Iranian Oral History Project | Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Mozaffar Firouz
Minister of Labor and Propaganda
Transcript 2 of 2
Edited Translation of Persian Transcript
Narrator: Mozaffar Firouz
Date: December 6, 1981
Place: Paris, France
Interviewer: Habib Ladjevardi
Suggested citation format page
He spoke Persian almost ... very well. And I said, "I have business in Tehran, unfortunately, which forces me to go back much sooner than I expected. My own plane is coming here in two days, but at present I have no plane and I've understood that there's an Intourist plane in the aerodrome. Would you please give instructions that they lease it to me immediately. I am leaving for Tehran at three o'clock this afternoon." He said, "What, what, will you leave for Tehran?" I said, "Yes." "But why?" I said, "What are these people you've brought in this country, and do you think we're going to listen to all this nonsense? Who the hell do they think they're talking about? And to whom are they talking?" I said, "I will show what should be done. I'll show them what should be done when I get back. Please, I want from you -- I want a plane."
"Oh no, no, no," he said, "they must sign what you order. They must sign what you said, that the agreement was that, wasn't it?" I said, "I don't know. I've given the signature. I'm not waiting for anything. I want a plane. I don't want any signature. I want a plane." He left.
After half an hour, Pishevari telephoned me. "But there must be some misunderstanding somewhere. There must be some misunderstanding. We have done nothing ... that should upset you or to be against what you say. Will you permit us to come around immediately to see what it's all about?" Well, they were back within half an hour. And the papers were all signed. This incident....
Q. This is in June '46?
A. Yes, in 1946. But this incident occurred in Tabriz, you see, in Tabriz -- when I decided to leave immediately. And when we signed, I said to Pishevari, I said, "The radio of Tabriz from eight o'clock tonight must be put in my disposition. And tell them every hour that they speak, they say I have something important at eight o'clock." They said, "All right." At eight o'clock I went on the radio Tabriz. (Excuse me, I'll put this here for a moment. Yes. This was the....) The next day, after it had been signed, I gave a luncheon for them. This was the luncheon the next day, you see, I'm speaking to them.
Q. Mr. Firouz has shown me a booklet which is entitled <Persian> "Iran on the Road Toward Democratic Reform Under the Leadership of His Excellency Mr. Qavam-os-Saltaneh," printed in June 1946 by the Propaganda Organization of Iran.
A. This was all the reforms, all the decrees, which we did at that time, you see. It's the High Council of Elections, everything....
Q. And your speech is in there?
A. This speech concerning Azarbaijan, yes, is there. Which I'll show you because it's interesting -- from Tabriz....
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(Translation of speech read in Persian)
Countrymen! Tonight, from the city of Tabriz, i.e., the cradle of Iran and the center of the great liberation movements, I speak to you, dear countrymen. As you know, the negligence and bad policies of past governments, the repeated treason of the imposed representatives of the Majles, ignoring the execution of the constitutional laws, and violating the basic rights of the people, had induced a group of oppressed and high-minded offspring of Iran to rise up for the defense of freedom, and consequently brought about the recent developments in Azarbaijan. No need to mention that the actions of reactionary elements nearly transformed the pure soil of Iran into a battleground for civil war and bloodshed, more than ever plunging this country and its oppressed inhabitants into misfortune and misery.
In the very crucial moments during which, because of the negligence and lack of interest of government officials, desperation and hopelessness had prevailed throughout the country, public opinion shifted towards the old and able statesman of of Iran, His Excellency Mr. Qavam-os-Saltaneh. And a consequence of that public opinion was that, despite the intrigues of reactionary elements, the reins of state of Iran have been placed in the experienced hands of this patriotic man. Immediately upon Qavam-os-Saltaneh's assuming the premiership, the apprehensions concerning civil war and fratricide disappeared, and gradually anxiety has been replaced by hope.
And repeated victories in foreign and domestic policies, as well as international prestige, have made Mr. Qavam-os-Saltaneh's name famous throughout the world. And this aged man has been recognized as a symbol of Iran and of honor in domestic as well as foreign opinion. As a result of these developments, repeated victories, and reforms, Mr. Qavam-os-Saltaneh became the leader of all freedom-seeking Iranians.
After the majority of the internal and external problems had been resolved, the only one which remained was the problem of Azarbaijan. Following negotiations with the representatives of Azarbaijan in Tehran, the head of state (the prime minister) dispatched me, together with a committee, to Azarbaijan to continue negotiations with those representatives, under his grand instructions, until the problems between us are resolved and settled in the interests of freedom and national unity.
Dear audiences, you well know that the problem of Azarbaijan was, for various reactionary elements, a means of constantly intriguing and poisoning public opinion in order to engender fear and anxiety. Unfortunately, these reactionary and treacherous elements were not content with internal poisoning, and intended to internationalize the problem of Azarbaijan in order to invite foreigners to interfere in our internal affairs, despite the principle of the sovereignty of Iran.
