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Selected Abstracts of Articles Published in the Journal of Cold War Studies


Issue 1
Issue 2
Issue 3
Issue 4
Volume 1

Spring 1999


Volume 2

Volume 3

Volume 4
Volume 5
Volume 6
Volume 7
Volume 8

Spring 2006

Volume 9

Spring 2007

 

Volume 9, Issue 4 (Fall 2007)

 

 
Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conference
Geoffrey Roberts

This article presents new evidence from the Russian Foreign Ministry archive regarding Josif Stalin's participation in the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences. The article shows that the published Soviet records of these wartime summits are incomplete and inaccurate in a number of respects. These omissions and distortions were motivated by political considerations, and the correction of them facilitates a more complete rendition of Stalin's statements at the three conferences. Of particular importance is evidence that Stalin during the war strongly favored the dismemberment of Germany. Not until later did he begin to propagate the myth that he had always supported German unity.

 
In the Shadow of the Bomb: U.S.-Soviet Biomedical Relations in the Early Cold War, 1944–1948
Nikolai Krementsov

The deterioration of U.S.-Soviet scientific relations in 1946–1948 traditionally has been seen as simply a consequence of the growing political conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Scientific activities with direct military applications—most clearly manifested in the nuclear bomb—have been depicted as the primary motive for a variety of Cold War science policies, ranging from restrictions on international cooperation to the veil of secrecy placed over military-related scientific research. This article explores U.S.-Soviet relations in oncology in 1944–1948 and shows that science became an integral part and an instrument, rather than a mere reflection, of the Cold War confrontation. Science played a central role in the formulation of certain Cold War policies and informed Soviet decision-making on a wide range of policy issues that were essential to the growth of the Cold War. In this context, the symbolic value of science as a propaganda tool became no less important than its military applications.

 
“No Fixed Values”: A Reinterpretation of the Influence of the Theory of Guerre Révolutionnaire and the Battle of Algiers, 1956–1957
Christopher Cradock and M.L.R. Smith

The so-called Battle of Algiers (1956–1957) was a pivotal event in the history of French decolonization and was controversial because it involved brutality and the use of torture. The tactical success of the French Army in the battle has been credited to the theory of guerre révolutionnaire, which evolved in French military thinking after the army's debacle in Indochina. The theory situated anti-colonial insurgencies within the Cold War struggle of Western values against Communism. This article reevaluates earlier claims about the theory's efficacy and shows that ultimately the methods used by the French during the Battle of Algiers can be explained more by factors related to the contingent historical experiences of the French army than by the influence of guerre révolutionnaire.

 
Review Essay: Clandestine Agent: The Real Agnes Smedley
Arthur M. Eckstein

This essay reviews a new biography of Agnes Smedley, a radical American writer and journalist who secretly worked for the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party on various endeavors, including espionage. When Smedley was accused in the late 1940s of having been a Soviet spy, she staunchly denied the allegations and depicted herself as an innocent victim of a McCarthyite smear. Ruth Price, the author of the new biography, initially expected to find that Smedley had indeed been unjustly accused of spying for the Soviet Union. But as Price sifted through newly available materials from Russia and China, she made the disconcerting discovery that Smedley had in fact eagerly served as an agent of influence and spy for the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. This case illustrates some of the complexities that arise when assessing why certain Western intellectuals and government officials decided to become spies for the Soviet Union.

 
Sino-Soviet Relations and the Emergence of the Chinese Communist Regime, 1946–1950: New Documents, Old Story
Sergey Radchenko

Andrei Ledovskii, a long-time Soviet diplomat with a particular expertise on East Asian affairs, and several other Russian specialists on Soviet policy in the Far East have published a massive collection of declassified documents about Soviet policy vis-à-vis China in the first five years after World War II. The authors seek to show that the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war was attributable to Soviet fraternal help, that Josif Stalin wholeheartedly embraced the Chinese Communists' struggle for power, and that the Sino-Soviet alliance from beginning to end enjoyed unstinting Soviet support. But in fact the documents reveal that Stalin's policy toward the Chinese Communists was opportunistic and utilitarian, that he refrained from decisively supporting the Communists in the Civil War until almost the end, and that all the talk of proletarian internationalism in the Sino-Soviet alliance was but a cloak for Soviet expansionist ambitions in East Asia.

 

Volume 9, Issue 3 (Summer 2007)

 

The Missiles of November, December, January, February . . .: The Problem of Acceptable Risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis Settlement
Coleman, David G.

This article examines how the Kennedy administration assessed the risk posed by Soviet short-range missiles in Cuba and the associated combat troops, particularly in the months after the peak of the Cuban missile crisis. The issue had a strong domestic political subtext that played out for months. Missiles in Cuba had been a topic of discussion well before the dramatic events of October 1962, and the dispute about them dragged on well past the famous "thirteen days." Many studies assume a final resolution to the crisis that did not actually exist. The evidence from this period indicates that domestic political considerations were a fundamental factor in Kennedy's decision-making and apparently induced him to take a slightly harder line in the post-crisis negotiations with the Soviet Union than he otherwise might have. But the evidence also suggests that Kennedy was more willing than some of his advisers and many Congressional critics to accept a degree of permanent military risk in Cuba.
 

"Pearl Harbor in Reverse": Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis
Tierney, Dominic.

During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the argument that U.S. air strikes against Soviet missile sites in Cuba would be morally analogous to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 had a major impact on policymaking. The invocation of this analogy contributed to President John F. Kennedy's decision to forgo an immediate attack on the missiles and to start instead with a naval blockade of the island. The "Pearl Harbor in reverse" argument is an example of an important phenomenon that has received little attention in foreign policy analysis—the moral analogy. Fusing together elements of moral and analogical thinking, the moral analogy can be a powerful force in shaping policy preferences, as it was in October 1962.
 

Sino-Cuban Relations during the Early Years of the Castro Regime, 1959–1966
Cheng, Yinghong.

China's relations with Cuba in the first half of the 1960s—when the Sino-Soviet split was rapidly intensifying—were important to both Beijing and Havana as well as to the world Communist movement. The Sino-Cuban relationship during this period moved from one of intimate comradeship to deterioration and finally a bitter separation. Although Fidel Castro's ties with Mao Zedong survived the immediate start of the Sino-Soviet rift, Castro's dependence on the Soviet Union ultimately doomed his courtship of China. Castro's vehemently anti-Chinese speech in March 1966 marked the end of Sino-Cuban amity. The Sino-Cuban case sheds valuable light on the tensions that bedeviled the international Communist movement after the Sino-Soviet divide flared to the surface.
 

Flashpoint Austria: The Communist-Inspired Strikes of 1950
Williams, Warren C.

Austria is frequently overlooked by Cold War historians, but this small landlocked country was the site of a number of East-West confrontations during the decade of occupation by the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1955. This article focuses on two of those incidents. In September and October 1950, Austria's Communist Party, supported by Soviet occupation forces, triggered a series of violent demonstrations throughout the country, ostensibly objecting to a new Wage and Price Agreement. Whether these strikes were part of a planned attempt to overthrow the central government is a question still debated. The article assesses the different views on this matter and the evidence available.
 

Review Essay: Cold War Legacies: The Migration and Transformation of Popular/ Unpopular Culture
Chapman, Roger.

This article reviews two recent collections of essays that focus on the role of popular culture in the Cold War. The article sets the phenomenon into a wide international context and shows how American popular culture affected Europe and vice versa. The essays in these two collections, though divergent in many key respects, show that culture is dynamic and that the past as interpreted from the perspective of the present is often reworked with new meanings. Understanding popular culture in its Cold War context is crucial, but seeing how the culture has evolved in the post–Cold War era can illuminate our view of its Cold War roots.

 

Forum: Perspectives on Resistance with the People
Dijk, Ruud van and Peter Grieder.

Gary Bruce's volume in the Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series, Resistance with the People: Repression and Resistance in Eastern Germany, 1945–1955, provides an overview of the East German state security apparatus (Stasi) from the mid-1940s, when secret police organs were set up in eastern Germany by the Soviet occupation forces, through the mid-1950s, when the size of the Stasi sharply increased, allowing it to become a massive surveillance and repressive apparatus. Bruce examines the origins of the Stasi, the role of the state security organs in the outbreak and suppression of the East German uprising of June 1953, and the subsequent evolution of the Stasi under Walter Ulbricht, who removed his rivals from the state security apparatus and then reestablished it as a separate ministry responsible for "combatting all internal and external enemies" of the Communist regime. Two prominent experts on East German history offer their perspectives on Bruce's book and the role of popular resistance under Communist rule.
 

Volume 9, Issue 2 (Spring 2007)

 

A Most Special Relationship: The Origins of Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning
Young, Ken.

This article examines a hitherto unexplored aspect of the Anglo-American "special relationship," the development of arrangements to coordinate U.S. and British forces in a joint nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. During the early Cold War, British political leaders and military officers struggled for a closer relationship with the U.S. Air Force in the hope of gaining greater insight into U.S. war plans, predicated as they were on nuclear strikes launched from bases in England. U.S. willingness to supply nuclear (and later thermonuclear) bombs for delivery by British bombers prompted bilateral talks from 1956 about their deployment in a joint air offensive. This prospective partnership raised difficult issues for the UK Air Staff, which was committed to the maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent and countervalue rather than counterforce targeting. Nevertheless, the advantages of joint strike planning were such that by 1962 Bomber Command's planning had become fully integrated with that of Strategic Air Command.
 

The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence
Perović, Jeronim.

This article reassesses the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 based on findings from former East-bloc archives. In particular, it shows that the version propagated in the official Yugoslav historiography, suggesting that the break with Moscow arose because of Yugoslavia's distinct path toward socialism, is incorrect. Instead, Josip Broz Tito's unwillingness to give up on his territorial and political ambitions in the Balkans, especially Albania, despite Moscow's objections is the main factor that ultimately sparked the conflict in 1948. Yugoslavia fell afoul of Moscow's policy of enforced Sovietization of the socialist camp, though not because of a long-term Soviet plan or because of particular animosity toward the Yugoslav leadership. Rather, Tito's independent foreign policy provided a welcome pretext to clamp down on Yugoslavia and thereby tighten Soviet control over the other East European states.
 

The Johnson Administration, the Shah of Iran, and the Changing Pattern of U.S.-Iranian Relations, 1965-1967: "Tired of Being Treated like a Schoolboy"
Johns, Andrew L.

This article explores a key period in the relationship between the United States and Iran in the shadow of the Vietnam conflict and the overarching Cold War. It shows how U.S.-Iranian relations shifted considerably from early 1965—when the shah of Iran stepped up his efforts to reduce his dependence on the United States—to November 1967, when U.S. economic development assistance to Iran formally ended. The Johnson administration's overwhelming concern with the Vietnam conflict led to the neglect of potentially critical foreign policy issues and allies, but the lack of success in Vietnam simultaneously accentuated the importance of maintaining key alliance relationships, especially with Iran. The article underscores the centrality of domestic political considerations in forming and understanding foreign policy, both in the United States and in other countries. It also suggests that Third World leaders understood the nature of the Cold War and used the superpower conflict to their advantage to a much greater degree than previously recognized.
 

Choosing Peace: Hanoi and the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam, 1954-1955
Asselin, Pierre.

Based largely on new documentary evidence from Vietnam, this article examines North Vietnamese policymaking immediately after the signing of the 1954 Geneva accords. The article demonstrates that leaders in Hanoi sought to abide by the accord on Vietnam because they genuinely believed that implementation would produce national reunification peacefully and in accordance with the interests of the "socialist revolution." To that end, they instructed all operatives and supporters in both halves of Vietnam to undertake no activity that might sabotage and otherwise undermine the Geneva accord or provoke or justify non-compliance by the enemy. This stance disappointed revolutionaries in the South, who considered the French, the Americans, and their indigenous "lackeys" incapable of respecting the Geneva agreement.

 

Review Essay: Historical Memory and the End of Communism
Kubik, Jan

In critiquing a recent book by Charity Scribner, Requiem for Communism, this article addresses fundamental questions about collective memories of Communism and the Soviet bloc: Why and how is "the past" remembered selectively? What happens when forgotten events are brought back to the fore of collective consciousness? What are the actual mechanisms of remembering? Who are the often invisible gatekeepers that direct the paths of our memories? Who are the influential rulers of memory attempting to shape our mnemonic repertoire? Scribner's book indirectly touches on these issues, though not in a fully satisfactory way, especially with regard to working-class life under Communism. Although the book does have some strong points, it too often fails to take account of how people in the region (as opposed to leftist intellectuals in the West who "knew" Communism vicariously) experienced manual labor during the Communist era and how they remember it now.
 

