

David Miguel Gray

2604 20th Street
Lubbock, TX 79410-1509

Cellular: 617 365 3469
Email: dgray@post.harvard.edu

Education & Employment

Texas Tech University, Visiting Assistant Professor, August 2009 – August 2010

New College of Florida, Postdoctoral Fellow, August 2008 - August 2009

Harvard University, Ph.D. in Philosophy, September 2008

Ph.D. Thesis: *What Lies Within: Essays on Phenomenology, Psychology, and Self-Knowledge*. Advisors: Richard Moran (Chair), Susanna Siegel, Michael Martin, Alex Byrne

Harvard University, M.A. in Philosophy, June 2002

M.A. Thesis: *Slow-Switching: Knowledge of Reference and Reference Change*. Advisor: James Pryor

Columbia University, B.A. in Philosophy, minor in Linguistics, May 1997

Honors Thesis: *Events, Objects, Tropes, and Explanation*. Advisor: Achille Varzi

Short Dissertation Abstract

Some schizophrenics claim that although thoughts are occurring in their minds, they are sometimes not the ‘author’ of these thoughts. Rather, they claim, these thoughts have been inserted into their mind by someone else. In my thesis, I use recent work in cognitive psychopathology to argue that these claims are based on a special aspect of experience. I also show that these extraordinary ascriptions of thoughts, though bizarre, are *prima facie* warranted by this phenomenal aspect of experience. I use this symptom of schizophrenia to begin an exploration into the nature of introspective experience and to show what errors of self-knowledge might teach us about the causal and epistemic relations between these experiences and our thoughts about them.

Areas of Specialization

Philosophy of Mind and Psychology, Philosophy of Race and Racism

Areas of Competence

Logic, African-American Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics

Fellowships

Postdoctoral Fellowship, New College of Florida 2008-2009

Martin Dissertation Completion Fellowship, 2006-2007

Graduate Prize Fellowship, Harvard University, 1999 - 2006

Harvard Summer School Fellowship, Harvard University, 2001

Departmental Honors for Senior Thesis, Columbia University, 1997

Summer Research Opportunities Program, University of California, Berkeley, 1996

Kluge Fellowship, Columbia University, 1994

Papers

“Phenomenal Warrant and the Ascription of Belief,” Revised and Resubmitted to *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, October 2009

Presentations

“Thought Insertion: From Phenomenology to Delusions”, Oxford University, June 17th, 2009

- “Non-Phenomenal Contributions to Delusional Reports of Alien Control in Schizophrenia,” Grinnell College, February 5, 2009. New College, March 4, 2008. Harvard University, January 17, 2008
- “Racial Norms: A Reinterpretation of Du Bois’ ‘The Conservation of Races,’” Texas A&M University, January 27, 2009
- “Do Chimpanzees Have a Theory of Mind?” Beloit College, February 11, 2008
- “Cognitive Phenomenology,” Western Michigan University, December 1, 2007. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April 5, 2007
- “Deception, Self-Deception, and Responsibility,” Harvard University, May 15, 2006
- “Phenomenal Warrant and the Ascription of Belief,” City University of New York Graduate Center, February 25, 2006. Harvard University, September 25, 2006
- “Is the Observational Model of Introspection Crazy?” Harvard University, April 11, 2005
- “Thought Insertion, Self-Blindness, and Immunity to Error through Misidentification,” Mind, Brain, and Behavior Group, Harvard University, March 10, 2005
- “Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence,” Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, Harvard University, February 3, 2005
- “Rationality and Introspection,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 14, 2005
- “Keeping it in the Family: Racial Reference and Family Resemblance Criterion,” Harvard University, December 20, 2004
- “Introspection and Propositional Attitudes,” Harvard University, April 19, 2003
- “What is Introspection Good For?: Introspection, Rationality, and Cognitive Therapy,” Harvard University, December 1, 2003
- “Slow-Switching,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 15, 2002
- “Understanding Evans: Spatial and Temporal Demonstratives,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 3, 2001

Instructor (Undergraduate seminars unless noted otherwise)

- Minds, Brains, and Machines, Texas Tech University, Spring 2010
- Logic (Lecture Course), Texas Tech University, Spring 2010, Fall 2009
- Philosophy of Psychology, (Graduate Seminar), Texas Tech University, Fall 2009
- Self-Knowledge and Introspection, Texas Tech University, Fall 2009
- Philosophical Theories of Perception, New College of Florida, Spring 2009
- Philosophy of Psychology, New College of Florida, Spring 2009
- Philosophy of Race and Racism, New College of Florida, Fall 2008, Harvard University Fall 2004
- Race, Racism, and Revolution, Queens College – City University New York, Fall 2007
- Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility, Harvard University, Spring 2006
- Paradoxes and Knowledge, Harvard University, Spring 2005
- Self-Knowledge and Externalism, Harvard University, Fall 2002