The astute policy and strong will of the head of state, as well as the good intentions and patriotism of the representatives of Azarbaijan, in particular Mr. Pishevari (we had to admire him there), by solving this problem in the interests of freedom and national unity, turned into despair the last hope of the reactionary elements who were determined to exploit and distort the issue of Azarbaijan in order to invite foreigners to interfere and deal a blow to the independence of Iran. At this moment, one should not ignore the fact that those who had favored fratricide, and who until yesterday had been, through reactionary propaganda, pointing to the use of force as the sole means of solving the problem of Azarbaijan, have today been disgraced before public opinion and the nation of Iran. And it has been proved with certainty that good intentions and adopting good policies are the best means of solving problems and removing difficulties.
As the contents of the agreement indicate, the principle of autonomy and national government in Azarbaijan has been transformed into provincial and city councils, the appointment of a governor-general for the provinces, and determining directors for the government offices there. His Excellency Mr. Qavam-os-Saltaneh's prudent and compromising policies, which produced such outstanding results, have been totally approved by the nation of Iran.
Finally, as the result of repeated negotiations during these recent days, an agreement has been signed and exchanged with the representatives of Azarbaijan at half past 7 o'clock tonight. And this important problem has been, with the utmost sincerity and honesty, solved in the interests of Iran and her national unity. The nation of Iran has always been proud of her magnanimous and daring Azarbaijani individuals, and tonight from Tabriz, i.e. the seat of freedom-loving Iranians, I inform you, dear countrymen, of this grand and important news.
Now, in the aftermath of the solution to this problem, one should know that tomorrow there will be no reason for disunity among freedom-loving Iranians, and the reactionary elements must also know that the government of His Excellency Mr. Qavam-os-Saltaneh, relying on the glorious and united force of freedom-loving Iranians, will, with the utmost power and despite all reactionary intrigues, take outstanding steps towards securing the welfare and well-being of the people and will initiate reforms throughout the country. By our broadcast of this happy news tonight, all freedom-loving Iranians will certainly celebrate and honor His Excellency, Mr. Qavam-os-Saltaneh, who has been astutely and successfully, despite various difficulties and continuous provocations from the reactionaries, sailing the ship of the country towards reform and prosperity.
In the midst of the joy brought about by this grand victory, I must bring this point to the attention of well-wishers and freedom-lovers of the country: that by forming unity and alliance among the columns of all freedom-lovers, the grand and united soldiers of freedom, we shall block any kind of infiltration and influence of the reaction so that, under this unity and alliance and the leadership of the head of state, we may succeed in serving the country and securing the well-being and tranquility of the people in order to avoid embarrassment before history, contemporary and future generations, God, and the masses.
Finally, I, for all my countrymen, announce that Azarbaijan, despite the poisonous propaganda of ill-wishing elements, has been and always will be an inseparable part of Iran, and no one is able to separate the honorable and patriotic offspring of Azarbaijan from the motherland.
Long live Iran. Long live all freedom-lovers.
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Q. What was the date of this speech?
A. At 9:45 pm on 23 Khordad 1325.
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Q. So what happened? Why didn't this agreement become implemented so that there would be no need for bloodshed? What went wrong?
A. It was implemented.
Q. But why was there finally bloodshed and civil war?
A. Because the Shah started intrigues. That was after I went to Moscow. I was never.... I nominated the governor-general. I nominated the ... all the heads of departments, and the military governor, the military commander, everything ... exactly under the 1906 Constitution -- <Persian> the town and provincial councils.
Q. But do you think, on the other side, Pishevari had good will and good intentions to implement this?
A. The question is here. The question of Azarbaijan is the incident I told you with the consul. You see, it was no longer a question of Pishevari, but a question of international relations. Obviously, Pishevari would prefer to be the prime minister sitting there. Do you understand what I mean? But, the proof was when I wanted to leave, and the Soviet consul came, and said, "Oh, no," that this was the agreement made, that they should sign, and so on. And they came. It shows that it was the international aspects of these things, that if you have a good policy, there can be no difficulty with the people who profess this ideology. There must be good international policy. Do you understand what I mean? There must be good international policy that everybody....
It was after these events that they accused me of being Communist. All right. If to get the Russian troops out of Iran -- all the negotiations were done by me, in person -- if to arrange the question of Azarbaijan, bringing it back into the nationalist camp, if that is Communist, all right, I'm Communist. I'd be honored to be a Communist.
Q. Do you believe that this plan, that the administration of this plan, was practical, and that if the policies that you and Qavam-os-Saltaneh pursued were continued, then there would have been no need for...?