Volume 9, Issue 1 (Winter 2007)

 

Transparency and Security Competition: Open Skies and America's Cold War Statecraft, 1948-1960
Marquardt, James J.

In recent years, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the role of transparency in international relations. U.S. efforts during the early Cold War to press for greater openness as a way of reducing tensions with the Soviet Union are often cited by specialists on military transparency. Yet the ill-fated Open Skies proposal has not been thoroughly investigated. This article draws on primary documents from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to show that proponents of transparency have generally drawn the wrong conclusions about Open Skies. The U.S. proposal for a system of aerial observation was part and parcel of a strategy to contain and ultimately defeat the Soviet Union. Consequently, Open Skies does not conform to the logic of transparency as a confidence-building measure; it instead affirms basic realist thinking about the competition for security between rivals. Future scholarship that appreciates how the quest for a more open world is affected by the competition for security would improve our understanding of the causes, consequences, and limitations of transparency.
 

Malaya, 1948: Britain's Asian Cold War?
Deery, Phillip

In 1948, at a time of severe economic austerity, the British Labour government committed itself to a costly and protracted campaign against a Communist foe in the Far East, despite not having any U.S. support for the endeavor. Clement Attlee’s government in Britain argued that the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) was necessary to counter Soviet attempts to use the local Communist party in support of Moscow’s expansionist designs. Subsequently, many commentators and historians accepted this judgment, at least to some degree. In reality, the rebellion, far from being carefully coordinated or meticulously organized, was inadequately planned and poorly executed. The 1948 insurrection cannot be understood without recognizing the influence of indigenous pressures and internal developments, which were more crucial than the external Cold War dimension.
 

The Czechoslovak Special Services and Their American Adversary during the Cold War
Lukes, Igor

U.S. intelligence officials in early postwar Czechoslovakia had access to some of the Czechoslovak government’s highest-ranking individuals and plenty of time to prepare for the looming confrontation with the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Yet the Communist takeover in February 1948 took them by surprise and undermined their networks. This article discusses the activities of four Czechoslovak security and intelligence agencies to demonstrate that the scale of the U.S. failure in Prague in 1945–1948 was far greater than often assumed, especially if one considers the substandard size and quality of Czechoslovakia’s Communist-dominated special services after the war.

 

Review Essay: The Security Forces and Polish Communism: Reclaiming History from Myth
Szporer, Michael

This article provides a critical review of Oczami Bezpieki (Through the Eyes of the Security Service), an overview of post-1945 Poland based on secret police files by Slawomir Cenckiewicz. The essay sheds light on the ongoing controversies surrounding the secret police ªles that still can cause turmoil in Polish politics. The article discusses the aggressive strategies of the Communist-era security apparatus in three areas considered in the volume: penetration of émigré communities in the United States; attempts to neutralize opposition to the Communist regime from 1968 through the 1980s; and the manipulation of the Roman Catholic Church. The documents demonstrate how obsessively the security forces kept track of opposition activities.
 

Volume 8, Issue 4 (Fall 2006)

 

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, January 1969-February 1972
Xia, Yafeng

Western scholars have long assumed that Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai encountered opposition within the Chinese leadership when they sought to improve relations with the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Formerly secret documents and first-hand accounts published in China over the last two decades cast doubt on this assumption. Drawing on newly available Chinese sources, this article examines China's policymaking process vis-à-vis the United States during the crucial period from January 1969 to February 1972. The article shows that the highest Chinese officials (especially Mao, Lin Biao, and Zhou) agreed that improvements in U.S.-China relations would be desirable to offset the threat from the Soviet Union.
 

Belated Decolonization and UN Politics against the Backdrop of the Cold War: Portugal, Britain, and Guinea-Bissau's Proclamation of Independence, 1973-1974
Macqueen, Norrie

When a guerrilla movement opposing Portuguese rule in Guinea-Bissau issued a unilateral declaration of independence in September 1973, it created a dilemma for Portugal's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Britain, like other NATO countries, wanted to keep Portugal within the alliance, British officials were exasperated by the Portuguese regime's refusal to let go of its colonies in Africa. When the United Nations (UN) took up the issue of Guinea-Bissau, Britain came under intense pressure from Portugal to proffer its support. Declassified documents from the British National Archives underscore the difficulties that ensued. British officials were mindful of their relationship with Portugal, but they were unsure of the intentions of the other Western permanent members of the UN Security Council and were worried about damaging Britain's broader position in Africa. This dilemma was not resolved until April 1974 when a military coup in Lisbon led to the Portuguese withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau.

 

Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights: Jimmy Carter Confronts the Left in Central America, 1979-1981
Soares, John A.

This article discusses the Carter administration's policies toward Nicaragua and El Salvador after the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua in July 1979. These policies were influenced by the widespread perception at the time that Marxist revolutionary forces were in the ascendance and the United States was in retreat. Jimmy Carter was trying to move away from traditional American "interventionism" in Latin America, but he was also motivated by strategic concerns about the perception of growing Soviet and Cuban strength, ideological concerns about the spread of Marxism-Leninism, and political-humanitarian concerns about Marxist-Leninist regimes' systematic violations of human rights.
 

Review Essay: Containment Strategies in Perspective
Jervis, Robert

John L. Gaddis's classic 1982 book Strategies of Containment, now out in a revised and expanded edition, characterizes the Cold War strategies of successive U.S. administrations as either symmetric or asymmetric. The new edition of the book retains this distinction and applies it to the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Gaddis incorporates a few findings from research that has appeared since 1982, but the original text has undergone fewer revisions than one might have expected. Gaddis's general approach, and many of his specific claims, are bound to provoke objections, but historians and political scientists will find his analysis stimulating and provocative.
 

Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975-1988
Gleijeses, Piero

This article explores the role that Cuba played in Africa after its dispatch of 36,000 soldiers to Angola in late 1975 and the first few months of 1976. The article focuses on the two most important aspects of Cuba's policy in Africa after 1976: its intervention in Ethiopia in 1977–1978; and its continuing presence in Angola, a presence that continued until 1991. The article analyzes Cuba's motivations, the extent to which Fidel Castro's policy was a function of Soviet demands, and the effect of Cuba's policy in Africa on relations with the United States. The concluding section offers an assessment of the costs and benefits of Cuba's policy.
 

Volume 8, Issue 3 (Summer 2006)

 

Mao, Tibet, and the Korean War
Sheng, Michael M.

In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.
 

Tibet and Chinese-British-American Relations in the Early 1950s
Zhai, Qiang

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who seized power in Beijing in 1949 viewed Tibet as Chinese territory. In this respect, they were no different from previous rulers of China. The chairman of the CCP, Mao Zedong, carefully devised a plan to re-annex Tibet, which had been effectively independent of China since 1911. The CCP's recent victory in the Chinese civil war gave Mao high confidence that he could reclaim Tibet without provoking outside intervention. Such a move not only would bring international political benefits but would also carry a symbolic meaning at home and thereby legitimize the rule of the CCP. Although Mao sent troops to Tibet, he also planned to rely on negotiations and coercive diplomacy. This article highlights the complicated relationships that emerged on the international scene as a result of China's actions in the early 1950s.
 

The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union Chen, Jian

Tibet, which had enjoyed de facto independence from 1911 to 1950, was resubordinated to China in late 1950 and 1951 through a combination of political pressure and military force. On 10 March 1959 a mass revolt broke out in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. Amid growing turmoil, the 14th Dalai Lama fled the capital. After Chinese troops moved into Lhasa on 20 March to crush the rebellion, the Tibetan leader took refuge in neighboring India. The Chinese People's Liberation Army quelled the unrest and disbanded the local government. This article looks back at those events in order to determine how the rebellion was perceived in China and what effect it had on relations with India.
 

Tibet's Cold War: The CIA and the Chushi Gangdrug Resistance, 1956-1974
McGranahan, Carole

This article analyzes the Chushi Gangdrug Tibetan resistance as narrated primarily by Tibetan veterans. The article recounts the origins of the Tibetan resistance forces, their relationship with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, their eventual laying down of arms in 1974, and their legacy in the present-day exile community. Analyses of the Tibetan resistance and the guerrilla war must take account of cultural as well as political and historical factors. The war, pitting a voluntary Tibetan guerrilla movement against the Chinese Communist army, had implications well beyond Tibet and China. India, Nepal, and the United States all became involved. In addition to presenting the perspectives of the soldiers alongside those of the relevant states, the article situates its discussion within the latest anthropological literature on international relations and the Cold War.
 

U.S. Policy toward South Asia and Tibet during the Early Cold War
McMahon, Robert J

Events in South Asia in the 1950s and early 1960s had a long-term impact on the Cold War and on relations among the countries involved—China, India, Pakistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. This article provides an overview of U.S. relations with South Asian countries during the early Cold War. It highlights the connections between U.S. policy priorities and commitments in South Asia on the one hand and developments in Tibet on the other. The article considers how U.S. policy priorities and actions in South Asia shaped, and were shaped by, China's reassertion of control over Tibet in the early 1950s and by the frictions that emerged between India and China in 1959 as a result of Beijing's brutal crackdown in Tibet.
 

The United States, Tibet, and the Cold War
Goldstein, Melvyn C.

This article examines U.S. policy toward Tibet from the end of the 1940s to the end of the 1980s, especially the 1950s and 1960s. U.S. policy during this period operated on two levels. At the strategic level, the United States consistently supported China's claim of sovereignty over Tibet. But at the tactical level, U.S. policy varied a great deal over time, ranging from the provision of military and financial aid to Tibetan guerrilla forces in the 1950s and 1960s to the almost complete lack of official attention to Tibet in the 1970s and early 1980s. The article explains why the U.S. government has never accepted Tibet's claim to independence and why the question of Tibet, after falling into obscurity in the 1970s, reemerged on the U.S. agenda in the mid- to late 1980s. The article highlights the cynicism that has often characterized tactical shifts in U.S. policy.
 

Rethinking the Linkage between Tibet and the China-India Border Conflict: A Realist Approach
Hoffmann, Steven A.

This article assesses the dynamic political and military relationships among Tibet, China, and India in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By examining the three governments' calculations and security interests, the article shows that the relationships among the three are best understood from a realist perspective. The focus in the article is on the Sino-Indian dispute over the territory known as "Assam Himalaya," located on the far eastern end of the Sino-Indian border, between southeastern Tibet and northeast India. The article covers a relatively lengthy period, from 1913 to 1962, but in doing so it shows that territorial claims and the desire for secure borders were the key concern of all the countries involved—Tibet, China, India under British imperial rule, post-1947 India, and the United States.
 

Volume 8, Issue 2 (Spring 2006)

 

Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975-1988
Gleijeses, Piero

Drawing on thousands of pages of documents from the closed Cuban archives, from U.S. archives, and from the former East German archives, as well as published materials, this article explores the role that Cuba played in Africa after its dramatic dispatch of 36,000 soldiers to Angola in late 1975 and the first few months of 1976. The article focuses on the two most important aspects of Cuba's policy in Africa after 1976: its intervention in Ethiopia in 1977-1978 and its continuing presence in Angola, a presence that continued until 1991. The article analyzes Cuba's motivations, the extent to which Fidel Castro's policy was a function of Soviet demands, and the effect of Cuba's policy in Africa on relations with the United States. The concluding section offers an assessment of the costs and benefits of Cuba's policy in Africa.
 

The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command
Odom, William E

During the Carter administration the Middle East and Southwest Asia became a third major theater in the Cold War struggle along with Europe and the Far East. Initially, President Jimmy Carter tried to remove this region from the Cold War competition, but the collapse of the shah's regime in Iran prompted Carter to reverse course and to build a "Persian Gulf security framework" that later allowed the United States to deal with three wars and many smaller clashes. The interagency process implementing this dramatic change was rent with clashes of departmental interests. The State Department and the military services resisted the structural changes they would later need to confront not only the Soviet threat but also intraregional conflicts. Moreover, the Reagan administration, after forcing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make the Central Command formal, actually slowed the process of its growth, leaving it far from ready to embark on the Gulf War in 1990-1991.
 

