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Colloquia, Conferences, & Workshops
2011-2012

The schedule of colloquia for the 2011-2012 academic year is now available.

All talks take place in Emerson 305, at 4 PM, and are free and open to the public, unless otherwise noted.

The schedule is subject to change, so please check back often.

September 2011 | October 2011 | November 2011| December 2011
February 2012 | March 2012 | April 2012 | May 2012
September 2012

September 2011

1 September 2011 Making the Best of Plato's Protagoras
Matthew Evans
University of Michigan
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Emerson 305
4 PM
10 September 2011 The Limits of Perception: Another Look at Theaetetus 184-186

Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop
Mary-Louise Gill
Brown University
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
11 AM-1 PM
15 September 2011 Responsibilities, Rights & Group Agents

Philosophy & Law Speaker Series
Philip Pettit
Princeton University
Co-sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Harvard Law School

Location: Harvard Law School, Pound Hall 335
4 PM
16 & 17 September 2011 Philosophical Progress: A Conference
John Bengson
University of Wisconsin, Madison/ANU

Nancy Bauer
Tufts University

David Chalmers
ANU/NYU

Richard Feldman
University of Rochester

Richard Foley
NYU

Benj Hellie
University of Toronto

Rae Langton
MIT

Peter Ludlow
Northwestern University

Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto

Robert Pasnau
University of Colorado, Boulder

Philip Pettit
Princeton University

Carlin Romano
Ursinus College/Chronicle of Higer Education

Jason Stanley
Rutgers University

Jessica Wilson
University of Toronto
Location: Thompson Roon, Barker Center
Can there be progress in philosophy? It is often said that philosophical problems are perennials for which it is pointless to expect a solution. On the other hand, professional philosophy seems to have organized itself, perhaps unconsciously, around the opposite view: how else to explain the panoply of conferences, graduate programs, journals, websites etc?  Who is right? What might philosophical progress be? Is it rational to think that there is (has been, will be) any?  The Harvard-ANU symposium on the progress of philosophy provides a forum for the discussion of these often neglected but all important questions.

This conference is free and open to the public.
18 September 2011 Social Vision

MBB Junior Symposium
Lisa Feldman Barrett
Northeastern University

Keith Payne
UNC, Chapel hill

Brian Scholl
Yale University
Location: William James Hall 1
Time: 10 AM - 4:30 PM

Please note that this event is not open to the public.
21 September 2011 The Realm of the Infinite

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
Hugh Woodin
University of California, Berkeley
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM
23 September 2011 Finite Subjects in the Ethics:  Spinoza’s Conception of the Human Mind and its Consequences for His Rationalism

Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop
Ursula Renz
Alpen-Adria Universität
Klagenfurt, Austria
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
4-6 PM
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October 2011

5 October 2011 Is the Continuum Hypothesis a definite mathematical problem?

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
Solomon Feferman
Stanford University
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM
19 October 2011 The Set-theoretic Multiverse

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
Joel Hamkins
City University of New York
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM

Abstract: In this talk, I will discuss the multiverse perspective on determinateness in set theory. The multiverse view in set theory is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I shall argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.

20 October 2011 Solidarity and Publicity
A. J. Julius
UCLA
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Emerson 305
4 PM
27 October 2011 Theoretical Terms without Stipulative Truths
Michael Strevens
NYU
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Emerson 305
4 PM

Abstract: When new theoretical terms are introduced into scientific discourse, prevailing accounts imply, stipulative truths come along with them, either as parts of definitions or as reference-fixing descriptions. But there appear to be few or no stipulative truths in scientific theory, suggesting that the prevailing accounts are mistaken. This paper looks to work on the psychology of natural kind concepts to suggest a new account of the introduction of theoretical terms that avoids both definition and reference-fixing description.

