Colloquia, Conferences, & Workshops
2011-2012 |
The schedule of colloquia for the 2011-2012 academic year is now available.
All talks take place in Emerson 305, at 4 PM, and are free and open to the public, unless otherwise noted.
The
schedule is subject to change, so please check back often. |
|
September 2011 |
| 1 September 2011 |
Making the Best of Plato's Protagoras |
Matthew Evans
University of Michigan |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 305
4 PM |
| 10 September 2011 |
The Limits of Perception: Another Look at Theaetetus 184-186
Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop |
Mary-Louise Gill
Brown University |
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
11 AM-1 PM
|
| 15 September 2011 |
Responsibilities, Rights & Group Agents
Philosophy & Law Speaker Series |
Philip Pettit
Princeton University |
Co-sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Harvard Law School
Location: Harvard Law School, Pound Hall 335
4 PM
|
| 16 & 17 September 2011 |
Philosophical Progress: A Conference |
John Bengson
University of Wisconsin, Madison/ANU
Nancy Bauer
Tufts University
David Chalmers
ANU/NYU
Richard Feldman
University of Rochester
Richard Foley
NYU
Benj Hellie
University of Toronto
Rae Langton
MIT
Peter Ludlow
Northwestern University
Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto
Robert Pasnau
University of Colorado, Boulder
Philip Pettit
Princeton University
Carlin Romano
Ursinus College/Chronicle of Higer Education
Jason Stanley
Rutgers University
Jessica Wilson
University of Toronto |
| Location: Thompson Roon, Barker Center |
Can there be progress in philosophy? It is often said that philosophical problems are perennials for which it is pointless to expect a solution. On the other hand, professional philosophy seems to have organized itself, perhaps unconsciously, around the opposite view: how else to explain the panoply of conferences, graduate programs, journals, websites etc? Who is right? What might philosophical progress be? Is it rational to think that there is (has been, will be) any? The Harvard-ANU symposium on the progress of philosophy provides a forum for the discussion of these often neglected but all important questions.
This conference is free and open to the public. |
| 18 September 2011 |
Social Vision
MBB Junior Symposium |
Lisa Feldman Barrett
Northeastern University
Keith Payne
UNC, Chapel hill
Brian Scholl
Yale University |
Location: William James Hall 1
Time: 10 AM - 4:30 PM
Please note that this event is not open to the public. |
| 21 September 2011 |
The Realm of the Infinite
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
|
Hugh Woodin
University of California, Berkeley |
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM |
| 23 September 2011 |
Finite Subjects in the Ethics: Spinoza’s Conception of the Human Mind and its Consequences for His Rationalism
Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop |
Ursula Renz
Alpen-Adria Universität
Klagenfurt, Austria |
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
4-6 PM
|
| Back to top |
October 2011 |
| 5 October 2011 |
Is the Continuum Hypothesis a definite mathematical problem?
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project |
Solomon Feferman
Stanford University
|
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM |
| 19 October 2011 |
The Set-theoretic Multiverse
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project |
Joel Hamkins
City University of New York |
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM |
Abstract: In this talk, I will discuss the multiverse perspective on determinateness in set theory. The multiverse view in set theory is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I shall argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for. |
| 20 October 2011 |
Solidarity and Publicity |
A. J. Julius
UCLA |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 305
4 PM |
| 27 October 2011 |
Theoretical Terms without Stipulative Truths |
Michael Strevens
NYU |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 305
4 PM |
Abstract: When new theoretical terms are introduced into scientific discourse, prevailing accounts imply, stipulative truths come along with them, either as parts of definitions or as reference-fixing descriptions. But there appear to be few or no stipulative truths in scientific theory, suggesting that the prevailing accounts are mistaken. This paper looks to work on the psychology of natural kind concepts to suggest a new account of the introduction of theoretical terms that avoids both definition and reference-fixing description. |
| Back to top |
November 2011 |
| 2 November 2011 |
Evidence & the Hierarchy of Mathematical Theories
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project |
Charles Parsons
Harvard University
|
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM |
| 3 November 2011 |
A Priori Testimony Revisited |
Anna-Sara Malmgren
Stanford University |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 305
4 PM |
| 9 November 2011 |
Unjust Enrichment
Philosophy & Law Speaker Series |
Ernest Weinrib
University of Toronto |
Co-sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Harvard Law School
Location: Emerson 305
