapels, athletic areas, hospitals, bakeries, laundries and cold storage plants."⁵

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 would inaugurate another dramatic revision of the Army's mission. This unprecedented direct assault on America's military infrastructure provoked a reassessment of the nation's defensive capacity that would take material shape in the bunkers and bomb shelters of the Cold War. At the same time, by World War II certain features of the postwar military landscape were already in place. After the war ended, the twentieth-century trend of maintaining "temporary" Army structures beyond their intended life span continued. A 1985 survey, for example, showed nearly 24,000 of the 30,000

⁵ Stimson's 1941 annual report quoted on <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-ww2-intro.htm>.

structures built stateside to house World War II GIs to still be in use.⁶ Of equal significance was the formation, over the first decades of the twentieth century, of the "Military-Industrial Complex."⁷ The partnership of American industrialists with the state in the production of the instruments of war resulted in a blurring of the boundary between defense and domestic manufacturing. This identity of war work and peacetime production was manifested physically in the architecture of the new plants, as defense contractors including Ford Motor Company brought their peacetime factory designers--in this case, Albert Kahn--with them into government employ.

I will make a two-part argument. First, I will show that the years between 1890 and the United States' entry into World War II were marked by an expansion of the United States Army. This expansion, importantly, had a domestic as well as an international aspect. Over the course of five decades, the Army constructed a far-reaching network of installations within the continental United States. From construction to operation, these Army posts and factories shaped local and regional economies in significant ways. Thus, I argue, the creation and maintenance of a standing army played a crucial role in the formation of the twentieth-century American political economy.

In addition, I suggest, the very process by which the American military expanded effectively masked its growth. Stateside Army construction projects depended for their completion on the cooperation of civilian community leaders, designers, contractors, and laborers. The form of military posts and factories, moreover, both influenced and was influenced by civilian community planning and industrial architecture. The practical and formal

⁶ see <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-ww2-intro.htm>

⁷ cite Eisenhower; explain how I am pushing back date of formation

interdependence of Army installations and civilian communities camouflaged the former in the latter's plain sight. The invisibility of the military at home complements the United States' rhetorical commitment to a weak federal government. But the history of the Army's built environment, I argue, both undoes the myth of American statelessness, and positions the military at the heart of the modern American state.

Historiography

My dissertation will directly engage several existing historiographies. First is the literature on American state-building, within which two questions are of primary relevance. On the one hand is the issue of American exceptionalism, that is, the extent to which the United States' political institutions have differed from other (primarily western European) examples at various points in the nation's history. On the other hand is the problem of describing the causal relationship between the creation of a standing army, and modern state formation more generally.

With respect to the question of American exceptionalism, I, like political scientist Stephen Skowronek,⁸ understand the early American state to differ from its European counterparts most noticeably in its separation of power and distribution of functions. Skowronek's predecessor, Samuel Huntington, argues that the origin of this emphasis on the promotion of liberty, rather than on the ordering of previously unconstrained social forces, lies in the peculiar circumstances of the United States' birth. In contrast to what occurred in the United Kingdom and on the European continent, social modernization in the United States was not achieved through social revolution. Rather, American settlers rejected the authority of the British

⁸ cite Skowronek

crown in favor of the already-operational and locally-oriented colonial system of government. Because the Constitution's framers were tasked with protecting Americans from the perceived monarchical tendency towards tyranny, rather than with creating political order where there had been none before, they concentrated on the limitation of authority and division of power, rather than on the creation of authority and accumulation of power. Thus, as Skowronek points out, the American story is not one of a transition from exceptionalism (or, at the extreme, statelessness; pre-1900) to typicality, but rather of a transformation of one unique state structure into another.