Teaching Assistant (Undergraduate Discussion Sections with Grading)

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|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| Philosophy of Mind: Mental Phenomena, Harvard University, Spring 2004 | Michael Martin |
| Epistemology, Harvard University, Spring 2003 | Jonathan Vogel |

Self, Freedom, and Existence, Harvard University, Spring 2002
 Introduction to Problems in Philosophy, Harvard University, Fall 2001

Richard Moran
 James Pryor

Academic & Community Service

Reviewer, *Philosophical Psychology*, Spring 2008 – Fall 2008
 Assistant Resident Dean, Pforzheimer House, Harvard University, 2001 – 2007
 Resident Tutor of Philosophy, Pforzheimer House, Harvard University, 2000 – 2007
 Race Relations Tutor, Pforzheimer House, Harvard University, 2000 – 2007
 Reader, Harvard/MIT Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, 2000 – 2007
 Workshop Leader, Harvard Mind, Brain, Behavior Initiative Senior Thesis Workshop, Spring 2004
 Tutor, Prisoner Education Program, Suffolk County House of Corrections, 2003 – 2004
 Committee Member, Harvard Philosophy Colloquium Series, 2002 – 2003
 Founder and Coordinator, Columbia University Philosophical Society, 1995 – 1997

Courses

Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Psychology

Self-Knowledge*	Alex Byrne
Philosophy of Race*	Tommie Shelby
Problems with Perception*	Michael Martin
Psychotherapy Research*	Matthew Knock
Introspection and Phenomenality*	Susanna Siegel
Sense and Reference*	Richard Heck
Epistemic Norms*	Scott Sturgeon
Self-Knowledge and Externalism I & II (Independent Study)	James Pryor
Realism and Anti-Realism	Richard Heck
Locke and Leibniz	Edward McCann
Demonstratives	Susanna Siegel
Hume's <i>Treatise of Human Nature</i>	Alison Simmons
Frege and Russell	William Demopolous
Events*	Ned Hall
Philosophy and the Ordinary	Stanley Cavell
Deductive Logic	Warren Goldfarb
Kant's <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>	Charles Parsons

Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy

African-American Philosophy*	Tommie Shelby
Kant's Ethical Theory	Christine Korsgaard
Williams' <i>Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy</i>	Thomas Scanlon
Rawls' <i>Theory of Justice</i>	Richard Heck

References

Richard Moran, Harvard University, moran@fas.harvard.edu, 617 496 6169
 Susanna Siegel, Harvard University, ssiegel@fas.harvard.edu, 617 495 1884
 Alex Byrne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, abyrne@mit.edu, 617 258 6106
 Michael Martin, University College London, michael.martin@ucl.ac.uk, (0)20 7679 3069

* Indicates audited course

James Pryor, (Teaching Reference) New York University, jim.pryor@nyu.edu, 212 998 8864
Aron Edidin, (Teaching Reference) New College of Florida, edidin@ncf.edu, 941 487 4360

Dissertation Abstract

What Lies Within: Essays on Phenomenology, Psychology, and Self-Knowledge develops a distinctive account of cognitive phenomenology and its causal and epistemic contributions to our beliefs. It argues for an accepted, yet undefended, assumption in cognitive psychology: that there is a kind of phenomenology which determines whether or not a thought is experienced as one's own. Ignored by philosophers of mind, this feature of mental life not only provides the best possibility for a defense of non-imagistic cognitive phenomenology, but also acts as an explanation for an extraordinary feature of schizophrenic experience.

Phenomenology is traditionally thought to be an aspect of sensory experience: for example, what it is like to have a dull pain. Those who believe in *cognitive* phenomenology claim that there is also something it is like to think. One sort of cognitive phenomenology could be imagistic: for example, what it is like to imagine a red cup. Another sort could be non-imagistic: for example, what it is like to think that *p*. This second sort of phenomenology, associated with the contents of conscious mental states, is what I am interested in. This phenomenology is said to be distinctive because what it is like to think that *p* is different from what it is like to think that *q*.

In my first essay, I rebut a recently popular position: that there is a distinctive and non-imagistic cognitive phenomenology (hereafter 'cognitive phenomenology') that is part of the content of thoughts. Many philosophers suspicious of cognitive phenomenology deny that it shares characteristics with the paradigmatic cases of sensory experience. In response, I provide a method to determine whether there is cognitive phenomenology. While this method weakens the case for the existence of cognitive phenomenology associated with the content of mental states, they do allow for a different sort of cognitive phenomenology which *prima facie* warrants the ascription of introspection-based thoughts to oneself (or to others!).