A. Well, if the policy which I proposed, I had always wanted, if at that time, at that moment, we could have ... one of the reasons a republic was proclaimed in Iran ... had simply kicked out the Shah at that time, the whole course of history would have been changed. Do you understand what I mean?
Q. When was the question of republic discussed? I didn't follow you.
A. No. See, if we had done that. If we had done. We had the possibility to do anything. We could run everything we wanted, you see. There was no question.... But I didn't want to, for my point of view, push Qavam too far, because Qavam would go up to a certain limit. Do you understand what I mean? To a certain limit. He put the Shah in his place. He brought me, without even consulting, without even talking. The Shah didn't know. <unclear> And I told the Shah, I said, "As long as I am in the government, you will reign and you will not rule." I said, "This is a fundamental conception we have of the constitution and the government of Iran."
Q. I think you weren't one of his favorites.
A. I beg your pardon?
Q. I don't think you were one of the Shah's favorites.
A. No. But I think he made a great mistake, because, you know, I had nothing, but of course I didn't back him. I didn't back his family. I was against his father. I was against everybody -- the whole family. They were usurpers. They usurped this place. They'd been brought by foreign bayonets. But when ... in front of a de facto situation, national considerations, in my opinion, should be above personal friendship or emnity or personal considerations, you see. And this was a person who had no personality. He could only be a valet. And a valet who wanted to be free to rob, himself, with a certain, as the French say, "association de malfaiteurs" -- a certain number of people around him. And the rest to send all the wealth of the country out, in the purchase of armaments ... nobody can even understand what ... they're so sophisticated, how to manipulate. Do you understand what I mean?
I mean, think of what schools, what universities, what reforms, agricultural reforms, what could have been done with all this wealth in Iran, if it had been done for the people. And it's the only way to keep these countries like Iran, these people, from slipping away into the other camp. And that's what we cannot, we cannot explain, don't understand how, nobody can arrive to explain to the Americans.
Q. What were the circumstances for the end of that coalition cabinet and the departure of yourself from the cabinet in October 1946?
A. Well, at first I didn't accept to go to Moscow. I wanted to continue with the Democratic Party -- organization.
Q. Why was the cabinet disbanded?
A. Well, it was the pressure, the pressure from everywhere, almost, you know, from the English, from the Americans, from even certain Tudeh people. All these people. Everywhere. Nobody was in favor of one hundred percent nationalist policies, my belief was -- and today it's more than ever justified.
Q. Well, the Americans have written that they were afraid that the cabinet was coming under the control of the Tudeh, and the three Tudeh cabinet ministers were packing their ministries with Tudeh partisans, and therefore that's why they were against this coalition cabinet.
A. No. The reason was ... the Americans, as I said, they were always badly informed. The policy which Qavam was pursuing, we were pursuing, that's the policy everybody knows. It was in my hands, I was doing all the discussions, all the policies with all these people. And the Russians, in spite of the fact that I was on their blacklist; in spite of the fact that in my newspaper, three days out of every six days that it was printed, the leading article was an attack on the Tudeh, signed Firouz. These are the documents. You've seen it. All right.
In spite of all that, you see, I got into the Qavam cabinet, all right. And we brought about what you see -- the reforms we made, the.... In a very short time we succeeded where others failed. We arranged the question of Azarbaijan when the others couldn't have done. The Russians would not have gone. They would have stayed 14, 15 -- perhaps they'd even have gone further south. But on several occasions, I know, even when I was appointed ... afterwards I went to Moscow.
Even when I was there, they ... on several occasions, the proposal of a division of Iran into two spheres of influence has been proposed to the Russians. And quite recently again, about two years ago, they proposed, you see. Every time the Russians have said no. For the simple reason that it's obviously difficult for a communist government to come and sign, as the Tsarist government did, at the same time, a document, a protectorate over a country, of spheres of influence and so on, and pretending to be socialist, communist and respecting the independence and integrity of.... It's hardly possible to conceive that. But if they even wanted it, under those conditions, it wouldn't be possible for them, you see, to....
For instance the question of Azarbaijan. They'd retire their troops, but the Azarbaijan people were there. To not let the Azarbaijan affair be settled, that would have been sufficient for the proclamation of a southern independence, you see. It was with the arrangement of the question of Azarbaijan that they followed this line which I pursued, you see, and they saw, and that's where there I spoke -- and I spoke very strongly with them.
Q. The Russians?
A. They respect people who don't hide the truth from them. They have a big respect, and they do respect people they see defending ... and especially when they saw that this person, who George Allen pretended was a Communist, and sent a report to the State Department saying he was a Communist, on the Shah's ... counsel. Because he was against me, you know.