The story of the twentieth-century development of the United States Army, then, illuminates the broader tension between America's decentralized, democratic polity, and the centralized state apparatuses championed by progressive reformers. Historians of the turn-of-the-century movement for Army reform, including Skowronek, have tended to emphasize the extent to which the division of power between Congress and the Executive Branch limited military modernizers' victories. Beginning from the same position regarding the difficulties inherent to raising a standing army in a democratic republic, I nevertheless will to invert the argument made by these scholars: What is remarkable, I suggest, is not that Congress and an unsympathetic public precluded further expansion and specialization of the United States' armed forces between 1890 and 1941, but that such developments occurred at all.⁹

Another issue taken up within the state-building literature is that of the role military concerns play in driving state formation. I follow Charles Tilly in understanding the quest for military supremacy to be at the very center of the state-building process. In *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*, Tilly argues that European states converged on a single

⁹Abrahamson as notable exception, though I disagree with his conclusions regarding aftermath of WWI; see, ex. Fuller dissertation for new conclusions re: the state of readiness of the US military in WWII.

structural model--that of the nation-state--only when their knitting-together on commercial as well as diplomatic and military levels increased the scale of war. Those countries able to raise and maintain standing armies won the early battles and thus set the terms of successive military conflicts. Because other states had to emulate the victors' military format in order to compete, so, too, did they replicate the politico-economic structure that made the standing army possible. If we apply this logic to the American case, remembering the importance throughout the United States' history of its diplomatic and economic ties to European states, we can begin to see why American military and government officials would even consider building a standing army in the first place. In addition, Tilly paints a convincing picture of the relationship between the standing army and a capitalist political economy. He first observes that accumulating coercive means generally requires extracting them from reluctant others; the accumulation of the instruments of war, then, constitutes a process of expropriation in direct parallel to that involved in the accumulation of capital. Moreover, European states (and the United States as well, I will show), increasingly relied upon direct purchase rather than the seizure of coercive means, thus conjoining the accumulations of coercion and capital in a relationship of dependency.

Regarding the American case more specifically, I agree with Charles Maier's description in *Among Empires* of the relationship between "hard" and "soft" power. He argues against a characterization of American empire (or hegemony) as post-territorial and based on "soft" (economic) power. Instead, he insists that concerns over physical territory are irreducible in any scenario of dominance, and that soft power cannot function without the backing of hard (military) power. Immediately following World War II, Maier writes, with the nuclear bomb in one hand and the techniques of Fordist production in the other, the United States embarked on programs of territorial and post-territorial imperialism simultaneously. And just as the United

States depends on its military supremacy to extend its social and economic influence, Maier argues, so was America's own politico-economic development dependent on its quest for military might. He goes so far as to suggest that Ford's development of the standardized-parts production process--ostensibly propelled by consumer-market forces--in fact achieved a manufacturing model inspired by the problems of machine-gun repair, and thus driven by the state.

As Maier focuses on the situation following World War II, my dissertation will form a sort of prologue to the story he tells. I will show how even before the development of its nuclear arsenal, the United States' emergence as a world power in economic terms was intimately connected to its development of a military force capable of effective international engagement. Moreover, Maier's emphasis on frontiers as the sites of (violent) political contest, and his charting of changing state structures in terms of border regimes, importantly reminds us that competitions for international dominance are ineluctably spatial as well as technological, ideological, and economic. I will locate the spatial effects of war-making within the nation's interior, thus extending Maier's argument about the territoriality of world-power contests to the United States' domestic situation.