Review Essay
The Aldo Moro Murder Case in Retrospect

Drake, Richard

On 16 March 1978, the Marxist-Leninist Red Brigades kidnapped Aldo Moro, Italy's paramount political figure of the time. The Italian government steadfastly refused to negotiate with the Red Brigades for Moro's life, and on 9 May the terrorists executed him. Conspiracy theories based on the logic of Cold War politics and involving accusations against subversive elements in the Italian government and the secret services of foreign governments, particularly the United States and Israel, quickly surfaced. These theories gained wide currency among the Italian public despite overwhelming evidence that the Red Brigades bore exclusive responsibility for the crime. This article surveys some of the recent literature on what is still an extremely controversial subject in Italy.
 

Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee, and U.S. National Security Policy
Brands, Hal

In late 1964, Lyndon Johnson and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy convened an ad hoc group of distinguished citizens to consider the problem of nuclear proliferation. The creation of this group, known as the Gilpatric Committee, signaled Johnson's fear that a number of foreign policy issues related to proliferation had reached a crisis point in 1964. It also signaled his dissatisfaction with existing bureaucratic arrangements to resolve these problems. After several weeks of deliberation, the committee gave Johnson a report that advocated a sharp intensification of U.S. nonproliferation policy. The committee challenged key aspects of the administration's foreign policy and urged the president to rethink the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Although Johnson shied away from implementing some of the committee's more controversial proposals, the administration eventually embraced the basic philosophy of the report. The Gilpatric Report provided a conceptual foundation for important departures in U.S. foreign relations and national security policy from 1965 until the end of Johnson's presidency.
 

Volume 8, Issue 1 (Winter 2006)

 

The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War
Golan, Galia

The Soviet Union's transfer of false information to Egypt about alleged Israeli troop concentrations facing Syria in May 1967 is still considered a major factor in the outbreak of the June 1967 Mideast War. Soviet motivations and expectations, however, remain a topic of dispute. New information has become available over the past fifteen years, primarily through interviews and memoirs but also through the release of some important Soviet documents, including correspondence and reports of meetings between Soviet and Egyptian officials at the highest levels. A careful analysis of the circumstances and events during the period immediately before the 1967 war substantiates the conclusion that the Soviet Union did not initially expect or want war to break out between Israel and the Arabs. Soviet leaders made efforts to moderate Egyptian actions and considered at least one proposal for averting war. By the first week of June, as Egypt and Syria mobilized for an attack on Israel, the Soviet Union apparently expected an Israeli preemptive strike. Soviet actions during and immediately after the war indicated an interest in reducing the risks of the conflict, even in cooperation with the United States, although Soviet leaders seem to have held differing views about this matter.
 

Great-Power Involvement and Israeli Battlefield Success in the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948-1982
Kober, Avi

This article shows that Israel's success in wars against Arab states should not be attributed exclusively to its own military prowess and the relative incompetence of its enemies. Another important factor was great-power involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars. Despite Israel's early fears, such involvement in most cases either failed to deny Israel its military achievements or was an asset for two main reasons: lack of will or capability on the part of hostile great powers to intervene against Israel; and a friendly patron's support, without which Israel's own military skills might not have been sufficient to secure military success.
 

A Fusion Bomb over Andalucía: U.S. Information Policy and the 1966 Palomares Incident
Stiles, David

The fiery mid-air collision of two U.S. Air Force planes in January 1966 caused a payload of hydrogen bombs to fall on the countryside near the village of Palomares in the southern Spanish region of Andalucía. Although no nuclear explosions resulted, the incident scattered small amounts of radioactive material. A more serious problem, however, was the loss of one of the hydrogen bombs in the nearby waters of the Mediterranean Sea. During the prolonged period in which U.S. military teams worked to recover the missing bomb, government officials hastily cobbled together an information policy to deal with members of the press. Their efforts were almost not enough to quell rising concerns in Spain and in other European countries. The Palomares incident is an excellent historical illustration of the need for a versatile information policy that can be organized and set into action almost immediately after a sensitive military incident.
 

Ireland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. Cold War Concerns
Whelan, Bernadette

The implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe from 1947 to 1951 has been increasingly well documented as archival materials have become available. Although U.S. motivations and the extent of the U.S. contribution to rehabilitating and uniting Europe, thwarting Communism, and consolidating democracy are still debated by historians, there is little disagreement about the impressive size and logistics of the program. However, not all of the assistance delivered was in the form of food, finance, and technical advice. Ideological and psychological weapons were also used. This article examines all of these aspects of the Marshall Plan and how the campaigns actually worked in a country that has often been left out of analyses of the postwar reconstruction—Ireland. Because Ireland had been neutral during the war and wanted to remain neutral afterward, the question of participating in a U.S.-sponsored program that did not include the Communist European states (because the Soviet Union vetoed their participation) raised sensitive questions within Ireland about the desirability of being so conspicuously aligned with a Western bloc.
 

Mongolian Politics in the Shadow of the Cold War: The 1964 Coup Attempt and the Sino-Soviet Split
Radchenko, S. S.

After Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of some of Stalin's crimes in 1956, the Mongolian People's Republic, following in the footsteps of the "fraternal" Soviet Union, also succumbed to the "thaw." Khrushchev used de-Stalinization to discredit his hardline opponents. Mongolia's leader, Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, was a Stalin-era holdover who came under criticism from his rivals for being unenthusiastic about political reforms. Tsedenbal had good reason to downplay de-Stalinization: He shared responsibility with Marshal Horloogiyn Choibalsan for violent repressions in the 1940s. But Tsedenbal outmaneuvered and eliminated his opponents in the late 1950s and early 1960s and consolidated his grip on power by 1964. Toward the end of that year, however, Tsedenbal once again was challenged, this time from an unexpected direction. Several members of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) used the precedent of Khrushchev's forced retirement from his leadership posts in Moscow in October 1964 as a pretext to overthrow Tsedenbal. At a plenum of the MPRP Central Committee in December 1964, Tsedenbal was accused of incompetence, corruption, disrespect for principles of "party democracy," lack of economic discipline, and overreliance on the Soviet Union for credits. But Tsedenbal rebuffed the "anti-party group" and depicted the affair as an attempted coup engineered by pro-Chinese sympathizers and spies. Soviet leaders were wary of Chinese efforts to "subvert" Moscow's influence in the socialist camp and were therefore willing to endorse Tsedenbal's version of events.
 

Volume 7, Issue 4 (Fall 2005)

 

"Reenacting the Story of Tantalus": Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Failed Rhetoric of Liberation
Tudda, Christopher J.

This article examines Dwight Eisenhower's and John Foster Dulles's publicly declared goal to achieve the "liberation" of Eastern Europe, a goal that they claimed would replace the Truman administration's "passive" containment policy. But the evidence shows that Eisenhower and Dulles were unwilling to risk war with the Soviet Union and believed that liberation, if actually pursued, would induce the Soviet Union to react violently to perceived threats in Eastern Europe. Hence, in top-secret meetings and conversations, Eisenhower and Dulles rejected military liberation, despite their public pronouncements. Instead, they secretly pursued a tricky, risky, and long-term strategy of radio broadcasts and covert action designed to erode, rather than overthrow, Soviet power in Eastern Europe. In public, they continued to embrace liberation policy even when confronted with testimony from U.S. allies that the rhetorical diplomacy of liberation had not worked. This reliance on rhetoric failed to deter the Soviet Union from quashing rebellions in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. If anything, the Eisenhower administration's rhetorical liberation policy may have encouraged, at least to some degree, these revolts.
 

Private Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy: William Pawley and the 1954 Coup d'État in Guatemala
Holland, Max

As a wealthy American businessman and former ambassador, William Pawley was a key actor in PBSUCCESS, the covert operation that brought down the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in Guatemala in 1954. The anti-Arbenz rebels, led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, could not have defeated the Guatemalan army on their own. The key to a successful coup was getting the army to act on their behalf, and in this regard, control of the air was vital. Pawley, owing to his knowledge of Latin America and experience in aviation, played a central role in ensuring that the rebels enjoyed air superiority during their move against the president. At a more abstract level, Pawley exemplified the role non-governmental actors played in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. The "state-private network," as it has been dubbed, remains a rich vein for scholarly investigation.
 

Cold War Pop Culture and the Image of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Perspective of the Original Star Trek Series
Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan

Star Trek has been a major American cultural phenomenon. In the 1960s, when the original series was in production, the producers, directors, and writers attempted to use it as a forum to comment on a number of political issues. They intentionally designed some episodes to critique U.S. foreign policy in the belief that the United States should seek to foster democracy and refrain from using force that would undermine the country's positive role in international affairs. In part, then, Star Trek was a running effort to reshape the foreign policies of the United States.
 

From Non-alignment to Neutrality: Austria's Transformation during the First East-West Détente, 1953-1958
Gehler, Michael

This article deals with Austria during the first phase of détente from 1953 to 1958, a period in which the country was still formally under Four-Power control. The article recounts and analyzes the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty (and Austria's accompanying declaration of neutrality) in 1955 and the positions taken by Austria during the crises in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Lebanon in 1958. Austria's neutrality was spurred not so much by the Cold War as by the East-West "thaw" after Stalin's death. Neutrality helped usher in a remarkably successful period of national self-assertion that facilitated Austria's efforts at nation building.
 

Volume 7. Issue 3 (Summer 2005)

 

Revolution or Self-Defense? Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War
Iatrides, John O.

At the end of World War II the Greek Communist party (KKE) claimed that it would seek an accommodation with its domestic opponents, but the party soon launched a full-scale insurrection on its own initiative in the expectation of receiving decisive support from the Soviet Union. With civil war under way, the head of the KKE, Nikos Zahariadis, repeatedly told Soviet officials that victory was certain if the Greek Communists could obtain funding, weapons, and other equipment from the USSR and its allies. Although Soviet leaders were concerned that the KKE's aggressiveness would provoke a U.S. reaction, they permitted the clandestine shipment of large quantities of supplies that delayed but could not avert the insurgents' defeat. U.S. officials at the time largely misperceived the causes of the insurrection, but they correctly sensed that the KKE's dependence on Soviet-bloc assistance would ensure that a Communist victory would bring Greece into Moscow's orbit.
 

The Nixon Administration, the "Horror Strategy," and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine
Burr, William

In early 1969 President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, received a briefing on the U.S. nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Appalled by the catastrophic scale of the SIOP, Nixon and Kissinger sought military options that were more credible than massive nuclear strikes. Participants in the Air Force Nuclear Options project also supported more flexible nuclear war plans. Although Kissinger repeatedly asked Defense Department officials to construct limited options, they were skeptical that it would be possible to control nuclear escalation or to introduce greater flexibility without weakening the SIOP. Interagency studies presented a mixed verdict about the desirability of limited options; nevertheless, continued White House pressure encouraged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to sponsor a major review of nuclear targeting. In 1972 the Foster panel developed concepts of limited, selective, and regional nuclear options that were responsive to Kissinger's interest in credible nuclear threats. The Foster panel's report led to the controversial "Schlesinger Doctrine" and further efforts to revise the SIOP, but serious questions endured about the whole concept of controlled nuclear warfare.
 

Continuity and Change: Reinterpreting the Policies of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations toward Iran, 1950-1954
Marsh, Steve

It has long been argued that the Eisenhower administration pursued a more assertive policy toward Iran than the Truman administration did. This interpretative consensus, though, has recently come under challenge. In the Journal of Cold War Studies in 1999, Francis Gavin argued that U.S. policy toward Iran in 1950-1953 became progressively more assertive in response to a gradual shift in the global U.S.-USSR balance of power. This article shares, and develops further, Gavin's revisionist theme of policy continuity, but it explains the continuity by showing that Truman and Eisenhower had the same principal objectives and made the same basic assumptions when devising policy. The more assertive policy was primarily the result of the failure of U.S. policy by early 1952. The Truman administration subsequently adopted a more forceful policy, which Eisenhower simply continued until all perceived options for saving Iran from Communism were foreclosed other than that of instigating a coup to bring about a more pliable government.
 

Who Is Trying to Keep What Secret from Whom and Why? MI5-FBI Relations and the Klaus Fuchs Case
Goodman, Michael S.

Klaus Fuchs was one of the most infamous spies of the Cold War, whose espionage feats altered the nature of the early postwar period. Drawing on newly released archival documents and witness testimony, this article considers the events surrounding his arrest and conviction. These sources reveal that even before Fuchs was arrested, he was used as a pawn. Because of his supreme importance to the British nuclear weapons program, some British officials initially believed that he should remain in his position, despite his admission of guilt. Until the matter was resolved, Fuchs was used unwittingly as a wedge between the British and U.S. intelligence services. Moreover, when the United States criticized British security standards, the Fuchs case was used by MI5 to cajole and mislead Parliament and the public.
 