Q. The Shah had told George Allen that you were a communist?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. You know, there's a controversy regarding this coalition cabinet -- the end of this cabinet. There's one group that says that Qavam thought that the usefulness of the Tudeh members in the cabinet was over and therefore voluntarily disbanded this cabinet. There's another view saying that the Shah had finally succeeded in persuading George Allen to back him up and support him, and, by using threats, force Qavam-os-Saltaneh to disband his coalition cabinet, to discharge six of its members and bring in new members who were more favorable to the Shah. Which of these two theories do you think <is> closer to the truth?
A. Well, I think there was a bit ... a certain amount of truth in the fact that the intrigues were made against the government, which even went to the extent of telegrams that who should not be in the government, you see.
Q. Telegrams from?
A. The Ghashghaie and these people. They sent ... from <?> on American instructions. That's quite true. I knew that. And, Qavam-os-Saltaneh wanted to ... he wanted to sort of keep everybody, you know. He wanted to keep a sort of a balance of everybody. And, unfortunately, when he.... One day he went to see the Shah and he said, "I've seen ... just been to the Shah and I've resigned," he said.
Q. Was that a surprise to you?
A. He hadn't told me before. He said, "I've resigned. I've resigned." I said, "You've resigned?" "Yes." He put -- like a child, you know -- he put his hand in his pocket. He said, "But I've got another order: to form the new cabinet." Laughing. He said, "I wanted to ask you something." I said, "All right." He said, "What have you done to these Americans?"
I said, "Me? To the Americans? Nothing at all. Why, I've only put into application your policies! I have done nothing against the Americans. On the contrary, what we have done, that's what the government has done, you have done that through me, by me, on my initiatives.... It was the acting, in my opinion ... the matter is not only in our national interest, but it's also in the interest of the Americans to have Azarbaijan free, to have the Russians no longer in the country. Perhaps they wanted them to stay. The British did want them to stay ... did want them to stay. But the Americans were ... sort of ... it appeared to us anyway, Truman pretended that they wanted them to go. But, otherwise I've got nothing against the Americans. What have I done? I've done what was my duty to my country. If the Americans want a member of the government to carry out their caprices, do what they say, I would never like ... accept to become a member of such a government. We are not here working for foreign interests. We must keep and show that we are capable and have sufficient dignity to keep our own independence. Nobody's going to grant us independence. We have to take this independence. We have to achieve it. In keeping ... our situation is such that we have to keep the very good relations with the two powers. And that's where our objective is. If the Americans want domination, well that book is finished." I told that, at that epoch, to Qavam. "If they want legitimate interests, friendship, well of course, nothing better."
Q. So then how did he tell you who is going out of the cabinet and...?
A. Well, then he said, "I want to ask you something.... I want to ask you to invite George Allen, have a dinner with him, invite him to dinner, a personal dinner. Because I don't know what you've done to these people. Of course you've done what I've said, but they have their fill, you see." I said, "Well, they can be full or empty. I haven't.... We've put through a policy which has been successful. If Iranian success in preserving its national independence runs counter to their interests, you see, then I'm sorry. I can be of no further use. Otherwise, I don't see <unclear> with them. But why do you want me to invite him for dinner?" He said, "Well, if you invite him to dinner and be nice with him. Talk to him. You know how to talk to these people." And so on.
I said, "Well, I always talk in a nice, friendly way. And, anyway, but I don't know what they've got against me. In other words, you are asking me to invite George Allen to a friendly dinner so that should be a visa for me to be in the government? I would never do that. That I can never do. 'We'd like very much, Your Royal.... We like you very much and we extremely....' Don't ask me. That's something I can't do. You see. Because not only it's <unclear>, it's contrary to their own interests. One day they may wake up. but then it will be too late, you see." I said to Qavam.
He said, "Well, look here, would you go to...? What will you do then?" I said, "Well, I'll continue to organize the Democratic Party." He said, "Oh, that's also difficult to do. We want the Party to be ... perhaps organize only the party and the party in hand, you see." Well, any government that came would have pushed the Party to put into application the policies of the Party. He said "Well, that's also difficult, now it makes difficult work for me," and so on. He was rather....
He said, "Well, look here. For three months, four months, go on a foreign mission as ambassador, if you like, to Moscow, somewhere. After four months I promise you to call you back. We'll have to have elections. If you want to be elected, you'll be a candidate, and have you elected." And so on. I said, "No, I don't want to go to...." He said, "Well, think about it, and tomorrow you'll come and we'll talk over it again."
I went home, and the next day I again saw Qavam, and Qavam showed me a list. He said, "These are the people I want to bring into the cabinet." There were some extraordinary names in it, you know, and so on. I said, "Who the hell are these people?" I said, "Do you know you have a party?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Well, where are the members of this party? There must be some?" Finally, I made a condition with him. I said, "Look here, I'll accept." He said, "For three or four months you go there." "If I can be of service to your policy in any way, there, I'll do it. But, I have one condition. Some of these members of the government must not be in." He said, "Who?"