My dissertation will also contribute to a growing body of literature on the built environment of war. This scholarship may be broken down into several categories: case studies of military bases; research on the consequences of wartime building for the design professions; and studies of the economic, social, and environmental legacies of war. Much of the writing on military installations has been on the United States' bases overseas. Whether they have an explicitly spatial focus (see Mark Gillem's *America Town*) or not (Katherine T. McCaffrey's *Military Power and Popular Protest*, for example), these works tend to frame the conflicts taking

place in and around military bases in terms of American versus indigenous, rather than military versus civilian, cultures. An important exception is Catherine Lutz's *Homefront*, a sociological investigation of Fort Bragg's relationship with the neighboring town of Fayetteville, North Carolina. Lutz makes two contributions that are particularly relevant to my own project. First, she shows how local topographies of political and economic power determined Fort Bragg's location. While Fayetteville's boosters welcomed the Army to their city, the burden of displacement during Fort Bragg's construction and subsequent expansion fell primarily on the area's rural blacks. In addition, Lutz introduces a concept she calls "civilian camouflage," by which she means that the apparently straightforward distinction between "civilian" and "military" conceals the profound economic and social impact military installations make on their surrounding communities. In Fayetteville, the soldiers use public resources, but the town loses revenue thanks to the Army's tax exemptions. Officers can prohibit the men and women under their command from patronizing particular local businesses. And the fact that some civilians (landowners) win big in the military-driven economy while others (retail workers) lose again and again is obscured by the way in which the relative wage equality within the army flattens the city's income statistics.

I will extend the kinds of questions Lutz asks about Fayetteville to a national level. After outlining the effects of military activity on a variety of places over time, I will be better equipped to draw conclusions about the relationship of American military policy to national social and economic development in the early twentieth century. Furthermore, like Lutz, I will demonstrate that the growth of the United States Army was responsible not just for the export of "America Towns," but, first, for shaping towns, cities, and entire regions within the country's own borders.

Others, primarily architectural historians, have explored the impact of wartime construction on the professions of architecture and urban planning. Most notable among these works are two collections of essays assembled for exhibitions. In *World War II and the American Dream: How Wartime Building Changed a Nation* (published in conjunction with a 1995 National Buildings Museum exhibition of the same name), Peter S. Reed shows how, for Marcel Breuer, Walter Gropius, and Frank Lloyd Wright, among others, commissions from the United States government presented opportunities to work out the the modernist aesthetic then coming into broader acceptance. At the same time, the designers' close work with industrialists prompted experimentation with prefabrication. In the same volume, Robert Friedel and Greg Hise demonstrate how wartime materials restrictions and demographic shifts transformed the construction industry and community planning practice, respectively. The same themes are revisited in the slender *1945: Creativity in Crisis, Chicago Architecture and Design*, the publication for a 2005 Art Institute of Chicago exhibition.

I, too, will attend to the involvement of individual architects and urban planners in military work, understanding them as vehicles for the transmission of "civilian" spatial concepts to military projects and vice versa. At the same time, my analysis extends beyond the extraordinary conditions of wartime construction to the involvement of designers, as well as the construction industry more generally, in peacetime preparations for war. I thus show the influence of military work on American architecture and planning to be ongoing, and use this in part to explain the difficulty in distinguishing between military and civilian spaces.

Finally, a number of American historians have assessed the tenacity of the social and economic patterns formed in the crucible of war. These may have either a positive or a negative character. Gerald Nash, for instance, argues in *World War II and the West: Reshaping the*

Economy that the World War II boom in the aircraft, shipbuilding, and metals industries permanently restructured the Western economy. Even after the magnesium plants had closed and the bomber factories reconverted, Nash shows, Western businessmen were able to use the political and social connections they had formed during the war to keep their region from reverting to colonial status with respect to the East. On the other hand, Margaret Crawford (in her essay in *World War II and the American Dream*), and Marilyn Johnson (in *The Second Gold Rush: Oakland and the East Bay in World War II*) tell similar stories about the way World War II's defense housing projects inscribed racial and class inequalities in the American landscape. During the Second World War, the East Bay's private and public planners built defense housing away from existing development, creating an isolated residential zone of what Johnson calls "shipyard ghettos." African-American workers, who had trouble gaining access to privately-financed, suburban-style war housing, were further disadvantaged after the war when Richmond cleared hundreds of acres of public housing to make way for more suburbs. Industries followed the white workers out of the cities and away from the black working class, draining urban tax bases and furthering African-Americans' dependence on public housing. Within a few years, the old newcomer-old-timer divide had been replaced by race-based spatial polarization--the direct result of, if not immediately obvious in, federal defense housing programs. Crawford shows the pattern replicated elsewhere, and in a series of five case studies further demonstrates how preexisting racial conflict (as in Detroit) combined with the federal government's tendency to take a reactive rather than a proactive stance on race problems to turn housing projects into sites of open controversy.¹⁰