Volume 7, Issue 2 (Spring 2005)

 

Introduction: The Role of Ideas and the End of the Cold War
Tannenwald, Nina and Wohlforth, William Curti

The end of the Cold War helped to prompt new interest in the study of ideas in international politics. Once the province of a few dedicated researchers on the fringes of the discipline, scholarship on the role of ideas now occupies an important place in the mainstream of North American and especially European international relations research. The five articles in this special issue of the journal are intended to move the research agenda on ideas and the end of the Cold War to a new level of rigor. They develop new models of how ideas affected the outcome and, in so doing, take stock of this event to refine our understanding of how ideas work in international politics. Although we seek a deeper understanding of the end of the Cold War itself, we also use this seminal case to clarify and advance the debate over the role of ideas in international politics more generally.
 

Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda
Tannenwald, Nina

This article responds to key methodological and theoretical challenges posed by the literature on the role of ideas in international relations, especially the literature on ideas and the end of the Cold War. The article develops a theoretical framework that guides the analysis of the empirical articles that follow. It identifies explanatory strategies for the role of ideas and seeks to clarify key methodological issues in the study of ideas. The article defines terms, identifies several different relationships between ideational and material factors, and lays out a series of "tests" for evaluating the causal effect of various kinds of ideas and ideational mechanisms. It then seeks to clarify two primary issues: whether it is possible to draw a clearer line between the material and the ideational; and what is meant by "constitutive effects" and "constitutive explanation." The article defends the notion of constitutive explanation and shows how both causal analysis and constitutive analysis are valid explanatory strategies for the role of ideas.
 

The Sociology of New Thinking: Elites, Identity Change, and the End of the Cold War
English, Robert

This article recounts the origins of Soviet "new thinking" as a case study of how Soviet intellectuals sought to redefine national identity in response to the West. It demonstrates that new thinking was fundamentally normative, not instrumental, insofar as it was developed in a period (1950s­1960s) when "socialism" was thought to be materially outperforming capitalism. It also demonstrates that new thinking decisively affected Soviet policy in the second half of the 1980s. Putting forth a socialization argument to show how new-thinking ideas originated in the post-Stalin period within a community of intellectuals, the article charts the growing influence of these intellectuals through the 1970s and 1980s. In the mid-1980s, when Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party and empowered many of the new thinkers as advisers, their liberal, Westernizing ideas played an indispensable role in shaping his reforms. The analysis focuses on mechanisms of identity change at two levels: that of the community of reformist intellectuals, and that of the Soviet Union itself. The analysis challenges realist and rationalist views that new thinking was largely instrumental. Until the Gorbachev era, Soviet reformers advocated new-thinking ideas often at the risk of their personal, professional, and institutional interests.
 

The Guns That Didn't Smoke: Ideas and the Soviet Non-Use of Force in 1989
Bennett, Andrew

Why did Soviet leaders not resort to force to preserve the Warsaw Pact in 1989? This article provides a cognitive model of how decision-makers learn from experience. It seeks to specify and establish the causal effect of this mechanism (elite cause-and-effect learning) as opposed to alternatives (more materialist or normative arguments) and to lay out the scope conditions for its operation. Soviet leaders learned from past Soviet military interventions in Czechoslovakia, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere the high costs and negative consequences of the use of force. Even Soviet hardliners, for both material and ideational reasons (i.e., beliefs about the efficacy of force), would have hesitated about the use of force in Eastern Europe had they been in power. The hardliners did, however, have much different views about the terms the Soviet Union should seek regarding German unification. Gorbachev's ideas prevailed largely because of the lingering authority of his position as top leader. In short, although ideas and material constraints pushed in the same direction to produce the startling events of 1989, ideas and governmental structure were critical in determining which of competing policy prescriptions would prevail regarding German unification.
 

Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War
Thomas, Daniel C.

This article analyzes the role of human-rights ideas in the collapse of Communism. The demise of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was significantly influenced by the transnational diffusion of human-rights ideas. The analysis focuses on how human-rights norms were transmitted to Soviet dissidents and policymakers. The article also considers precisely how, and how much, these norms affected policy. The two primary causal mechanisms were the transmission of these ideas by a transnational Eastern European social movement for human rights, which expanded the roster of available political concepts and the terms of political legitimacy, and the mechanism of "rhetorical entrapment" whereby Soviet leaders became "trapped" or constrained to uphold their rhetorical commitment to the Helsinki Accords by the expanding discourse of human rights. Subsequently, Soviet leaders accepted human rights ideas for both substantive and instrumental reasons. Western power played some role, but the ideas themselves were salient, legitimate, and resonant for Soviet leaders seeking a new identity and destiny for the Soviet Union.
 

Economic Incentives, Ideas, and the End of the Cold War: Gorbachev and German Unification
Forsberg, Tuomas

Focusing on Gorbachev and German unification, this article shows how the effectiveness of economic aid depends on ideas decision-makers hold about economics and identity. German economic statecraft worked in securing Gorbachev's support for German unification solely because of a specific set of ideas that animated Soviet decision-makers during that period. The weakness of the Soviet economy made economic assistance from Germany attractive, but Gorbachev did not bargain hard over the amount of aid because he thought it would ruin an anticipated close partnership with Germany in the future. The importance of the German economic incentives lay in their role as trust-building measures. In contrast, Japan's effort to use economic aid to persuade Soviet leaders to return the Kurile Islands during the same period failed, in part because Soviet leaders did not expect a friendly relationship with Japan. For cultural and political reasons, Soviet leaders were more oriented toward Germany and the West. The fact that Soviet leaders did not seek aid or technology from Japan--a technology powerhouse--and turned instead to Germany, shows that material pressures alone cannot account for the success or failure of economic incentives.
 

The End of the Cold War as a Hard Case for Ideas
Wohlforth, William Curti

The articles in this special issue of the journal succeeded in meeting the core objective set out in the introduction: to refine, deepen, and extend previous studies of the role of ideas in the end of the Cold War. In particular, they confront more forthrightly than past studies a major challenge of studying ideas in this case; namely, that ideas, material incentives, and policy all covaried. Two other important problems for those seeking to establish an independent role for ideas remain to be addressed in future studies. Facing those problems as squarely as the contributors to this issue have faced the covariation problem will yield major benefits for the study of ideas in this case and in international relations more generally.
 

Volume 7, Issue 1 (Winter 2005)

 

The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 3)
Kramer, Mark

This is the concluding part of a three-part article that discusses the transformation of Soviet­East European relations in the late 1980s and the impact of the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union. This final segment is divided into two main parts: First, it provides an extended analysis of the bitter public debate that erupted in the Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991 about the "loss" of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The debate roiled the Soviet political system and fueled the hardline backlash against Mikhail Gorbachev. Second, this part of the article offers a concluding section that highlights the theoretical implications of the article as a whole. The article, as the conclusion shows, sheds light on recent literature concerning the diffusion of political innovations and the external context of democratization and political change.
 

Special Forum: The Marshall Plan and the Origins of the Cold War Reassessed
Cox, Michael
Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline
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Two British scholars reassess what they view as the decisive episode in the early Cold War, the Marshall Plan. Far from seeing the Plan as a mere act of generosity by the United States, they argue that it was an integral part of an increasingly aggressive U.S. posture toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was still seeking a cooperative relationship with the United States, but the U.S. decision to establish a European Recovery Program (ERP) without a sincere intention of including the Soviet Union posed a threat to Soviet security interests. Josif Stalin wanted to prevent the United States from luring the East European countries away from the Soviet Union's sphere of influence and into the Western sphere. Although Stalin was reluctant to abandon his bid for close cooperation with the West, the Marshall Plan left him with little choice. As the ERP progressed, Stalin drastically tightened his hold over Eastern Europe and imposed Soviet-style systems on the countries in the region. The Marshall Plan thus had the "tragic" effect of creating a long-term divide in Europe that consigned tens of millions of people to life under tyranny.
 

Responses

Five distinguished scholars offer separate commentaries on the article by Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe. All of the commentators reject the broad interpretation and many of the specific arguments put forth by Cox and Kennedy-Pipe. They point out several crucial issues that are omitted from the article and raise questions about the authors' sources, use of evidence, and selective invocation of secondary literature. They regret that Cox and Kennedy-Pipe seem to dwell on a large number of the same matters that preoccupied radical revisionist historians in the 1960s. They argue that although Cox and Kennedy-Pipe offer a more sophisticated version of revisionism, their article suffers from many of the same shortcomings. Most of the commentators believe that the Marshall Plan merely reflected a division of Europe that was already well under way rather than being the precipitating cause. In that sense, the debate on the origins of the Cold War needs to go well beyond the issues raised by Cox and Kennedy-Pipe.
 
Response 1: The Marshall Plan as Tragedy
Trachtenberg, Marc
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Response 2: The Advent of Neo-Revisionism?
Bishof, Günter
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Response 3: Looking for Love (or Tragedy) in All the Wrong Places
Bonds, John Bledsoe
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Response 4: Was American Diplomacy Really Tragic?
Borhi, László
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Response 5: The Marshall Plan and the Division of Europe
Maier, Charles S.
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Rejoinder: The Tragedies of American Foreign Policy: Further Reflections
Cox, Michael.
Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline

Cox and Kennedy-Pipe offer a staunch defense of their article, arguing that the commentators generally missed the point of what the article was supposed to accomplish. Rather than providing an exhaustive account of the early Cold War and all the complications posed by Germany, the article sought to distill the essence of U.S. and Soviet strategies. The basic problem, as highlighted in the article, is that the United States would not accept the extension of Soviet influence into Eastern Europe and that, in opposing and seeking to roll back Soviet influence, U.S. officials sealed the fate of the East European countries.
 

Volume 6, Issue 4 (Fall 2004)

 

The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2)
Kramer, Mark

This is the second part of a three-part article that looks at the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the repercussions of those events in the Soviet Union. The first part focused on the "direct" spillover from Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union, whereas this segment examines the "indirect" spillover, which took four forms: (1) the discrediting of Marxist-Leninist ideology, (2)the heightened sense of the Soviet regime's own vulnerability, (3)the diminished potential for the use of force in the USSR to curb internal unrest, and (4) the "demonstration effect" and "contagiousness" of regime change and democratization in Eastern Europe. These factors together made it considerably more difficult for Gorbachev to prevent the Soviet Union from unraveling. The final part of the article will be published in the next issue of the journal.
 

Immunizing against the American Other: Racism, Nationalism, and Gender in U.S.-Icelandic Military Relations during the Cold War
Valur Ingimundarson

The 1951 U.S.-Icelandic Defense Agreement paved the way for a permanent U.S. military presence at the Keflavik base in Iceland, an outpost that played a crucial role in U.S. strategy during the Cold War. The article explores two gender-related aspects of the U.S.-Icelandic Cold War relationship: the restrictions on off-base movements of U.S. soldiers, and the secret ban imposed by the Icelandic government on the stationing of black U.S. troops in Iceland. These practices were meant to "protect" Icelandic women and to preserve a homogeneous "national body." Although U.S. officials repeatedly tried tohave the restrictions lifted, the Icelandic government refused to modify them until the racial ban was publicly disclosed in late 1959. Even after the practice came to light, it took another several years before the ban was gradually eliminated. Misguided though the Icelandic restrictions may have been, they did, paradoxically, help to defuse domestic opposition to Iceland's pro-American foreign policy course and thus preserved the country's role in the Western alliance.
 

De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and The Choice for Europe : Soft Sources, Weak Evidence
Lieshout, Robert S.
Segers, Mathieu L. L.
Vleuten, Johanna Maria van der

In The Choice for Europe Andrew Moravcsik develops a "commercial" interpretation of Charles de Gaulle's European policies. Moravcsik claims that his revisionist analysis succeeds because he, as opposed to almost all other students of European Community policymaking, has relied not on "soft" sources but on hard primary sources. An investigation of his claim shows that it cannot be substantiated. Both the quality of his sources and his handling of them are poor. His commercial interpretation of de Gaulle's policy is based on a serious misreading of the two sources on which his argument depends. Finally, his restatement in 2000 ofhis original argument—a restatement intended to overcome the problem that, as his critics pointed out, he failed to produce any direct supporting evidence—leads only to further problems.
 
