The New England Colloquium in Early Modern Philosophy

What are the two types of ideas of power?  The first type is the simple idea of power.  The simple idea of power, like all simple ideas, is perfectly simple.  This means that it is a basic or minimal unit of content.  It also means that it is structurally basic; it is not composed of other ideas.  And like all simple ideas it is received in experience.  The second type of idea of power is an idea of a specific power.  These are like the idea of a magnet’s power to attract iron or the idea of a hemlock’s power to kill a human.  These ideas are complex.  Like all complex ideas they admit of diversity of content and they are composite with regard to their structure (they are composed of many simple ideas).

There are both textual and philosophical reasons for recognizing this distinction.  These reasons primarily center on the fact that the Essay has two main presentations of the idea of power (in 2.7 and in 2.21).  The ideas of power presented in these two chapters cannot be the same.  The ideas of power presented at 2.21 are clearly complex (we can differentiate between them, they are actively constructed by the mind, they contain relations).  And the idea of power presented at 2.7 is clearly simple (it is explicitly introduced as a simple idea, the machinery for generating complex ideas is not introduced until 2.12, it is passively received in sensation).

Once this distinction is established I show that it can help us to solve three problems which Locke’s account allegedly faces.  The first problem can be called the Simplicity Problem.  Michael Jacovides, Vere Chappell, and Walter Ott have suggested that perhaps Locke equivocates over whether the idea of power is simple or complex.  Once we recognize the distinction we realize Locke does not equivocate.  One type of idea of power is simple and the other is complex.

The second problem can be called the Circularity Problem.  Michael Ayers has suggested that Locke’s account of the idea of power and his account of our ideas of cause and effect will be viciously circular.  In discussing ideas of power he uses causal notions and in discussing the ideas of cause and effect he appeals to the idea of power.  Once we recognize the simple idea of power, however, this problem can be dissolved.  If Locke can ground both the idea of a causal power and the idea of causation in simple ideas received from sensation and reflection the circularity will disappear.  And the simple idea of power is one of these simple ideas, it can serve to ground both our ideas of causal powers and our ideas of causation.

The third problem can be called the Origin Problem.  Formulations of this problem for Locke can be traced back to Hume and it is, in many ways, the most philosophically interesting problem facing Locke’s account of power.  The problem claims that when we see billiard balls collide and one move away we do not perceive one billiard ball’s power to move the other.   Many have thought that Locke denies this claim when he says we receive an idea of power in sensation.  I show that, in fact, Locke fully agrees with the claim that we do not receive the idea of a billiard ball’s power to move another billiard ball in sensation.  That idea is a complex idea; it is constructed by the mind.  Locke does not have to believe that it is received in sensation; he only has to claim that when the mind constructs its ideas of billiard balls it includes the idea of a power to move other billiard balls.  Of course, Locke still must claim that a simple idea of power is received in sensation, but this is a far more defensible claim.

Thus, I hope to show that the distinction between different ideas of power in the Essay is not only motivated by the text but that it is also philosophically fruitful and helps Locke avoid serious difficulties.

Total Incorrigibility: We cannot be mistaken about any aspect of the perceptions of our mind.

Careful Incorrigibility: We cannot be mistaken about any aspect of the perceptions of our mind, so long as we are careful in our introspection.

Apperceptual Incorrigibility: Our perceptions of our perceptions as perceptions cannot be mistaken.

Qualitative Incorrigibility: We cannot be mistaken about the qualitative character of our perceptions.

I dismiss the first three interpretations for two reasons: first, because they fail to provide an adequate account of why the aspects of perceptions that they say to be incorrigible really are so, and secondly, because all three interpretations seem to be violated by Hume at some point in his philosophy. I endorse Qualitative Incorrigibility because it provides an adequate account of incorrigibility – the qualitative character of our perceptions is incorrigible because there is no appearance/reality gap, as the qualitative character of a perception just is how it appears to us. It also has much more success in addressing the types of mistakes Hume does and does not allow for with respect to perceptions. However, the ‘Palsy Passage’ (EHU 7.13) might be thought to be problematic because it seems to invoke the Incorrigibility Principle to guarantee a memory; however, I argue that given the memory is of a simple impression, Qualitative Incorrigibility can guarantee such a memory given Hume’s Copy Principle.