¹⁰ cite Johnson shipyard ghettos quote

While Nash, Johnson, and Crawford point to continuities pre-and post-conversion, Paul Davidson (also in *World War II and the American Dream*) makes a powerful argument regarding the role of architecture in promoting an ongoing partnership between industry and the military. When the United States began mobilizing for the Second World War, he writes, military contractors quickly discovered that existing (civilian) factories were ill-suited for airplane and arms production. Thus, with money from the military, the federal government, and private corporations, contractors erected a massive new defense infrastructure. Upon the Allies' victory, the soldiers, bureaucrats, scientists, and academics who worked in these installations were confronted by the prospect of occupational homelessness. At the same time, the aircraft industry foundered on the shoals of low civilian demand. "The very existence of these massive facilities," according to Davidson, ". . . provided its own argument for continued defense production." In other words, continued defense work--justified on the grounds of a Soviet threat--as a long-term pattern offered the solution to several short-term problems, including what to do with recently-constructed defense buildings. On a similar note, Katherine McCaffrey shows how land on Vieques, Puerto Rico released by the United States Navy during World War II resisted reconversion to agricultural use. Their sugar mills previously destroyed by the Navy, islanders had little incentive to return to sugar cultivation there. By 1947, the land was back in federal hands, again designated for military use.

All of these historians point to the potential of preparations for war to induce structural change, a theme my dissertation will take up. I am also interested in the kind of economic and environmental inertia they address. Understanding the staying power of built programs, I argue, may help us uncover otherwise hidden continuities. At the same time, I suggest, the way in

which the built environment acts as a barrier to change itself helps explain the expansion of the United States military during the twentieth century.

Method

My dissertation will be structured chronologically, with each of six chapters covering between two and ten years (see below). Though I am explicitly avoiding a case-study format, certain themes are more prominent in some periods than others, and the chapters will be focused accordingly. Likewise, though I am synthesizing information about the Army's built environment over the whole of the continental United States, certain regions are more important than others at particular moments in the story.

I am taking a top-down approach to the question of the changing role of the Army in early-twentieth century America. I am interested in the institutional evolution of the United States Army, which I understand to be the consequence (sometimes unintended) of decisions made on the upper levels of the Army and government. Thus my actors are primarily those in positions of political and economic power: Congressmen, Presidents, Secretaries of War, and Chiefs of Staff, as well as community leaders, industrialists, and labor leaders. In addition, part of my interest in the Army's built environment lies in its status as a representational project--as a self-conscious attempt by government and Army officials to create a particular image of the Army, for both its soldiers and American citizens. Thus the architects and planners responsible for giving the changing vision of the Army built form are also important agents in my story.

One of the broadest claims my work makes is that space matters. During the first decades of the twentieth century, the built environment of the United States Army was, to a large extent, the stake as well as the site of the struggle to define the armed forces' national status. As Samuel

Huntington has pointed out,¹¹ legislation on military format contains a paucity of detail.

Questions about the Army's shape are consequently displaced from the courts to Congressional appropriations committees. And debates that might otherwise take place on the level of theory are transformed into battles over supply--including, prominently, the location of and provisions for military bases and factories.

But while I argue that the planning and architecture of the Army's factories and bases do reflect certain ideas about the way the United States Army should function in society, this is not to say that a particular concept of the Army's role automatically implies specific forms. Instead, I suggest, designers created new forms based not just on military needs, but also on a variety of precedents (both military and civilian, American and international), practical concerns (such as material and labor shortages), and social theory. The forms of the Army's bases and factories, therefore, had at least the capacity to create new ideas about the military in American life, even as they substantiated existing ones.