REVIEW ESSAY
German and Soviet Military Doctrinal Innovation before World War II
Roberts, Cynthia
In the lead-up to World War II, both Germany and the Soviet Union pursued important changes in military doctrine that proved crucial during the armed confrontation between the two countries in 1941-1945. Using a new book by the military historian Mary Habeck as a point of departure, this essay explains how the German and Soviet armed forces by the late 1930s had developed almost identical doctrines without extensively borrowing from each other. Although the doctrinal innovations that informed the German Blitzkrieg and the Soviet conception of "deep battle" have long attracted attention, Habeck's book is the first detailed comparison of the development of armored warfare in these two countries. Although the book does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the sources of innovation in military doctrine, it sheds a great deal of light on the revolutionary changes in German and Soviet military doctrines during the interwar years.



Volume 6, Issue 3 (Summer 2004)

 

The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 2)
Hershberg, James G.

Though virtually ignored in the historiography, Brazil played an intriguing role in the politics and diplomacy of the Cuban missile crisis and in U.S.- Cuban relations during the Kennedy administration. In the years after Fidel Castro took power, successive Brazilian governments tried secretly to mediate between Washington and Havana as their mutual confrontation intensified. Newly available U.S., Brazilian, Cuban, and other sources reveal that this role climaxed during the missile crisis, as John F. Kennedy clandestinely sought to employ Brazil to transmit a message to Castro. In turn, Brazil, which was also promoting a Latin American denuclearization scheme at the United Nations as a possible means of resolving the crisis, sought to broker a formula for U.S.-Cuban reconciliation that would heighten the prestige of its own "independent" policy in the Cold War. Ultimately, these efforts failed, but they shed light on previously hidden aspects of both the missile crisis and the triangular U.S.-Cuban-Brazilian relationship. This is the concluding part of a two-part article.

The Irony of Vietnam: The Johnson Administration's Tentative Bridge Building to China, 1965-1966
Lumbers, Michael
Drawing on recently declassified American documents, this article traces the shift in U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) initiated by the Johnson administration in 1965-1966. During the first two years of his presidency, Lyndon Johnson resisted proposals to adopt a more flexible stance toward China, owing in large part to his suspicion that Beijing was encouraging and supplying the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam. This perception remained intact for the duration of the Johnson years and stifled major changes in policy toward China. Yet ironically, the Vietnam War itself led to a reappraisal of long-standing strategy toward the PRC. Johnson's determination to head off the threat of Chinese intervention in Vietnam and to sustain public support for the war yielded a relaxation of travel restrictions, the promotion of unofficial contacts between the two countries, and a striking change in rhetoric.

REVIEW ESSAY
The Soviet Dimension of Italian Communism
Drake, Richard

This essay reviews two books that provide diverging views of the relationship between the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Soviet Union. The first book, a lengthy collection of declassified documents from the former Soviet archives, provides abundant evidence of the PCI's crucial dependence on Soviet funding. No Communist party outside the Soviet bloc depended more on Soviet funding over the years than the PCI did. Vast amounts of money flowed from Moscow into the PCI's coffers. The Italian Communists maintained their heavy reliance on Soviet funding until the early 1980s. The other book discussed here—a memoir by Gianni Cervetti, a former senior PCI financial official—seeks to defend the party's policy and to downplay the importance of the aid provided by Moscow. Nonetheless, even Cervetti's book makes clear, if only inadvertently, that the link with the Soviet Union helped spark the broader collapse of Marxism-Leninism as a mobilizing force.

REVIEW ESSAY
The CIA and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981
Davies, Richard T.

The crisis in Poland in 1980-1981 imposed great demands on the U.S. intelligence community. On the one hand, U.S. intelligence analysts sought to determine whether the Soviet Union might send troops into Poland to crush the Solidarity movement. On the other hand, a small group of senior intelligence and national security officials who were privy to reports from Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff who was secretly working for the United States, had to decide how best to use the enormously valuable information the colonel was providing. These issues and others pertaining to the activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Polish crisis are examined in a new book by Douglas J. MacEachin, a former CIA deputy director who oversaw the agency's efforts vis-à-vis Poland and the Soviet Union. MacEachin's book, as this essay shows, provides an astute and refreshingly candid evaluation of the CIA's performance.
 

Volume 6, Issue 2 (Spring 2004)

 
The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Part 1)
James G. Hershberg
Though virtually ignored in the historiography, Brazil played an intriguing role in the politics and diplomacy of the Cuban missile crisis and in U.S.-Cuban relations during the Kennedy administration. In the years after Fidel Castro took power, successive Brazilian governments tried secretly to mediate between Washington and Havana as their mutual confrontation intensified. Newly available U.S., Brazilian, Cuban, and other sources reveal that this role climaxed during the missile crisis, as John F. Kennedy clandestinely sought to employ Brazil to transmit a message to Castro. In turn, Brazil, which was also promoting a Latin American denuclearization scheme at the United Nations as a possible method to resolve the crisis, sought to broker a formula for U.S.-Cuban reconciliation that would heighten the prestige of its own “independent” policy in the Cold War. Ultimately, these efforts failed, but they shed light on previously hidden aspects of both the missile crisis and the triangular U.S.-Cuban-Brazilian relationship. The first part of this two-part article sets the scene for an in-depth look at the Cuban missile crisis, which will be covered in Part 2 of the article in the next issue of the journal.

Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War
Raymond L. Garthoff

Foreign intelligence played a number of important roles in the Cold War, but this topic has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. This survey article provides a broad overview of some of the new literature and documentation pertaining to Cold War-era intelligence, as well as the key dimensions of the topic. Despite the continued obstacles posed by secrecy and the mixed reliability of sources, the publication of numerous memoirs and the release of a huge volume of fresh archival material in the post-Cold War era have opened new opportunities to study the role of intelligence in Cold War history. Scholars should explore not only the “micro level” of the problem (the impact of intelligence on specific events) but also the “macro level,” looking at the many ways that the Cold War as a whole (its origins, its course, and its outcome) was influenced, perhaps even shaped, by the intelligence agencies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other key countries. It is also crucial to examine the unintended consequences of intelligence activities. Some interesting examples have recently come to light of “blowback” (effects that boomerang againts the country that initiated them) from intelligence operations that the United States undertook against the Soviet Union. Only by understanding the complex nature of the role of intelligence during the Cold War will we be able to come to grips with the historiographical challenge that the topic poses.

REVIEW ESSAY
Italian Communism and Soviet Terror

Richard Drake

The declassification of materials from the Russian archives has provided a good deal of new evidence about the relationship between the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Soviet Union both before and after World War II. Two newly published collections of documents leave no doubt that, contrary to arguments made by supporters of the PCI, the Italian party was in fact strictly subservient to the dictates of Josif Stalin. The documents reveal the unsavory role of the PCI leader, Palmiro Togliatti, in the destruction of large sections of the Italian Communist movement and in the tragic fate of Italian prisoners of war who were held in the Soviet Union during and after World War II. Togliatti’s legacy, as these documents make clear, was one of terror and the Stalinization of the PCI.

REVIEW ESSAY
Historical Analogies and the Use of Force

John Garofano

Using a recent book by Jeffrey Record as a point of departure, this essay considers the role of historical analogies in decisions by U.S. leaders to use force during the Cold War. The analogies considered by Record – those of Munich and Vietnam – may have had a bearing on some decisions, but it is often difficult to assess their relative weight compared to other critical variables. Moreover, other analogies not considered by Record – Pearl Harbor, for example – may have been far more salient, during certain crises, than the analogies he examines. In any case, we need a more systematic analysis of historical analogies than Record provides if we are to gauge the real influence and impact of historical analogies on the Cold War.

Volume 6, Issue 1 (Winter 2004)

 
A Dangerous Miscalculation: A Reassessment of North Korean Policymaking and the Crises of 1968
Mitchell Lerner

When North Korean forces seized an American intelligence ship, the USS Pueblo, in international waters on 23 January 1968, U.S. officials assumed that the attack had been orchestrated in conjunction with the Soviet Union, Communist China, or both. Based on this assumption, the Johnson administration contacted Soviet leaders and asked them to resolve the matter. But it turned out that there was little Moscow could do. Newly available documentation shows that North Korea was acting independently in 1968 and did not even inform Soviet or Chinese leaders in advance of the capture of the ship. The U.S. government’s failure to recognize that North Korea had been acting on its own meant that a good deal of time was squandered on efforts to prod the Soviet authorities to intervene. The resolution of the prolonged crisis, in December 1968, was feasible only because the Johnson administration managed to accommodate North Korea’s rather bizarre demands without yielding on the substance of the matter.

Crisis and Opportunity: NATO and the Miscalculation of Détente, 1966-1968
Andreas Wenger

This article discusses how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) overcame the challenged posed by France in the mid- to late 1960s. French President Charles de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw France’s remaining forces from NATO’s integrated military commands, and his visit to Moscow shortly thereafter, exposed the alliance to unprecedented tension. Yet as NATO moved toward a crisis, opportunities arose to define a new vision for the alliance in a time of détente. Trilateral talks among the United States, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany forged a consensus on strategy, force levels, burden sharing, and nuclear consultation – a consensus that was endorsed by the other member-states. The Harmel exercise in 1967 restored NATO’s political purpose, expanding its political role as an instrument of peace. By 1968, NATO had evolved into a less hierarchical military alliance of fourteen and a more political and participatory alliance of fifteen (including France). This successful transformation of NATO moved the process of détente from the bilateral superpower accommodation of 1963 to the multilateral European rapprochement of the 1970s.

REVIEW ESSAY
Public Diplomacy During the Cold War: The Record and Its Implications

James Critchlow
 
Public diplomacy in its many forms proved a great asset for the United States during the Cold War. A new book by Yale Richmond, a retired U.S. official who for many years was involved with policy toward the Soviet Union, including U.S.-Soviet exchanges, highlights the importance of the “cultural” dimension of the Cold War. Richmond focuses on the U.S. side of the U.S.-Soviet exchanges, but he also provides interesting comments about Soviet policy, drawing on newly declassified materials from the former Soviet archives. The exchanges, information programs, and other activities undertaken by the U.S. Information Agency and the Department of State played a crucial role in spreading democratic ideas and values within the Soviet bloc. Candid and balanced broadcasts were far more effective than the heavy-handed propaganda that was used initially. The record of public diplomacy during the Cold War provides some important lessons for U.S. foreign policymakers in the post-Cold War world.

REVIEW ESSAY
Georges Marchais and the Decline of French Communism

Jeffrey Vanke

Georges Marchais’s long tenure as the leader of the French Communist Party (PCF) witnessed a sharp decline in the party’s electoral performance. Shortly after Marchais took over, the PCF received more than 20 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections; by the time he left office, the party’s share of the vote had dropped to less than 10 percent. A new biography of Marchais, by Thomas Hofnung, provides a nuanced assessment of the French Communist leader, showing why Marchais’s political instincts, which once proved so remarkably effective, began to fail him the longer he was in power. Marchais’s decision to endorse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979-1980 symbolized the decline of the PCF, but even then, Marchais’s colleagues were unwilling to remove him. He remained in office for another decade, as the fortunes of the party continued to ebb. Hofnung’s perceptive book takes due account of Marchais’s strengths, but is especially illuminating in its portrayal of the French Communists in decline – a decline that paralleled the waning of the Cold War.

Volume 5, Issue 4 (Fall 2003)
 
Social Trends, Public Attitudes, and the Dilemma of Opening the USSR
Walter D. Connor
 
Soviet society underwent profound changes during the seven-and-a-half decades of Soviet rule.  By the late 1970s and 1980s, adverse economic and demographic trends had led to widespread public cynicism, especially among younger people.  Mikhail Gorbachev was aware of the discontent within Soviet society when he came to office in 1985, and he pursued a reform program that was intended to remedy the country’s ills and rejuvenate the society.  In the end, he failed.  Although Soviet society did not “revolt” against Gorbachev’s reforms and the hardships that ensued, the crucial thing by 1991 was that the society as a whole no longer had much of a stake in the survival of the USSR – a stake that might have induced people to mobilize in favor of preserving a union.

Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union
Astrid S. Tuminez
Nationalism and ethnic pressures contributed to the breakup of the Soviet Union, but they were not the primary cause.  A qualified exception to this argument is Russian elite separatist nationalism, led by Boris Yeltsin, which had a direct impact on Soviet disintegration.  This article provides an overview of Soviet policy vis-à-vis nationalities, discusses the surge of nationalism and ethnic pressures in the Soviet Union in 1988-1991, and shows how ethnic unrest and separatist movements weakened the Soviet state.  However, the demise of the Soviet Union resulted mainly from three other key factors:  1) Mikhail Gorbachev’s failure to establish a viable compact between center and periphery in the early years of his rule, 2) Gorbachev’s general unwillingness to use decisive force to quell ethnic and nationalist challenges, and 3) the defection of a core group of Russian elites from the Soviet regime.