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November 2011

2 November 2011 Evidence & the Hierarchy of Mathematical Theories

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
Charles Parsons
Harvard University
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM
3 November 2011 A Priori Testimony Revisited
Anna-Sara Malmgren
Stanford University
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Emerson 305
4 PM
9 November 2011 Unjust Enrichment

Philosophy & Law Speaker Series
Ernest Weinrib
University of Toronto
Co-sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Harvard Law School

Location: Emerson 305
4 PM
16 November 2011 In Defense of the Ideal

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
William Tait
University of Chicago
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM
17 November 2011 Spinoza's Deification of Existence

Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop
Yitzhak Melamed
Johns Hopkins University
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
4-6 PM
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December 2011

3 & 4 December 2011
Current Work in Philosophy of Language
Sharon Berry
Harvard University

Herman Capellen
Arché Institute/University of Oslo

Gennaro Chierchia
Harvard University

Maite Ezcurdia
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Eli Hirsch
Brandeis University

David Liebesman
Boston University

Bernhard Nickel
Harvard University

Mark Richard
Harvard University

Brett Sherman
Brandeis University

Rachel Sterken
Arché Institute/University of Oslo
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
7 December 2011 Objectivity in Mathematics - CANCELED

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
Penelope Maddy
University of California, Irvine
UPDATE: This talk has been canceled.
10 December 2011 Causation, Explanation, and Value in Plato’s Phaedo
Devin Henry
University of Western Ontario

Ravi Sharma
Clark University

Byron Stoyles
Trent University
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
Time: 1-4:30 PM
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February 2012

9 February 2012 Intending to Aid
Gideon Yaffe
USC
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Emerson 305
4 PM

A copy of the paper may be viewed by clicking on the link of this Colloquium title.
15 February 2012 Global Reflection Principles

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
Philip Welch
University of Bristol
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM
23 February 2012 How Empirical Facts about Attention Transform Traditional Philosophical Debates about the Nature of Perception

William James Lectures
Ned Block
NYU
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Emerson 305
Time: 4-6 PM
24 February 2012 Kant's Realism and Fictionalism about Things in Themselves

Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop
Anja Jauernig
University of Pittsburgh
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
4-6 PM
29 February 2012 Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness: Workshop 8 -- CANCELED
Stevo Todorcevic
University of Toronto
UPDATE: This talk has been canceled.
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March 2012

1 March 2012 Rich Perception, Sparse Cognition

William James Lectures
Ned Block
NYU
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Emerson 210 -- Please note the new room location.
Time: 4-6 PM
7 March 2012 Beyond the Standard Picture

Philosophy & Law Speaker Series
Mark Greenberg
UCLA
Co-sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Harvard Law School

Location: Emerson 305
4 PM
Abstract: In this paper, I sketch what I will call a theory of law.  It is uncontroversial that the facts about what the content of the law is in a given jurisdiction - i.e., the facts about the legal obligations, powers, privileges, and so on - are not among the ultimate facts of the universe.  Rather, we can explain why those facts obtain in terms of more basic facts. A theory of law is such a constitutive explanation of the content of the law.  I have elsewhere articulated and criticized a vague picture of law - I hesitate to call it a theory - that is widely implicitly assumed though rarely defended.  According to this Standard Picture, the content of the law is simply the linguistic content of authoritative legal pronouncements.  My project in this paper is to offer a theory of law that rejects the Standard Picture.  Legal institutions take various kinds of actions, such as voting on bills and deciding cases, that change our moral obligations, powers, and so on - our moral profile.  My theory holds, very roughly, that the resulting moral obligations are legal obligations.  I give many examples of ways in which legal institutions change the relevant circumstances, thereby changing the moral profile.  For example, by protecting people from violence and punishing wrongdoers, a legal system can make it morally impermissible for people to use violence except in a very narrow range of circumstances.  Differently, by making a particular solution to a coordination problem salient, a legislature can make that solution obligatory.  According to my theory, it is *not* that a legal authority, such as a legislature or court, pronounces a norm, which thereby becomes a valid legal norm, and then that legal norm, because of moral reasons for obeying the law, gives rise to a moral obligation.  The direction of explanation is the other way around: the legislature votes or the court decides a case, thus altering the relevant circumstances in a way that changes the moral profile.  The resulting part of the moral profile constitutes the content of the law.
8 March 2012 Unconscious vs. Preconscious

William James Lectures
Ned Block
NYU
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Emerson 210 -- Please note the new room location.
Time: 4-6 PM
20 March 2012 Is Conscious Perception More Fine Grained than Attention and Perceptual Belief?