4 PM |
| 16 November 2011 |
In Defense of the Ideal
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project |
William Tait
University of Chicago |
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM |
| 17 November 2011 |
Spinoza's Deification of Existence
Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop |
Yitzhak Melamed
Johns Hopkins University |
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
4-6 PM |
| Back to top |
December 2011 |
3 & 4 December 2011
|
Current Work in Philosophy of Language |
Sharon Berry
Harvard University
Herman Capellen
Arché Institute/University of Oslo
Gennaro Chierchia
Harvard University
Maite Ezcurdia
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Eli Hirsch
Brandeis University
David Liebesman
Boston University
Bernhard Nickel
Harvard University
Mark Richard
Harvard University
Brett Sherman
Brandeis University
Rachel Sterken
Arché Institute/University of Oslo |
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
|
| 7 December 2011 |
Objectivity in Mathematics - CANCELED
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project |
Penelope Maddy
University of California, Irvine |
| UPDATE: This talk has been canceled. |
| 10 December 2011 |
Causation, Explanation, and Value in Plato’s Phaedo |
Devin Henry
University of Western Ontario
Ravi Sharma
Clark University
Byron Stoyles
Trent University |
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
Time: 1-4:30 PM |
| Back to top |
February 2012 |
| 9 February 2012 |
Intending to Aid |
Gideon Yaffe
USC |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 305
4 PM
A copy of the paper may be viewed by clicking on the link of this Colloquium title. |
| 15 February 2012 |
Global Reflection Principles
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project |
Philip Welch
University of Bristol |
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM |
| 23 February 2012 |
How Empirical Facts about Attention Transform Traditional Philosophical Debates about the Nature of Perception
William James Lectures |
Ned Block
NYU |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 305
Time: 4-6 PM
|
| 24 February 2012 |
Kant's Realism and Fictionalism about Things in Themselves
Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop |
Anja Jauernig
University of Pittsburgh |
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
4-6 PM |
| 29 February 2012 |
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness: Workshop 8 -- CANCELED |
Stevo Todorcevic
University of Toronto |
| UPDATE: This talk has been canceled. |
| Back to top |
March 2012 |
| 1 March 2012 |
Rich Perception, Sparse Cognition
William James Lectures |
Ned Block
NYU |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 210 -- Please note the new room location.
Time: 4-6 PM |
| 7 March 2012 |
Beyond the Standard Picture
Philosophy & Law Speaker Series |
Mark Greenberg
UCLA |
Co-sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Harvard Law School
Location: Emerson 305
4 PM |
| Abstract: In this paper, I sketch what I will call a theory of law. It is uncontroversial that the facts about what the content of the law is in a given jurisdiction - i.e., the facts about the legal obligations, powers, privileges, and so on - are not among the ultimate facts of the universe. Rather, we can explain why those facts obtain in terms of more basic facts. A theory of law is such a constitutive explanation of the content of the law. I have elsewhere articulated and criticized a vague picture of law - I hesitate to call it a theory - that is widely implicitly assumed though rarely defended. According to this Standard Picture, the content of the law is simply the linguistic content of authoritative legal pronouncements. My project in this paper is to offer a theory of law that rejects the Standard Picture. Legal institutions take various kinds of actions, such as voting on bills and deciding cases, that change our moral obligations, powers, and so on - our moral profile. My theory holds, very roughly, that the resulting moral obligations are legal obligations. I give many examples of ways in which legal institutions change the relevant circumstances, thereby changing the moral profile. For example, by protecting people from violence and punishing wrongdoers, a legal system can make it morally impermissible for people to use violence except in a very narrow range of circumstances. Differently, by making a particular solution to a coordination problem salient, a legislature can make that solution obligatory. According to my theory, it is *not* that a legal authority, such as a legislature or court, pronounces a norm, which thereby becomes a valid legal norm, and then that legal norm, because of moral reasons for obeying the law, gives rise to a moral obligation. The direction of explanation is the other way around: the legislature votes or the court decides a case, thus altering the relevant circumstances in a way that changes the moral profile. The resulting part of the moral profile constitutes the content of the law. |
| 8 March 2012 |
Unconscious vs. Preconscious
William James Lectures |
Ned Block
NYU |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 210 -- Please note the new room location.