Western Policy and the Demise of the Soviet Union
Celeste A. Wallander
The role of Western governments in the disintegration of the Soviet Union was complex.  The two most important factors that undermined the Soviet state were the deepening economic chaos under Mikhail Gorbachev and the rapid growth of internal political dissent.  Western policies tended to magnify both of these factors.  This is not to say, however, that Gorbachev’s original decision to embark on an economic reform program was simply the result of pressure created by Western defense spending and military deployments.  The Soviet economy was plagued by severe weaknesses, of which the misallocation of resources and excessive military expenditures were only a small part. Gorbachev’s initial economic reforms were spurred by his awareness of the country’s general economic problems.  After the first round of reforms failed, he sensed that arms control and reductions in military spending would be helpful for the next stage.  Even so, the belated cuts he made in military spending (beginning in 1989 and 1990) were of relatively little consequence.  The West’s refusal to pour money into the Soviet system without evidence of structural reform in the last years of the Soviet regime, and Western pressure on Gorbachev not to crack down on political dissent and separatism, did hasten the Soviet collapse.  These policies denied the Soviet system resources that might have prolonged its survival, and they helped to deter Gorbachev from using decisive force against elements that were splitting the Soviet Union apart.    

The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions Within the Soviet Union (Part 1)
Mark Kramer

The largely peaceful collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 reflected the profound changes that Mikhail Gorbachev had carried out in Soviet foreign policy.  Successful though the process was in Eastern Europe, it had destabilizing repercussions within the Soviet Union.  The effects were both direct and indirect.  The first part of this two-part article looks at Gorbachev’s policy toward Eastern Europe, the collapse of Communism in the region, and the direct “spillover” from Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union.  The second part of the article, to be published in the next issue of the journal, discusses the indirect spillover into the Soviet Union and the fierce debate that emerged within the Soviet political elite about the “loss” of the Eastern bloc – a debate that helped spur the leaders of the attempted hardline coup d'état in August 1991.



Volume 5, Issue 3 (Summer 2003)

 
France and the German Question, 1945-1955
Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg
This article challenges the traditional view that France was “obsessed” with the German threat in the decade after World War II and that French leaders only grudgingly accepted the policy that the United States and Britain had decided to pursue. The official rhetoric of the postwar period should not to be taken at face value. In reality, French leaders understood the logic of the “western strategy” for Germany and at a very basic level endorsed it. Even on the question of West German rearmament – a critical issue in 1950 – the French government was not nearly as opposed to moving ahead as many scholars have argued.

Responses

Three scholars offer separate responses to the article by Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg. The responses include some common points, but they diverge sharply in other respects. The first two respondents generally agree with the conclusions reached by Creswell and Trachtenberg, but one of them believes that the article goes too far (in its contention that France’s anxiety about the Soviet Union eclipsed its concerns about Germany), whereas the other argues that the article does not go far enough in showing how the United States adapted its policy to accommodate French leaders. The second respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have added anything new to the latest “revisionist” works on French-German relations in the first decade of the Cold War. The third respondent, unlike the first two, rejects the main thrust of the Creswell/Trachtenberg article and seeks to defend the traditional view that France was very reluctant to go along with U.S. and British policies on the German question. This respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have focused on the most appropriate sources of evidence.

Rejoinder

Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg reply to the three commentaries, emphasizing the conflicting points raised therein. Addressing each of the respondents in turn, Creswell and Trachtenberg contend that their article accurately depicts French concerns in the late 1940s and 1950s, that it goes beyond existing “revisionist” works on the topic, that it debunks the traditionalist view of French policy, and that it makes use of the best evidence to judge French leaders’ real (rather than publicly proclaimed) concerns.

Official Policies and Covert Programs: The U.S. State Department, the CIA and the Tibetan Resistance
John Kenneth Knaus
 
The U.S. government’s involvement in Tibetan affairs began over a half century ago with a series of commitments—both overt and covert—to support the Tibetans in their resistance to the Chinese occupation of their country. The motivation for undertaking these commitments and the scorecard on their fulfillment are mixed. When the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency abandoned any further efforts in the mid-1970s, the Congress and private organizations took over the sponsorship of the Tibetan cause, helping to generate a worldwide movement. With this support and under the direction of Tibet’s charismatic leader, the Dalai Lama, the status of Tibet became an internationally recognized human rights issue and thereby survived the Cold War in which it was spawned.

Rethinking Cold War Universities
David Engerman
Detailed research in archives and other primary sources has added a great deal to our understanding of American universities during the Cold War. Recent studies of “the Cold War University” describe the sometimes contradictory ambitions surrounding these institutions: faculty members seeking an escape from the classroom through external funding, administrators hoping to enhance their university's prestige and balance sheet, and government agencies promoting cutting-edge research with practical (usually military) applications. By examining four recent books on the topic, this article asks whether these impulses created a genuinely new institution – a “Cold War University” – or merely built on existing trends.  

Adapting International Relations Theory with the End of the Cold War
Terrence Hopmann
The end of the Cold War posed a formidable challenge for theorists of international relations. Almost all the theoretical approaches that were in vogue in the 1980s were unable to account for the sudden end of the bipolar Cold War system. These approaches could explain incremental change in international politics, but they fell woefully short when confronted by revolutionary developments of the sort that occurred in 1989-1991. Leading scholars in the field of international relations in recent years have sought to adapt earlier theories and devise new ones to help explain drastic changes in the international system. The books under review show that improvements and useful innovations have occurred, but that the field still has a long way to go before it can fully cope with abrupt, radical change.
 

Volume 5, Issue 2 (Spring 2003)

 
The Prelude to Nationwide Surveillance in East Germany: Stasi Operations and Threat Perceptions, 1945-1953
Gary S. Bruce
Many observers have been puzzled by the extent of the uprising that swept through East Germany in June 1953, given the legendary efficiency of the East German state security (Stasi) forces and their vast network of informants. Some scholars have even attempted to explain the Stasi’s inability to foresee and prevent the uprising by arguing that the Stasi conspired with the demonstrators. The opening of the archives of the former German Democratic Republic has shed valuable light on this issue. Based on extensive research in the archives of the Stasi and of the former Socialist Unity Party of East Germany, as well as materials from the West German archives, this article shows that the Stasi did not fail its party superiors in being unable to foresee the uprising of June 1953. There was, in fact, no way that the organization could have foreseen the rebellion.  Prior to 1953, the Stasi was not outfitted with a massive surveillance apparatus, nor was it mandated for broad internal surveillance. Rather, it primarily targeted well-known opposition groups at home and anti-Communist organizations based in West Berlin. The criticism directed against the Stasi after the uprising was attributable mainly to Walter Ulbricht’s embattled leadership position and his need for a scapegoat.

Peace Probes and the Bombing Pause:  Hungarian and Polish Diplomacy During the Vietnam War, December 1965-January 1966
James G. Hershberg
Archival materials from Budapest and Warsaw have shed valuable light on the role that Hungary and Poland played as intermediaries between Washington and Hanoi during the 37-day pause in the U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam in December 1965-January 1966.  It is now possible to trace contacts between the East European countries and Hanoi, and to see how the Hungarian and Polish governments coordinated their diplomatic activities with the Soviet Union.  Although the new evidence does not reveal any “missed opportunities” in early 1966 for the opening of direct peace negotiations between Washington and Hanoi, it does cast doubt on the way that former U.S. officials and most historians have interpreted these events.  Up to now, almost all accounts have dismissed Hungary’s and Poland’s efforts as insincere and deceptive, and some observers have even questioned whether the two countries were in genuine contact with North Vietnamese leaders.  The documentary evidence leaves many questions unanswered, but it permits a far more nuanced assessment of East European diplomacy during the bombing pause.

Efforts to Make Sense of the Vietnam War
Charles E. Neu
The Vietnam War is notoriously difficult to explain.  The war lasted so long, passed through so many phases, and involved such a wide range of people and groups in Vietnam, the United States, and other countries that the task of explaining it all in a single volume is nearly impossible.  Several recent books have tried to make sense of the conflict, with varying degrees of success.  The books under review are syntheses aimed at undergraduate students and general readers.  Although both books have their strong points, neither of them provides a comprehensive or satisfactory account of the war.  

Better Late Than Never?  The Delayed Debate over the Costs of Vietnam
Edwin Moise
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson sharply escalated the U.S. military effort in Vietnam and prepared for further escalation in 1966.  He and his aides, notably Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, did their best to forestall a public debate about the potential costs of the war.  They concealed their plans for increased military expenditures and expanded commitments of American troops.  Not until the United States was deeply embroiled in Vietnam did a full-fledged public debate finally emerge, along with protests and demonstrations at American universities.  If the administration had been more candid about its plans from the outset, U.S. policy might have gone in a different direction, and the domestic and international costs of the war might not have been as onerous.  
 

Volume 5, Issue 1 (Winter 2002)

 
The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR
Brian Taylor
This article uses competing theories of civil-military relations to explain why the Soviet military failed to act in a decisive manner to prevent the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The norms and beliefs held by Soviet military officers – that is, the military’s organizational culture – were crucial in shaping officers’ behavior. The article tests this explanation against other approaches to civil-military relations and finds that the organizational culture framework is by far the most convincing. The article gives particular attention to the behavior of the Soviet armed forces during the attempted coup d'état in August 1991 and the events leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet state at the end of 1991.

The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union
Amy Knight

More than a thousand radio addresses drafted by Ronald Reagan in the 1970s, in between his terms as governor of California and president of the United States, were recently published. These addresses, along with related writings from 1951 to 1985, reveal long-standing, consistent beliefs about a wide variety of topics in international relations and foreign policy. In particular, the writings presage specific arms control policies that were implemented in his first term as president. This article reassesses some of these policies in light of the newly released addresses. The article draws on experimental psychology to discuss a specific judgmental bias, availability, which makes particular beliefs more accessible, and then examines the five specific beliefs that influenced Reagan in his approach to arms control negotiations. In each case, the article shows how these beliefs affected policy outcomes and choices.


The August Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics
John B. Dunlop
A book published by the author in 1993 contained a lengthy chapter on the August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union. This article builds on and updates that chapter, making use of a trove of newly available documents and memoirs. The article discusses many aspects of the coup attempt, but it particularly seeks to explain why the coup failed and what the implications were for the Soviet Union. The events of December 1991 that culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union were the direct result of changes set in motion by the failed coup. The major state and party institutions that might ordinarily have tried to hold the country together – the Communist Party apparatus, the secret police, the military-industrial complex, the Ministry of Defense, and the state administrative organs – all were compromised by their participation in the coup. As a result, when events pushed the Soviet Union toward collapse, there was no way of staving off that outcome.

Yeltsin and Gorbachev: The Politics of Confrontation
Marc Zlotnik

The confrontation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps no event of comparable magnitude has been more affected by the personal interactions of two men. The history of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin relationship during the final years of the USSR is largely the story of the collapse of the Soviet state. The passionate dislike and animosity that developed between the two leaders made compromise difficult and accelerated the collapse of the union. Gorbachev’s initial unwillingness to deal seriously with the new Russian leader probably did more to contribute to the disintegration of the Soviet Union than did Yeltsin’s bluster and thirst for revenge. It was only when the tables were turned after the failed coup of August 1991, and when Yeltsin clearly had gained control of the situation, that he allowed his intense dislike of Gorbachev to drive his actions..

 

Volume 4, Issue 4 (Fall 2002)

 
The Planning Coordination Group: Bureaucratic Casualty in the Cold War Campaign to Exploit Soviet-Bloc Vulnerabilities
James Marchio
The Planning Coordination Group (PCG) was a non-departmental government organization created in March 1955 by the Eisenhower administration to generate new ideas and coordinate U.S. political warfare activities aimed at exploiting Soviet and East European vulnerabilities. The PCG’s demise six months later reflected the continuing problems encountered by the new national security bureaucracy in waging political warfare. The PCG’s agenda showcased the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to attack Communism and secure freedom in a world in which the number and destructiveness of nuclear weapons were growing rapidly. At the same time, the PCG’s history illustrates that "aggressive" Cold War policies had not been completely dismissed by the Eisenhower administration, a situation that contributed to the "conflicting approaches" strategy it pursued in 1955 and 1956 and the contradictions that adversely affected its policies in Eastern Europe. Finally, this case study highlights Dwight Eisenhower's unwillingness to back his rhetorical support for psychological warfare with consistent action.