In *The Production of Space* (1974) sociologist Henri Lefebvre developed a theory of "social space," which may be understood as an extension of Marx's theory of the fetishism of commodities. That is, just as Marx showed the commodity (the principal output of the capitalist system of production) to be tied to (social) labor relations, so Lefebvre demonstrates that physical space (the principal output of the post-industrial system of production) has embedded within it the social dynamics responsible for its emergence. Thus space is neither preexisting nor absolute, but produced over time and relative.

Lefebvre explains the production of space as a dialectical relationship among the members of the following conceptual triad: *spatial practice*; *representations of space*; and

¹¹ cite Huntington on appropriations

representational space. The first concept, *spatial practice*, refers to the ways by which a society both produces physical space, and engages with already-produced physical space.

Representations of space and *representational space* have to do with how social relationships are contested in and in relationship to social space. *Representations of space* are conceptualizations of space propagated from the top down by the society's technocrats. *Representational space* is the space within which *representations* of space are passively received, but also might be appropriated or reconfigured through symbolic manipulation.

In Lefebvrian terms, my project will illuminate both the *spatial practice* responsible for the production of Army space, and the *representations of space* employed to hide it in plain sight of America's citizens. While the expansion over time of the United States Army has resulted in its increasing dependence--on a spatial as well as political, economic, and social level--upon civilian America, this new relationship, and thus the expansion behind it, remains hidden to many of the United States' citizens, exactly because the idea of a neat division between "civilian" and "military" functions, economies, and spaces, continues to be propagated by military and government leaders.

Chronology and chapter outline

Chapters one and two: Consolidation and the outward turn

From 1890 to 1917 several factors shaped the institutional trajectory of the American military. Most significantly, the Dick Act of 1903 (revised 1908) strengthened the position of the militia vis a vis the regular Army. A response to problems with recruitment and training for the 1898 Spanish-American War, the Act officially designated the Organized Militia--now to be called the National Guard--as the Army's primary reserve force. In exchange for official

recognition and federal subsidies, Guardsmen, who would still serve in units called up by individual states, submitted to federal training standards. The Dick Act precluded further expansion of the 66,000-man Army, as militia supporters argued successfully that a decentralized organization of citizen-soldiers, in contrast to a centralized, hierarchical organization of professional troops, would meet the nation's defense needs without threatening its democratic polity. In 1900 the National Guard, with 116,542 officers and enlisted men, outnumbered the Army nearly two to one.¹²

Meanwhile, the enthusiasm for expansion engendered by the Spanish-American War quickly waned. Instead, Army officers renewed their earlier interest in defending against an outside invasion. In 1906 the National Coast Defense Board recommended to Congress a total of 37 ports for fortification, including 29 within the United States.¹³ A substantial building program followed; nearly two-thirds of the fortifications were in place by 1914.¹⁴ At the same time, some military reformers advocated an expansion of the Army's educational program, in part in order to promote specialization. This trend took built form in a number of school projects, including the expansion of the United States Military at West Point (1902-1910) by architects Cram, Goodhue, and Ferguson.

With the mobilization of both Army and National Guard troops along the border following Pancho Villa's 8 March 1916 raid on Columbus, New Mexico, Army officials once again turned their attention to the problems inherent to cooperation with the militia.

¹² <http://www.ngaus.org/content.asp?bid=2488>

¹³ (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/coast.htm>)

¹⁴ (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/coastal-forts-taft.htm>)

A group of officers articulated a different vision of the citizen-soldier, to be achieved through Universal Military Training (UMT), rather than through volunteer participation in local National Guard units.¹⁵ These reformers would only increase the volume of their demands for a new system of soldiering following the First World War.