Time: 4-6 PM |
| 20 March 2012 |
Is Conscious Perception More Fine Grained than Attention and Perceptual Belief?
William James Lectures |
Ned Block
NYU |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 210 -- Please note the new room location.
Time: 4-6 PM |
| 21 March 2012 |
Some Challenges for the Philosophy of Set Theory
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project |
James Cummings
Carnegie Mellon University |
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM |
| 23 March 2012 |
Bayle and the Thinking Cadavers
Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop |
Jean-Luc Solère
Boston College |
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
4-6 PM |
| 28 March 2012 |
The Triple Helix
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project |
John Steel
University of California, Berkeley |
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM |
| Back to top |
April 2012 |
| 3 April 2012 |
Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World |
Philippe Van Parijs
Université Catholique de Louvain |
Co-sponsored by the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, the Center for European Studies, and the Department of Philosophy
Location: Lobby, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation
124 Mt. Auburn Street, Suite 200-North
Time: 5:30-7 PM |
| 4 April 2012 |
Completeness or Incompleteness of Basic Mathematical Concepts
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project |
Tony Martin
UCLA |
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM |
| 5 April 2012 |
POSTPONED
Philosophy & Law Speaker Series |
Sophia Moreau
University of Toronto |
Co-sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Harvard Law School
UPDATE: This talk has been postponed until Fall 2012 |
| 12 April 2012 |
Rousseau and the 'Sick' Society |
Frederick Neuhouser
Barnard College, Columbia University |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 305
4 PM |
| 14 April 2012 |
Knowledge, Stability and Virtue in the Meno [Perin]
Understanding the Amphiboly: Kant’s Critique of Leibniz [Look]
Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop |
Casey Perin
UC, Irvine
Brandon Look
University of Kentucky |
Location:Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
Time: Perin's talk will be from 10 AM-11:30 AM; Look's will be from 11:45 AM-1:15 PM |
| 18 April 2012 |
Some Set Theories Are More Equal
Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project |
Menachem Magidor
Hebrew University |
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM |
| 19 April 2012 |
Remoralizing Weakness of Will |
Agnes Callard
University of Chicago |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 305
4 PM |
| 20 April 2012 |
Killing and Not Preventing Death
Harvard Review of Philosophy Lecture |
Judith Jarvis Thomson
MIT |
For information, please contact Adam Kern (abkern@college.harvard.edu).
Location: Emerson 210
4 PM |
| Abstract: Many people think that if a person, say Alfred, must choose between (i) killing one, in which case he thereby prevents the deaths of five, and (ii) not killing the one, in which case he does not prevent the deaths of the five, which therefore occur, then other things being equal, Alfred ought to choose (ii). Most Consequentialists disagree. The question who is right has generated a large literature, and not surprisingly, since it is both hard to answer and central to moral theory. I will suggest a reason why the question has proved so hard to answer, and then suggest a reason why other things being equal, Alfred ought to choose (ii). |
| 26 & 27 April 2012 |
The Relationship of Experience to Judgment
Whitehead Lectures |
Anil Gupta
University of Pittsburgh |
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy
Location: Emerson 210
4 PM |
| Back to top |
May 2012 |
| 4 May 2012 |
Symposium: "Ethics for Enemies: Terror, Torture, and War" |
| Complete details are available at the link above, with the exception of the location -- see below. |
Location: Wasserstein Hall 1585 Massachusetts Avenue, Millstein West A/B -- please note that this is the correct location, not the one listed in the link to the symposium above. |
| 18-20 May 2012 |
New England Colloquium in Early Modern Philosophy |
| Complete details are available at the title link above. |
| Location: Thompson Room, Barker Center, 12 Quincy Street |
| Back to top |
September 2012 |
| 15 September 2012 |
Workshop on Belief |
Maria Aarnio
University of Michigan
Jane Friedman
Oxford/NYU
Lisa Bortolotti
University of
Birmingham |
Commentators:
Declan Smithies (The Ohio State University)
Richard Holton (MIT)
Sarah Paul (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
Chairs:
Anna-Sara Malmgren (Stanford University) |
| Location: CGIS Knafel N-354, 1737 Cambridge Street |
| Back to top |