The Origins of the Reagan Administration’s Arms Control Policy
Rose McDermott
More than a thousand radio addresses drafted by Ronald Reagan in the 1970s, in between his terms as governor of California and president of the United States, were recently published. These addresses, along with related writings from 1951 to 1985, reveal long-standing, consistent beliefs about a wide variety of topics in international relations and foreign policy. In particular, the writings presage specific arms control policies that were implemented in his first term as president. This article reassesses some of these policies in light of the newly released addresses. The article draws on experimental psychology to discuss a specific judgmental bias, availability, which makes particular beliefs more accessible, and then examines the five specific beliefs that influenced Reagan in his approach to arms control negotiations. In each case, the article shows how these beliefs affected policy outcomes and choices.

Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?
Jeremi Suri
Despite the many books and articles written on the end of the Cold War, scholars have not produced a truly international history of this seminal event. This article shows how some of the most important monographs on the end of the Cold War can be synthesized to yield a preliminary account. In particular, the article hints at a new consensus of interpretation that connects the immediate crisis of the early 1980s, long-term ideological and institutional trends, and transformational choices made from 1985 to 1991. No single decision or variable brought the Cold War to an end. Personalities, trends, and institutions interacted to create an outcome that few predicted.

Stalin, the Pact with Nazi Germany, and the Origins of Postwar Soviet Diplomatic Historiography
Geoffrey Roberts

Recently released files from the Stalin Fond in the former Central Party Archive in Moscow have shed new light on the development of postwar Soviet diplomatic historiography, particularly in relation to Josif Stalin’s personal role in framing the official rationale and justification for the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939-1941. This episode was linked to the emergence of a policy of archive-based publications in the mid-1950s and provided the foundation for later Soviet (and post-Soviet) treatments of the diplomatic history of the Second World War and other topics.

 

Volume 4, Issue 3 (Summer 2002)

 
"Ike" and Italy: The Eisenhower Administration and Italy’s "Neo-Atlanticist" Agenda
Alessandro Brogi
U.S.-Italian relations in the 1950s were shaped in part by Italy’s pursuit of a "Neo-Atlanticist" policy – a policy that emphasized economic multilateralism within the Western alliance and active diplomatic engagement with the non-aligned Arab countries. The Neo-Atlanticist approach led to certain accomplishments, but also some notable failures. By late 1959, when domestic political squabbles and an unpropitious international climate brought an end to the Neo-Atlanticist policy, Italy had been unable to attain its chief objective of a significant increase in its international standing. The country did, however, shift from being a mere client of the United States to something closer to a full-fledged partner. Despite the failures of Neo-Atlanticism, the policy showed that a reliance on "soft power" (non-coercive means of influence) can work in some circumstances.

The United States, Italy, and the Opening to the Left, 1953-1963
Leopoldo Nuti
Drawing on newly declassified U.S. and Italian documentation, this article assesses U.S. policy toward Italy under the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and uses this test case to draw some general conclusions about the nature of U.S.-Italian relations during the Cold War. The first part of the article focuses on issues that have been neglected or misinterpreted by the existing literature on the subject, and the second part presents some of the lessons that can be learned from the study of U.S.-Italian relations in the 1950s and 1960s. The aim is to cast broader light on the current debate about the role and influence of the United States in Western Europe after World War II.

The Carter Administration and Italy: Keeping the Communists Out of Power Without Interfering
Olav Njolstad
From the late 1940s on, the United States did its best to prevent the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from gaining a role in the Italian government. When Jimmy Carter took office in Washington in 1977, the PCI was once again maneuvering for a share of power in Rome. Some observers in Italy speculated that the new U.S. administration would be less averse than its predecessors had been to the prospect of Communist participation in the Italian government. The Carter administration’s initial statements and actions created further ambiguity and may have emboldened some senior PCI officials to step up their efforts to gain at least a share of power. Faced with the prospect that Communists would be invited into a coalition government in Italy, the Carter administration dropped its earlier caution and spoke out unequivocally against a "historic compromise" involving the PCI. Although it is difficult to say whether the more forceful U.S. stance made a decisive difference, the ruling Christian Democrats in Italy were able to keep the Communist Party out of the government.

Hollywood Glamour and Mass Consumption in Postwar Italy
Stephen Gundle
Italian society after World War II was profoundly affected by the culture of "glamour" that encouraged mass consumption. This culture drew heavily on images and desires created by the American film industry, and it would not have arisen in the absence of American glamour. Over time, however, Italian glamour acquired some important indigenous features, which were economically beneficial for Italy in boosting exports and tourism. Through most of the Cold War, the perceived glamour of Rome — captured in the film La Dolce Vita — made the city a cosmopolitan crossroads for the rich and famous. Nevertheless, in contrast to the United States, which was the avatar of glamour, Italy did not develop domestic glamour in the full sense of the term.
 

Volume 4, Issue 2 (Spring 2002)

 
Martyrs, Miracles, and Martians: Religion and Cold War Cinematic Propaganda in the 1950s
Tony Shaw
This article examines Cold War film propaganda in the 1950s, when the cinema was enjoying its last period as the dominant visual mass entertainment form in both the West and the East. It concentrates on the role that religion played as a theme of propaganda primarily in British and American movies, as well as significant references to Soviet films released during the decade. The article explores the relationship between film output and state propagandists, to show how religious themes were incorporated into films dealing with Cold War issues, and considers how audiences received the messages contained within these films. The article therefore builds on recent scholarship that highlights the importance of ideas and culture during the Cold War by looking at the adoption and adaptation of religion as a tool of propaganda mainly in the West but to some extent also in the East.

Litvinov’s Lost Peace
Geoffrey Roberts
The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the ensuing conflict witnessed the political rehabilitation of the former People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maksim Litvinov. After serving as ambassador to the United States from 1941 to 1943, Litvinov returned to the Soviet Union and played a key role in charting Moscow’s Grand Alliance wartime strategy. He urged Soviet leaders to convene a joint Anglo-Soviet-American commission to discuss military-political questions, and he helped organize the October 1943 foreign ministers’ conference in Moscow. As the war drew to a close, Litvinov argued for a postwar settlement dividing the world into security zones. His realist conception of foreign policy suggested a more moderate alternative to Josif Stalin's reliance on confrontation with the West. Although Litvinov faded again from public view after his retirement in 1946, his belief that the Grand Alliance could continue suggests that the rapid, postwar descent into the Cold War might have been averted had it not been for Stalin.

The New History of Cold War Alliances
Vojtech Mastny
Efforts to document the full histories of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact are still hindered by key obstacles. NATO documents from 1965 onward remain closed to researchers, as do many Warsaw Pact military records that were carted off to Russia in 1991. Despite these gaps, newly declassified materials from both East and West have shed light on how the two alliances helped shape the Cold War. This article takes note of some of the more important recent scholarship on NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War
Kenneth A. Osgood
Throughout the Cold War, the task of winning "hearts and minds" around the world was of great importance to Soviet and American leaders. Both sides fought a cultural Cold War via radio waves, television transmissions, propaganda, and other forms of psychological pressure. A number of recent books that draw on declassified U.S. government records have provided valuable insights into the American side of the cultural Cold War. The U.S. government employed military, political, diplomatic, and cultural means to influence foreign and domestic opinion. The study of this phenomenon requires interdisciplinary methodological approaches. Diplomatic historians need to integrate the cultural and propaganda issues into their narratives, and cultural historians need to pay greater heed to the themes raised in diplomatic historical accounts.
 

Volume 4, Issue 1 (Winter 2002)

 
Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959: Domestic Politics and Cultural Diplomacy
Marilyn S. Kushner
In 1959 the United States Information Agency coordinated the American National Exhibition that was sent to Moscow. Included in the displays of American culture, science, and technology was an art exhibit that was intended to highlight the broad range of American painting and sculpture and, by doing so, the freedom of Americans to express themselves as they desired. Chosen by a jury of respected art museum directors, artists, and art professors, the exhibit became embroiled in a controversy instigated by Representative Francis E. Walter, the chair of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Walter charged that more than fifty percent of the artists represented in the exhibition had prior Communist affiliations. He attempted to recall the exhibition from Moscow and convened congressional hearings on the matter. Although the hearings detracted from the use of cultural diplomacy in the Cold War, Walter failed to block the exhibit.

Ilya Ehrenberg: Between East and West
Joshua Rubenstein
The most morally compromising episodes of Ilya Ehrenburg's career took place at the outset of the Cold War. The wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union broke down, leaving the Soviet people increasingly isolated and subject to unrelenting propaganda against Western culture and society. Ilya Ehrenburg played a double game. He became a principal spokesman in the West for the Stalinist regime, defending Soviet policies and promoting the Soviet-inspired Partisans of Peace movement. At the same time, he used his contacts to make Western literature and art more accessible to a Soviet audience.

The ROCI Road to Peace: Robert Rauschenberg, Perestroika, and the End of the Cold War
Pamela Kachurin
Robert Rauschenberg's exhibition in Moscow in 1989--the first one-man show by a modern American artist in the Soviet Union--was touted in both the United States and the Soviet Union as emblematic of the radical reforms under way in the USSR and even of the end of the Cold War. This article assesses the role of the 1989 exhibition in the cultural Cold War waged by the two superpowers: Rauschenberg's ultimate success in Moscow was prefaced by the heavy promotion of his work in the 1960s and early 1970s by the U.S. Information Agency. An analysis of the political and cultural context in which the exhibition was negotiated and carried out reveals that the choice of Rauschenberg and his project affirmed a fundamentally conservative vision of glasnost' and "new thinking" in the Soviet art world. Thus the official embrace of Rauschenberg in the Soviet Union should be understood as a compromise. Individuals within the Soviet cultural hierarchy recognized that an exhibition of his work could potentially satisfy ideological demands being made on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism: Stalin and the Impact of the "Anti-Cosmopolitan" Campaigns on Soviet Culture
Konstantin Azadovskii and Boris Egorov
As the Cold War gathered pace in the late 1940s, the Soviet Union adopted an anti-Western orientation in cultural affairs. By 1949 this orientation had shifted toward overt anti-Semitism. The "anti-cosmopolitan" campaigns of 1949, initiated by Josif Stalin, served the interests of Soviet foreign policy and bolstered Stalin's position vis-õ-vis his subordinates. For the Soviet scholarly and cultural communities, however, the campaigns were gravely damaging. This episode illustrates the link between Soviet foreign policy objectives and domestic repression under Stalin.

Keepers of the Flame: An Exchange on Art and Western Cultural Influences in the USSR After World War II
John E. Bowlt and Dmitrii Sarab'yanov
This dialogue between two leading art historians - an American and a Russian - illuminates the mutual attraction of Russian culture to Western observers, and Western culture to Russians, during the Cold War. The onversation emphasizes the official Soviet attitude toward Western culture in general and the pervasive obstacles facing Soviet artists and art scholars who wanted to keep abreast of Western practices. Even the most esoteric fields of scholarship in the Soviet Union were affected official pressure and Cold War mentality.
 

Volume 3, Issue 3 (Fall 2001)

 
War and Peace in the Strategy of the Communist Party of Greece, 1945-1949
Thanasis D. Sfikas
Using archival sources that have only recently become available, this article focuses on the interplay between the concepts of war and peace in the strategy of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) during the Greek Civil War of the late 1940s. The article demonstrates that the choices facing the KKE and its opponents changed quite dramatically in the period from 1945 to 1949. The active role played by Britain in Greek domestic affairs, and the relatively limited role played by the Soviet Union meant that the KKE was increasingly ostracized in the international community. The unwillingness of the Greek Liberal Party to forge a political alliance with the KKE prompted the Communists to resume their armed struggle for power. This article presents the alternatives facing the KKE in light of the postwar domestic and international context.

Cold War Under the Ice: The Army's Bid for a Long-Range Nuclear Role, 1959-1963
Erik D. Weiss
Recently declassified U.S. Defense and State Department documents have shed new light on the motivations for Western missile deployment concepts. In some cases, conflicting political and military objectives were complicated by the technological challenges of creative deployment schemes as well as the competitive nature of Defense Department funding. This article examines the Army's Iceworm IRBM deployment concept of the early 1960s to show how interservice rivalries, strategic considerations, technological developments, and the competition for a share of funding affected decisions on U.S. nuclear forces and the defense of Western Europe.