Chapters 1 and 2 will focus on the Army's consolidation and reorientation during the 1890s and early 1900s. After a brief description of the Army built environment prior to 1890, I will discuss the eastward movement of the regular Army and the establishment, paying particular attention to the political and economic dynamics influencing the siting of the new, larger posts. Then, in Chapter 2, I will turn to the construction of schools and seacoast fortifications in the early 1900s. Both programs, I suggest, signaled new ideas about the relationship of the Army to American society more generally. No longer the Jack-of-all-trades providing assistance to individual settlers in the West, the soldier of the twentieth century was to be a specialist in the arts of war, prepared to defend the nation as a whole from outside attackers.

Chapter three: The Army base as town

The United States' entry into World War I in April 1917 necessitated the rapid construction of training camps for the draftees and National Guardsmen who would join the Army regulars to form Pershing's American Expeditionary Force. Within months, thirty-two new camps--sixteen National Guard tent camps, plus sixteen National Army cantonments--had been erected, primarily in the southeast. Camp planners drew heavily on the recent experience along the Mexican border. There, Army camps had quickly earned reputations as vice magnets. President Wilson and his military chiefs feared a wholesale rejection of the selective service program unless the historical association of the military with prostitution was broken. Thus

¹⁵ (Abrahamson 115-6)

within days of the declaration of war, Wilson appointed a Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) to develop a recreation program for soldiers waiting to be sent to Europe.

The CTCA's anti-venereal disease work had a significant impact on the design of the new training camps. The commission invited a number of welfare agencies, including the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, and the American Library Association to erect recreation buildings on camp grounds. These organizations hired their own architects to design their quarters. The training camps as a whole, moreover, were laid with these civilian-run facilities at their center, often forming a kind of town square around the troops' parade grounds.

At the war's end the Army "militarized" its recreation program, ejecting the welfare workers from post grounds. But the conceptualization of the Army base as a small town--as well as some of the buildings put up by the YMCA, YWCA, and others--remained. In fact, despite a massive salvage operation following the Armistice, many of the "temporary" training camps gained permanent status. At least nineteen of the thirty-two camps built for World War I were operative in World War II.

Chapter 3 will look at the construction of training camps for the National Army and the National Guard during World War I. The Quartermaster Corps engaged civilian town planners, most notably the Olmsted Brothers, in the problem of defining the Army base as a cohesive community. I will investigate precedents considered by the Olmsted office, as well as innovations introduced at the camps--innovations at least potentially meant to influence civilian town design. I will also consider the architectural ramification of the CTCA's social hygiene work, and the ways in which architects hired by the involved welfare agencies interacted with the

military program. Finally, I will discuss the problems with contracting, labor, and materials brought on by simultaneous construction at geographically disparate sites.

Chapter four: A permanent Army?

The landmark National Defense Act of 1920 appeared as a blow to those Army officials urging an expansion of the regular Army in preparation for future war. Rather than supporting an expansible Army as the primary force to be employed in overseas operations, the Act confirmed the National Guard's position as the Army's first reserve line. At the same time, Congress authorized an increase in Army strength to 280,000 (from 200,000 at the time of passage), and charged the War Department with the responsibility of preparing mobilization plans, including provisions for industrial mobilization, on a regular basis. Indeed, military-industrial relations received a special emphasis in the immediate postwar period, particularly after the establishment, in 1924, of the Army Industrial College.¹⁶

While the National Defense Act had denied the scale of personnel increase some officers insisted was necessary, and though Congress in fact failed to provide enough funding for even the 280,000 authorized troops in its annual appropriations, the 1920s nevertheless saw movement towards a more permanent military infrastructure. In March of 1926, Congress authorized the disposal of all or part of forty-three existing military reservations, the proceeds of which were to go to a Military Post Construction Fund to promote the erection of permanent military bases. For ten years and at a cost of \$148 million, the Army's Quartermaster Corps constructed housing and other facilities according to plans prepared by civilian architects and engineers.