Well, I proposed three ministries. There was the Ministry of Labor ... was one , and the Ministry of Communications, and the Ministry of Justice. As minister of justice I proposed a man called Mousavizadeh. He was a judge.
When Reza Khan left and the Shah was reigning, because he had assassinated my father, as you know, I pursued the police. The Shah was reigning. The Shah said to me, "Oh, look here, do this, anything you want." He tried to buy me: "Do this." I said, "Look here, this is not a question of ... it's a question of conscience, it's not ... there's no price which is possible to pay. It doesn't exist. It's Iranian history. Your father can be bad and you can be good. You can be good, your son can be bad." I said, "If you tell him in my behalf, tell the Shah that if he wants to be a good Shah, he can't be a good son." That's exactly what I said in the message to him, you see. "I'm sorry," I said, "I can't do it. My advice ... if you want to be a good son and continue in the same line, well, you can't and you won't remain Shah."
And I continued. It was the biggest -- you were'nt there. Perhaps you've ... of course you've heard about it, if you've heard about the history of Iran. There was the biggest list of accusations against all these people. We had them all arrested. And in the big salons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was the court, because there was no place where 500 people, <unclear> everything.... For a month, nearly a month, every day in this court I was there. And it was the whole history of Reza Khan: how he came, all his crimes, the politics that brought him. All. I opened the whole door for everybody. People came in. They were shouting, they were cheering and so on, you see. And Mousavizadeh -- I'd never met this man -- was the judge, presiding judge. I'd never seen him in my life.
And I know the Shah was spending lots of money. He'd brought for Mokhtari this ... good attorneys. Dr. Aghayan was there ... to defend him, and so on. And he was trying to buy the judges, you see. All right. I was aware of that. The only implement I had was to carry out a press campaign, you see. Which I did. My newspaper ... I hadn't yet started CRa'd-e EmrouzD at that time; I was writing in the CSetarehD and other newsuapers at that time, but organizing many newspapers. And a big press campaign to show the judge that he can't ... must be careful. He must keep the road straight, you know. That everybody wass watching. Anyway, the whole show ended, and he gave a judgment, condemning all these people. And one of the things which the ... of giving him a sort of extenuating circumstances, you see, which made his imprisonment less, was that it had been done on the orders of what was to become the "Reza Shah the Great," you see. And this is an official document which went to <the> highest ... the Court of Cassation. Highest court.
Q. This Mousavizadeh had been the judge?
A. Had been the judge. That always impressed me. After that I became very friendly with him and I wanted to pay him back -- the duty he had done towards his country, the honesty he had shown, and the.... He'd been a very good judge to the Ministry of Justice, you see. I made him minister of justice. Qavam accepted. I told him the reason. I said <unclear>. He did that in order that I accept....
Q. To go to Moscow?
A. To go to Moscow, yes. But when I was there, they started little intrigues in Azarbaijan. When I was ambassador. And....
Q. Did Qavam want to do this?
A. I beg your pardon?
Q. Did Qavam want these intrigues to take place?
A. When.... After I went, it was "malgre" Qavam -- in spite of him -- because he was then surrounded by people, all kinds of things the Shah had got more. He'd got more into ... other people's hands. When I was there, I didn't allow.
Q. How could this 25, 26 year old Shah overcome a statesman like Qavam? That's what I can't understand.
A. Well, he didn't overcome a statesman like Qavam. Qavam knew him....
Q. He forced him to....
A. Qavam knew him very well. Sometimes ... sometime we're talking, they'd say, "When will you get rid of this shit? If you can do it, do it quickly." Several times he was talking plainly, I mean. His impression he knew. But he was an old politician, you see. And he was always seeing on the foreign policy questions how, where the possibilities....
Q. It seems that after your departure the game was lost. I mean, according to history, because from then on....
A. No. For Qavam it was lost. He told me himself. He told me himself. When he came here....
Q. Why did he allow this?
A. Because, well, he had to. Qavam was doing the whole damn work for him....
Q. What if he had refused to disband his cabinet?
A. If he had done that, it would be much better.
Q. Why didn't he do it?
A. Well, that's the reason. He liked power. There's no doubt about the fact that.... Even, I'll tell you, some people came along sometimes, and it was a matter of what we call in Persian hojb-e haya <respect for friends>, and so on. They used to come along, and ask favors, this, that and the other. And I didn't want Qavam's name ... while I was there (I was his vice prime minister -- my room was just behind his room, you see) to be, sort of a bad <unclear> people coming and going. And I put the name of preserving Qavam <Persian>, but I put a special person there to ... that certain people, who were ... I knew, who wanted to come around and profit from Qavam's hojb-e haya, as we used to call it, and get certain favors which would have been bad for Qavam's personal reputation. I wouldn't let them go, when they came there. I didn't let them go in. I would say, "There is no time now." And Qavam understood that. He said, "You're only allowing certain people to come here." I said, "If I've done something that I've told you, it's quite true, but it's in your interests." When he thought, he said, "Perhaps you are right." I said, "I was afraid that you might sometime accept something ... to do something for somebody which afterwards you yourself would probably regret."