In my next essay, I argue for the existence of this different sort of cognitive phenomenology by examining a positive symptom of schizophrenia known as 'thought insertion'. In cases of thought insertion, a schizophrenic reports introspectively experiencing a thought, but claims that it has been inserted into her mind by someone else. While schizophrenics are able to report the content of their thoughts, they sometimes misascribe their thoughts to others. I use recent work in cognitive psychopathology to argue that the best explanation of thought insertion is that there is a phenomenal aspect to experiencing thoughts as inserted. Furthermore, this experience *prima facie* warrants ascriptions of these thoughts to someone else. My explanation of thought insertion is unique because it reveals that there is also a phenomenology to experiencing thoughts as one's own. Likewise, this phenomenal aspect of experience provides *prima facie* warrant for our beliefs that our thoughts are our own.

My third essay defends and supplements the model of schizophrenia put forward in my second essay. While this model is not sufficient to explain fully the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, it is adequate to account for abnormal experiences. I argue that if we supplement this model with an account of the inferences schizophrenics make (both rational and irrational), we can explain how abnormal experiences result in reports of schizophrenic experience. My purpose in explaining these failures of self-knowledge is to uncover unacknowledged aspects of mental states and our relationships with them, which, in turn, offer new insights into the study of the mind.

Future Research

Distinctive Cognitive Phenomenology. In this work in progress, I explore difficulties for how accounts of non-imagistic cognitive phenomenology (e.g. what it is like to think that p , where p does not involve imagery) distinguish phenomenal episodes. This project is problematized by two factors: (1) the view that phenomenology wholly constitutes mental contents and (2) the possibility that mental contents are only wide (i.e. that strong externalism about mental contents is true). If this is so, then there can be cases where thoughts have different phenomenology and yet these differences are unbeknownst to the one experiencing the thoughts. I provide an account of how to distinguish episodes of cognitive phenomenology regardless of one's view concerning the locality of mental content.

Racial Norms: A Reinterpretation of Du Bois' 'The Conservation of Races'. In this work in progress, I argue that standard explanations of Du Bois' theory of race inappropriately characterize his view. Instead of analyzing his theory of race as solely attempting to provide a metaphysical criteria for what counts as a race, I propose that we should understand his theory as an attempt to characterize what races are in terms of what they should strive to accomplish. If his theory is best interpreted as providing procedural norms for being a race, then previous methods of evaluation are inadequate as well.

Races: Natural Artifacts? In this work in progress, I discuss how different racial theories—which give race a positive ontological status—have the choice of construing it as either a natural kind or as a kind of artifact. The former approach is now highly unpopular forcing a commitment to the latter construal. I claim that races are importantly dissimilar to both natural kinds and kinds of artifacts. I develop a hybrid category called 'natural artifacts' which more accurately captures what we take races to be.

Issues in Modeling Passivity Symptoms of Schizophrenia. There have been major advances in our understanding of the passivity symptoms of schizophrenia (i.e. thought insertion, alien control, and auditory verbal hallucinations) over the past 15 years. This understanding has manifested itself in improved models of the disorder. However, most models still have difficulty in explaining the particular nature of the deficits in self-monitoring that are central to explaining passivity symptoms. In this work in progress, I address many of the difficulties with providing such an explanation and set forth a new model to account for passivity symptoms. I also explain why such models can only provide a partial explanation of passivity symptoms and must be supplemented by an account of inferential failures prevalent among delusional schizophrenics.

Self-Knowledge, Rationality, and Introspection. The next part of my research program, on the special authority we have over our own mental content, finds itself in a well-defined discussion and an ill-defined debate. All agree that an account of self-knowledge must be given, but there is little agreement on just what an account of self-knowledge should explain. Current accounts fall into two general categories: introspectionist and rationalist. Introspectionist accounts have used perceptual models to explain the epistemic authority we enjoy over our mental states by means of a comparison with the epistemic authority that perception provides us with. In contrast, rationalist accounts of self-knowledge have argued that the epistemic authority we enjoy over our mental states stems from the role of introspection in critical deliberation or belief revision. I will develop two critiques of the rational account. First, many of the descriptions of rational processes which claim that self-knowledge is essential to them can be explained in ways in which it is not. Second, whereas perceptual models give a positive account of self-knowledge in virtue of the mechanisms involved in introspection, rational accounts are silent on this issue. Perceptual accounts face a number of well-known problems; however, I believe that we may give a non-perceptual introspectionist account of self-knowledge.