William James Lectures
Ned Block
NYU
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location: Emerson 210 -- Please note the new room location.
Time: 4-6 PM
21 March 2012 Some Challenges for the Philosophy of Set Theory

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
James Cummings
Carnegie Mellon University
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM
23 March 2012 Bayle and the Thinking Cadavers

Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop
Jean-Luc Solère
Boston College
Location: Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
4-6 PM
28 March 2012 The Triple Helix

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
John Steel
University of California, Berkeley
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM
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April 2012

3 April 2012 Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World
Philippe Van Parijs
Université Catholique de Louvain
Co-sponsored by the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, the Center for European Studies, and the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Lobby, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation
124 Mt. Auburn Street, Suite 200-North
Time: 5:30-7 PM
4 April 2012 Completeness or Incompleteness of Basic Mathematical Concepts

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
Tony Martin
UCLA
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM
5 April 2012 POSTPONED

Philosophy & Law Speaker Series
Sophia Moreau
University of Toronto
Co-sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Harvard Law School

UPDATE: This talk has been postponed until Fall 2012
12 April 2012 Rousseau and the 'Sick' Society
Frederick Neuhouser
Barnard College, Columbia University
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Emerson 305
4 PM
14 April 2012 Knowledge, Stability and Virtue in the Meno [Perin]

Understanding the Amphiboly:  Kant’s Critique of Leibniz [Look]  


Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop
Casey Perin
UC, Irvine

Brandon Look
University of Kentucky
Location:Emerson 310 (Tanner Room)
Time: Perin's talk will be from 10 AM-11:30 AM; Look's will be from 11:45 AM-1:15 PM
18 April 2012 Some Set Theories Are More Equal

Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness Project
Menachem Magidor
Hebrew University
Location: Fong Auditorium, Boylston Hall 110
Time: 4-5:30 PM
19 April 2012 Remoralizing Weakness of Will
Agnes Callard
University of Chicago
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location:
Emerson 305
4 PM
20 April 2012 Killing and Not Preventing Death

Harvard Review of Philosophy Lecture
Judith Jarvis Thomson
MIT
For information, please contact Adam Kern (abkern@college.harvard.edu).

Location:
Emerson 210
4 PM
Abstract: Many people think that if a person, say Alfred, must choose between (i) killing one, in which case he thereby prevents the deaths of five, and (ii) not killing the one, in which case he does not prevent the deaths of the five, which therefore occur, then other things being equal, Alfred ought to choose (ii).  Most Consequentialists disagree.  The question who is right has generated a large literature, and not surprisingly, since it is both hard to answer and central to moral theory.  I will suggest a reason why the question has proved so hard to answer, and then suggest a reason why other things being equal, Alfred ought to choose (ii).
26 & 27 April 2012 The Relationship of Experience to Judgment

Whitehead Lectures
Anil Gupta
University of Pittsburgh
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy

Location
: Emerson 210
4 PM
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May 2012

4 May 2012 Symposium: "Ethics for Enemies: Terror, Torture, and War"
Complete details are available at the link above, with the exception of the location -- see below.

Location: Wasserstein Hall 1585 Massachusetts Avenue, Millstein West A/B -- please note that this is the correct location, not the one listed in the link to the symposium above.

18-20 May 2012 New England Colloquium in Early Modern Philosophy
Complete details are available at the title link above.
Location: Thompson Room, Barker Center, 12 Quincy Street
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September 2012

15 September 2012 Workshop on Belief
Maria Aarnio
University of Michigan

Jane Friedman
Oxford/NYU

Lisa Bortolotti
University of Birmingham
Commentators:

Declan Smithies (The Ohio State University)
Richard Holton (MIT)
Sarah Paul (University of Wisconsin, Madison)

Chairs:

Anna-Sara Malmgren (Stanford University)
Location: CGIS Knafel N-354, 1737 Cambridge Street
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