Q. What I still can't understand, what were the pressures that were on this old statesmen that made him give up ... you know, let his friends go.
A. Well, he liked me very much....
Q. Why didn't he say, "No. I'm going to keep my cabinet. I'm going to keep these people."? What could have happened? I mean, he had his political party.
A. Yes, well, we had the political party. We had....
Q. He had much power.
A. He had the power, but then it would have become a sort of a duel between the Shah and Qavam. If I had been there, I would have promised Qavam within 24 hours. I would have finished the whole damn thing, you see. It's a question of being a man of action -- one is or one isn't, you understand. At a crisis in the country, if one wants to think about doing this, that, and the other -- well everything disappears. There are certain moments in history where one is obliged to take decisions which are of vital importance, and it's there ... no concession is possible. Qavam was always a man of concession. Where, in my opinion, certain things, concessions should not have been made.
Well, he <the Shah> lasted up to three years ago, the same person. Do you understand what I mean? He was a cancer in the body politic of Iran, the Shah, you see, until the moment he died.
And now they're talking all this rubbish about his son. Which you know, of course. They talk. And nobody seems ... these people don't seem to understand. And the people who hear.... They've opened shops. These people are so ... certain sort of opposition here. They talk and talk and talk. They're now talking for two years: "In twenty days we're in Tehran." You see, they've opened a shop. They're getting money from here, there, and everywhere. They've opened shops. And now there's no possibility of them going. They're not prepared to take risks. They've got too much money now to take risks. Do you understand what I mean? It is something incredible.
I know that because they won't ... the people won't ... are not leaving me alone. They are coming night and day from Iran, here. They're every one: "Where are you? Why don't you come? There's only one person who could come along and arrange a country and not let this thing...." Well, there must be possibilities. There must be certain things. I don't discourage them. They're all there. But people who have been collaborating with all these people, the certain so-called oppositions here, you know, they're disgusted. I'd never met them in my life. Civil, military, all kinds of ... every type of people, you understand.
Well, the question is, there must be certain ... the practically possible ... there must be a certainty on the international question. I was waiting to see what Reagan was going to do, you see. But I'm only hearing this talking about muscles. You have muscles. Well everyone knows, but that other side has more muscles than you -- in the region, especially. What muscles? It's not a question of muscles. It's a question of the policy. It must be based on discretion, on meditation ... of the situation. That's really the whole trouble.
Q. Can we go back to when you left Tehran for Moscow? And you were in Moscow and things were happening in Tehran....
A. Well, as I said, when things started to happen ... well, I stopped it all. Because there were ... they came there ... some of them were running away from Azarbaijan, some of the people who had been there ...stayed there, running away -- with arms and so on. I went and saw Molotov. I telephoned up and made a <protest>. I said, "What's this going on in Azarbaijan again?" I said, "Are you going back, making some ... certain agreements or something with the British about the division of Iran if some ... anyone starts trouble?"
Q. The Russians were going in?
A. No, no, no. They wanted to provoke the Russians to come in.
Q. I see.
A. The plan was to make trouble. Provoke the Russians to come.
Q. I see.
A. That was the plan. Do you understand what I mean? If they <the Russians> had come, the others <the British> wouldn't have even waited one minute. They were there, you see. They would have come to Basra and they wouldn't have waited one minute, you see. If the Russians had come, they would have come. The affair would have been finished, you see. I said, "Well, Molotov," I said, "What are you doing?" I said, "Some of them are running away with the arms. The arms belong to the government." He gave immediate orders to stop all these people at the frontier and take every bit of arms they'd got. I sent a telegram to Qavam. I said, "All these arms will be given back to your representatives."
Q. I see, the Pishevari people were taking arms <unclear>?
A. They were taking arms and running away ... wanting to go to Russia, you see, ... at the frontier.
Q. I see, they were going over ... across the border....
A. They wanted to cross over the border, then to see if they could do something there, you know, and get.... They could say.... There were many other agents of people amongst these people, you see. There were arms on Iranian territory. They would have stayed <there> in <unclear> until the Russians had come in.
Q. I see, that these were Russian arms coming in.
A. It was a plan to get the Russians into the thing. I went and spoke to Molotov -- without any instructions ... from the government.
Q. But didn't you wonder what was happening to your old friend, Qavam? Why was he allowing these things to happen?
A. No, I knew, I knew. That's why I resigned. That's finally why I resigned. And Qavam ... anyway ... he knew, himself. After I'd gone, he told me, when he was here -- afterwards he came to France. He was here. We talked. He said, "The day you left me, I was lost," he told me. Because the sincerity must exist, you see. Qavam wanted ... meant well, you see, but he wasn't always prepared to use all those means necessary for arriving at the....