Chapter 4 will focus on Quartermaster General Cheatham's building program. As another case in which Army officials worked closely with civilian architects and city planners,

¹⁶ <http://www.history.army.mil/books/amh-v2/amh%20v2/chapter2.htm>

the post construction initiative demonstrated the continued relevance of civilian ideas about community to the formation of military spaces. The sheer quantity of construction also raises questions about historians' characterization of the 1920s as years of institutional stasis for the Army.

Chapter five: Army expansion under the New Deal

The Great Depression was a boon for Army construction. Immediately after the 1929 stock market crash, President Hoover urged the speeding-up of existing public works projects, including construction on Army installations. Almost immediately, the Quartermaster Corps received an additional \$2.5 million for repair and maintenance of military facilities. Under Roosevelt's New Deal, facilities construction funds allotted by Congress were supplemented by Public Works Administration monies.

While civilian construction workers labored on military posts as part of the New Deal relief efforts, the Army itself directed the Civilian Conservation Corps. Though explicitly forbidden from running members of "Roosevelt's Tree Army" through military drills, some Army officers saw CCC work as a useful exercise in mobilization.¹⁷ Given that some CCC divisions lived on Army bases, the confusion of public works supervision with an exercise in military preparedness is perhaps understandable.

[add paragraph on what happens in subsequent years--CCC placed under civilian control, but taken out of National Parks and onto military posts, to help with construction there]

Chapter 5 will complicate the conventional explanation for economic recovery following the Great Depression. Preparations for World War II, rather than the job-creation programs of the New Deal, are said to have been responsible for reversing the United States' economic

¹⁷ (cite this--all-volunteer army book)

circumstances. I will show instead that a significant number of the public works projects undertaken during the Roosevelt years *themselves* constituted preparations for war. The relationship of the Army to the CCC--the former first supervising the latter, the latter then building for the former--will be a particular focus in this chapter.

Chapter six: American industry at war

From 1939 to 1945, the Army actively prepared for war. Following Germany's September 1939 invasion of Poland, the Army Corps of Engineers (having recently taken over Army construction from the Quartermaster Corps) implemented a new series of camp designs. Explicitly modeled on the World War I training camps, the World War II camps would incorporate improvements in sanitation, lighting, and heating, while retaining a domestic flavor. The number of civilians at work building for the Army skyrocketed, from just over 5,340 in July 1940 to nearly 400,000 six months later.¹⁸

Of equal significance was the substantial construction of factories for the production of arms and aircraft. Located disproportionately in the West--home, fifty years prior, to the majority of America's military bases--these plants served to reorient America's industrial economy around the preparation for war.

Chapter 6 will first look at the base construction program of the years immediately preceding America's entry into World War II. The architecture and planning of these new Army camps reveal significant conceptual and formal continuities in base design throughout the twentieth century. This again suggests the incomplete nature of demobilization following World War I. I will also discuss the erection of factories for aircraft and arms manufacture. Albert

¹⁸ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-ww2-intro.htm>

Kahn's work for Ford will receive special attention here, as it signals the increasing difficulty in distinguishing between domestic and defense industry.

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Selected Bibliography

Archives

National Archives, Washington, D.C., and College Park, Maryland

Record Group 18. Army Air Forces

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Record Group 42. Office of Public Buildings and Grounds

Record Group 46. U.S. Senate

Record Group 69. Works Projects Administration

Record Group 77. Office of the Chief of Engineers

Record Group 92. Office of the Quartermaster General

Record Group 107. Office of the Secretary of War

Record Group 135. Public Works Administration

Record Group 165. War Department General and Special Staffs

Record Group 179. War Production Board

Record Group 212. U.S. Committee for Congested Production Areas

Record Group 218. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Record Group 225. Joint Army and Navy Boards and Committees

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New York, NY

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