Q. The objective.
A. The objective. Well, you can't hesitate if you have an important objective to achieve.
Q. Is it true that sometimes he would estekhareh <consult a book or worry-beads> in order to decide about something>?
A. He believed in it sometimes. Yes.
Q. I was told by one person that there was an important question, and he said he was going to estekhareh.
A. Yes, yes. Make estekhareh. Well, when he didn't want to do something, or when it depended on his own.... He always said, "If I didn't want to do it" he could say he believed it: "I did estekhareh and it turned out bad! <Persian>" He wouldn't accept the responsibility himself. He said the estekhareh did it.
Q. And then the next year his cabinet resigned, and left him alone, and the Majles gave him a vote of no confidence, and they wouldn't even give him a diplomatic passport to leave Iran?
A. Yes, they left and he had to come. And....
Q. An ordinary passport! How did this happen?
A. Yes, yes. He came. Well, as I said to you, he ... that was all the Shah's enmity, of course, and....
Q. I mean, how could within one year <there> be such a great change?
A. Well, it depends on....
Q. The "Jenab-e Ashraf" <His Excellency> to become someone without a passport?
A. "Jenab-e Ashraf," you know finally the Shah gave the ... because when he was ... <unclear> Jenab-e Aghayeh Qavam <His Excellency, Mr. Qavam>. That was before.... But on the radio, talking all over Iran, I had given instructions to say "Jenab-e Ashraf." The Shah was hearing the news: "Jenab-e Ashraf ... Jenab-e Ashraf." <He said:> "They've been eliminated, all the titles." Well, all right. He saw it was bad. He had obliged. He wrote the order himself, and signed: "the title 'Jenab-e Ashraf' is being granted to you."
Q. So it was after the fact.
A. Yes. After I had given instructions all over the country, you see -- "Jenab-e Ashraf", they said -- which forced him to do that. Yes.
Q. But again, you know, what I'm trying to say is that the dramatic difference within 12 months, from where Qavam was and where he ended up is really difficult to understand.
A. Well, it's not really difficult to understand ... for somebody who was there, but for me it's not difficult to understand because I know what importance there is in the surroundings one has there, you see. When one is....
And the fact that, of course, after I left, the Shah's authority became more. I wouldn't allow it -- I told him, you see. And they had several shots at me, you know, while I was in Iran. They tried to 'bump me off'. Do you understand what I mean? When I was in Abadan. There was a strike there. And I was walking in the gardens of the governorship there. Suddenly, I was talking with somebody, and a bullet passed and Hejazi, Colonel Hejazi, who I had arrested, and....
Q. And also the other man....
A. Mesbah-Fatemi was there, as well, the governor-general was there, you see -- of Khouzestan -- they were there, standing at the corner there. And when I.... "What the hell is happening?" I said, "What the hell is happening?" There was a jeep there. I said, "Hejazi, come, quickly!" I got into the jeep and said, "Come in. Let's go out and see what's happening -- who's firing and from where." They were afraid of the things. I said, "Sit down, sit down, sit down." I said, "Now, who's fighting? What's all this firing coming from?" He said, "We don't know what's happening." I said, "You don't know? You're governor-general. You're the military governor here."
Q. Also there was a Fateh -- a policeman or something?
A. Fateh was the oil-fellow. Mostafa Fateh.
Q. But there was another army ... the Commander of Khorramshar or something.
A. Oh, perhaps there was another officer. I don't know. But the farmandeh of Khouzestan, the commander of Khouzestan, who had sent arms -- British arms -- from Basra, by Iranian army trucks to the Bakhtiari, to be distributed, you see. And we had documents that he had done that, and he'd sent these.
Q. Who were the people who wanted the Shah to gain greater power vis-a-vis the Prime Minister? And why?
A. All those people who were around the Shah. They were degenerate, interested, peculiarly interested, people. They were not for the person of the Shah. They didn't care a damn about him. They just wanted to exploit any and every situation to fill their pockets.
Q. But they had joined the Democratic Party and they were members of a party along with their leaders.
A. No, but we had all kinds of people in the party. We had to. Certain people came in the party who were not very well-reputed either -- newspaper people and so on. In their newspapers they could write.... Somebody came and said, "I heard you're making a party. What is this people who you allow in them?" I said, "Who?" He gave me names. I said, "Well, look here, we're going to build a wonderful palace -- marble palace." He said, "Yes." I said, "In this marble palace are you going to build a water closet or not? Or perhaps several water closets?" He said, "Sure." I said, "Well, they are water closets. You can't build a marble palace without having...."
Q. But it sounds like the marble palace was full of water closets. And that's why....
A. No. After I left, I don't know, because it was at the beginning I left. It was the beginning of the party and so on. But as long as I was there, I wouldn't allow....
Q. Because when ... at the time when Qavam received a vote of no confidence, they even took over the party. His opponents even took over his own party.
A. Well, I said, they allowed infiltration. They got in. But while I was there, no. While I was there, the Democratic Party.... It was at the beginning, of course, it was the beginning of it's thing. I'd kept it very clean, and there was one or two newspaper people who wanted to come in -- I knew them very well. They changed their ideas with the question of money, but they were necessary for certain people if we wanted to attack or wanted to use language which wasn't used by most people, you see. They were necessary. They were the water closets, as you imagine, and I told them that. And they all laughed when I told them that.
Q. I've come across a letter written by George Allen to Mr. Jernegan, and he explains the circumstances of this change of cabinet. He says that ever since he came to Iran, the Shah wanted to have Qavam removed. But he would not yield. He would say, "You should reign and not rule, and leave Qavam alone, because he's the strongest man to keep the Russians out." But he says by ... in September, when your government, Qavam's government, and the Ghashghaies came to an agreement, where the Ghashghaies agreed to support the Democratic Party, the Shah was upset because he wanted the Ghashghaies crushed and their arms taken, and this wasn't done. So he increased his pressure on the Americans.
At the same time, George Allen says that he received a report from someone that he ... had, that the question of the joint air company with the Russians was discussed in the cabinet by General Firouz, who was minister of roads. And that everyone in the cabinet meeting, except for Hazhir, had agreed with this air agreement. Iraj Eskandari had asked for the question to be postponed so that Iran could renounce its signature in the Chicago Agreement, where apparently this agreement was not consistent with that. Then it was claimed -- and I'll stress claimed, or alleged -- that you had spoken about this meeting with someone in the Russian Embassy.
A. Me?
Q. This is the report that....
A. Yes, I know....
Q. The first secretary of the Russian Embassy had gone to Eskandari's house and had said, "Why did you oppose this air company?" And Eskandari said, "I hadn't opposed it, I'd just asked for postponement." Then Eskandari had gone to Qavam, saying, "Firouz has ... reported to the Russians about me." Then this story had reached George Allen. And he says in his letter (which I think you would be interested in seeing and I'll send it to you), he says, "This was a golden opportunity I was waiting for, because this ... now I could get rid of Firouz and these others from the cabinet, and at the same time end these discussions with the Russians for this air traffic."
So he had gone -- on October 14th, I believe -- he had gone to Qavam and had said, "We no longer have confidence in your government, because you are infiltrated in your cabinet and you cannot have cabinet discussions without it being reported to the Russians." And Qavam had asked him, "Now who are you talking about?" George Allen had refused to mention your name. George Allen had waited two days, or three days, and Qavam had done nothing. Then George Allen goes to the Shah and says, "I now agree with you that Qavam should either be arrested, exiled, or imprisoned, if he does not agree to disband his cabinet." And the Shah had asked Allen, "When should I do this?" And he had said, "Right away."
Now, just a few days before that, Abbas Mas'oudi had gone to George Allen, in the evening, and had said, "We want to make a coup d'etat against Qavam, and will you help us?" And then of course the Shah had asked Qavam to come in. There were rumors that General Amirahmadi had contacted Qavam and said that he may have to act on behalf of the Shah if he didn't resign. And then Qavam had agreed to propose a new cabinet. Now, this is something which has not come out in any reports in the past, and I'm very interested in.... You're the first person who was actually there who I can ask this question.
A. The only question, this question about the limit and Iraj.... This is the first time I'm hearing this -- from you -- this question about the ... the question of Iraj <Eskandari>. The only thing I can tell you is that Iraj Eskandari was amongst those people who were afterwards suspected of having been working for British interests in Iran -- amongst the Tudeh. Do you understand what I mean? So if it was a prefabricated arrangement that there should be this question, that Iraj Eskandari should ask for time, and so on and so on.... They would go and come along ... and then Eskandari would go and say, "This person ... this report has been given by ... to the ... the question was of no interest for us. It was a question of very minor interest, this question of the thing...."
Q. Air traffic.
A. The air traffic question. "Very, very insignificant." The reports ... if he wanted to give the reports to the Soviet Embassy ... they should give reports to the Soviet Embassy, that it was through me -- that I got the Russians out. They knew better than anybody, do you understand what I mean? I mean, these things were so insignificant that they only become....
Q. But of interest, what's of interest....
A. But it's the first time I hear about it -- from you.
Q. But what's of interest is the very active role that George Allen....
A. Against me....
Q. Took to change....
A. I'll show you, now I'll show you, let me show you...
Copyright © 2003 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard University)
Dr. Habib Ladjevardi
Iranian Oral History Project
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Harvard University
1430 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
ladjevar@fas.harvard.edu
617.495.4232 (tel)