The Politics of Cold War Culture
Tony Shaw
This article examines the relationship between politics and culture in Great Britain and the United States during the Cold War, with particular emphasis on the period from the late 1940s to the early 1960s. The article critically examines several recent books on British and American Cold War cultural activities, both domestic and external. The review takes in theatrical, cinematic, literary, and broadcast propaganda and analyzes the complex network of links between governments and private groups in commerce, education, labor markets, and the mass entertainment media. It points out the fundamental differences between Western countries and the Soviet bloc and provides a warning to those inclined to view Western culture solely through a Cold War prism.

Bringing in the "Other Side": New Scholarship on the Vietnam Wars
Fredrik Logevall
The literature on the Vietnam War is large and getting larger. Much of it is extraordinarily valuable to students of the conflict. Until recently, however the literature suffered from its America-centric focus, from its tendency to look solely at decision-making in Washington. Too few studies have placed that decision-making into its wider international context; fewer still have given a voice to the "other side," the Vietnamese who fought so long and hard to defeat first the French and then the South Vietnamese government and its American allies. The picture is beginning to change, however, and this article examines several new books that illuminate the Vietnamese side of the equation. Although many of the most important findings in these works come not from Vietnamese documentary sources but from Western archives and publications, the authors appear to have made effective use of what Vietnamese material is available. The volumes are worthy entries in the international history of the Indochina Wars, and they help set the agenda for future research.
 

Volume 3, Issue 2 (Spring 2001)

 
Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe
Silvio Pons
Soviet policy toward the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from 1943 to 1948 exemplified Josif Stalin's complicated relationship with the West European Communist Parties and Western Europe in general. For a considerable while, Stalin insisted that the PCI follow a policy of moderation. Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the PCI, heeded Stalin's orders and tried to ensure that Italian Communists pursued a policy of "national unity" and avoided conflicts that might lead to civil war in Italy. But this "moderate" approach collapsed after the Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan in 1947 and thereby forced the West European Communist parties into extra-parliamentary opposition. Not until after the poor showing of the PCI in the 1948 Italian elections was the party able to regain a viable role. Stalin's conflicting "advice" to the PCI was indicative of his tenuous grasp of the situation in Western Europe.

The Political Stalinization of China: The Establishment of One-Party Constitutionalism, 1948-1954
Hua-yu Li
This article offers a fresh perspective on the establishment of a one-party constitutional structure in China from 1948 to 1954, using documents and first-hand accounts published in China over the past two decades. These documents suggest that the Stalinization of China cannot be understood outside the larger context of the political Stalinization of the rest of the Communist world. Stalin played a critical role in determining the pace of political reform in China, and he actively encouraged Mao to allow non-Communists to take part in the Chinese electoral process and in the writing of the Chinese constitution. Although Mao would have preferred to establish a Soviet-style one-party system right away, he readily yielded to Stalin's advice. Mao chose to obey Stalin's dictates for political reform so that he could gain greater independence in domestic economic policies.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited: Was the War Inevitable?
Erik Melander
This article explains why the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh escalated into full-scale ethnic warfare in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The article uses newly available sources to test the explanatory value of recent theories of conflict and strategic uncertainty. The evidence shows that in the summer of 1991 the Armenian separatist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh offered the Azerbaijani authorities virtual capitulation in exchange for a cessation of the offensive initiated against the region in the preceding spring. Because a more radical Armenian leadership gained the upper hand in Nagorno-Karabakh, and because the coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991 distracted Soviet leaders, the conflict soon became a full-fledged war.

Congress and the Cold War
Robert David Johnson
Congress has received insufficient attention from scholars of Cold War foreign policy for a number of reasons, including historiographical patterns and the scattered nature of congressional sources. This gap in the literature has skewed our understanding of the Cold War because it has failed to take into account the numerous ways in which the legislature affected U.S. foreign policy after World War II. This article looks at Cold War congressional policy within a broad historical perspective, and it analyzes how the flurry of congressional activity in the years following the Vietnam War was part of a larger trend of congressional activism in foreign policy. After reviewing the existing literature on the subject of Congress and the Cold War, the article points out various directions for future research.
 

Volume 3, Issue 1 (Winter 2001)

 
Norms, Heresthetics, and the End of the Cold War
Matthew Evangelista
The academic debate about the end of the Cold War has reached an impasse. Realists draw on evidence of economic decline and external pressure to explain the Soviet Union's retrenchment. Constructivists emphasize ideational change and Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" as the source of accommodation. Neither approach sufficiently accounts for the fact that many powerful Soviet institutions did not support Gorbachev's approach from early on, well before his decisions contributed to the disintegration of the country. Even so, Gorbachev persuaded influential people who disagreed with him to accept his policy proposals. William Riker's concept of heresthetics--the use of language to manipulate the political agenda--goes a long way toward explaining Gorbachev's success. Heresthetics could be a way to bridge the gap between realist and constructivist approaches to international relations.

Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?
Robert Jervis
Under the security dilemma, tensions and conflicts can arise between states even when they do not intend it. Some analysts have argued that the Cold War was a classic example of a security dilemma. This article disputes that notion. Although the Cold War contained elements of a deep security dilemma, it was not purely a case in which tensions and arms increased as each side defensively reacted to the other. The root of the conflict was a clash of social systems and of ideological preferences for ordering the world. Mutual security in those circumstances was largely unachievable. A true end to the Cold War was impossible until fundamental changes occurred in Soviet foreign policy.

Changing Patterns of Power in Cold War Politics: The Mysterious Case of Vladimˆr KomÖrek
Igor Lukes
The story of the arrest and imprisonment of Vladimˆr KomÖrek sheds valuable light on relations between Czechoslovakia and the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. KomÖrek, who had worked as an intelligence officer against the Czechoslovak Communist regime in the 1950s, was a U.S. citizen traveling to the Soviet Union on business when he was dramatically captured by the Czechoslovak authorities. Pressure from the U.S. government and private individuals, as well as conflicts between the Czechoslovak secret service and other, more liberal, elements in the Czechoslovak government, ultimately led to KomÖrek's release. Czechoslovakia's eventual willingness to cooperate in the KomÖrek case signaled a new approach to relations with the West, an approach that would have significant consequences in the Prague Spring of 1968.

The Demise of Non-Communist Parties in North Korea (1945-1960)
Andrei N. Lankhov
This article, based on newly declassified material from the Russian archives, deals with the fate of non-Communist parties in North Korea in the 1950s. Like the "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe, North Korea had (and still technically has) a few non-Communist parties. The ruling Communist party included these parties within the framework of a "united front," designed to project the facade of a multiparty state, to control domestic dissent, and to establish links with parties in South Korea. The article traces the history of these parties under Soviet and local Communist control from the mid-1940s to their gradual evisceration in the 1950s.


Volume 2, Issue 3 (Fall 2000)

 
De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958-1970 (Part 2)
Andrew Moravcsik
The concluding segment of this two-part article explores two key episodes in French foreign policy under President Charles de Gaulle: (1) France's veto of British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), and (2) de Gaulle's decisions to provoke and then resolve the "empty chair" crisis of 1965-1966. These two cases, like the two examined in Part 1 of this article, demonstrate the fundamental importance of economic considerations in de Gaulle's policy toward the EEC. De Gaulle was a democratic politician first and a geopolitical visionary second. His experience tells us a great deal about the limits imposed by modern democratic politics on any leader who might hope to make statecraft serve an idiosyncratic political vision. The article concludes with an analysis of possible counterarguments and a discussion of the proper use of historical evidence.

Responses
Stanley Hoffman, John T. S. Keeler, John Gillingham, Alan S. Milward, Jeffrey Vanke, Marc Trachtenberg
The responses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the key substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: Was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the commentators as well. Moreover, both Vanke and Trachtenberg point out that, in using the available material, Moravcsik sometimes omits crucial evidence that contradicts his thesis. Vanke brings up the question of determinism in Moravcsik's view of the influence of commercial interests on de Gaulle's policies, and Trachtenberg concludes with reflections on the nature and limits of historical understanding.

Rejoinder
Andrew Moravcsik
Moravcsik's reply to the six commentaries deals with sources omitted from the original article, the use of evidence in his analysis of the Fouchet Plan and the "empty chair" crisis, and broader critiques of (and proposed alternatives to) the commercial interpretation of French policy on European integration during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. Moravcsik concedes some of the points raised by the critics and offers a more qualified and nuanced restatement of his argument, but he sticks to his basic contention that "commercial interests were a dominant and sufficient motivation for French policy in Europe."


Volume 2, Issue 2 (Spring 2000)

 
De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958-1970 (Part I)
Andrew Moravcsik
The thousands of books and articles on President Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration all accord primary explanatory importance to his distinctive geopolitical ideology. These analyses place secondary significance, if any at all, on commercial considerations. This two-part article seeks to revise that historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration taken by France during de Gaulle's presidency: to remain in the Common Market and promote the Common Agricultural Policy, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the European Economic Community, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966. The first two decisions are discussed here, and the other two are covered in Part 2. For each case, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence confirms that the interests pursued by de Gaulle were more commercial than geopolitical.

Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far East
Shen Zhihua
After initially insisting on the peaceful reunification of Korea, Josif Stalin suddenly decided in early 1950 to give North Korean leader Kim Il Sung permission to invade South Korea. Documents from the Russian archives and materials published in China help explain this abrupt shift in Stalin's position. They show that Stalin carefully assessed the likely American reaction and mistakenly concluded that North Korean forces would quickly seize South Korea, giving the United States no opportunity to respond. The documents also reveal that Stalin's attitude toward Korea was strongly influenced by Sino-Soviet relations in 1949-1950, particularly his desire to maintain Soviet privileges on Chinese territory and his concern that Beijing would challenge Moscow's leadership of the international Communist movement. Stalin believed that a North Korean invasion of the South would greatly strengthen the Soviet Union's leverage vis-B-vis China.

Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Cooperation after the Nassau Conference: The British Policy of Interdependence
Michael Middeke
The Anglo-American summit at Nassau in December 1962 did not strictly separate Britain's deterrent from the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF). As a result, Conservative governments in the 1960s tried to safeguard maximum British independence in nuclear relations with the United States. The British tried to thwart American initiatives on the mixed-manned MLF. Some British officials even hoped to preserve an "independent British deterrent" through nuclear cooperation with France. For the United States, the British deterrent had political value in an intra-alliance or East-West context, but no military or political significance in itself. The MLF idea or bilateral nuclear cooperation with Britain and France was a means to contain French and German nuclear ambitions and to settle Cold War disputes with the Soviet Union. In London, however, leading officials believed that Britain's future as a great power was inextricably linked to the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. When nuclear independence was lost, the appearance of independence became more important.

The Road to the Austrian State Treaty
Warren W. Williams
The path that led to Austrian independence in 1955 has often been ignored in Cold War scholarship. Although Austria was a battleground for East-West conflict in Europe from 1945 to 1955, it often gets short shrift compared to the detailed analysis of Germany's role in the Cold War. This essay seeks to redress that imbalance, taking as a starting point the valuable new book by Gunther Bischof, Austria and the First Cold War, 1945-1955. Bischof's analysis is not uniformly convincing, but he makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of a neglected part of Cold War history. Although the book provides some helpful speculation about why the Soviet Union decided to sign the Austrian State Treaty after years of stalling, far more research on this particular issue is needed.


Volume 2, Issue 1 (Winter 2000)

 
Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem, 1953-1954
David G. Coleman
Soon after taking office, the Eisenhower administration adopted two key decisions on Berlin and the German question that were to have far-reaching consequences in the 1950s and 1960s. First, Eisenhower reaffirmed the U.S. security commitment to West Berlin, a commitment that entailed at least some risk of general war. Second, the administration prepared to use West Berlin in a broader political strategy aimed at weakening and eventually undermining Soviet power in Eastern Europe. The implications of these early decisions did not become fully evident until 1958, when the administration was confronted by a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin.

The Curtiss-Wright Corporation and Cold War-Era Defense Procurements: A Challenge to Military-Industrial Complex Theory
Eugene Gholz
The extraordinary year-to-year continuity in the list of top Cold War aerospace suppliers has led many analysts to adopt theories of a military-industrial complex (MIC). The collapse of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, once the second largest manufacturer in the United States and a leading defense contractor, belies their approach. This article recounts the histories of Curtiss-Wright's three independent divisions and uses these to test the MIC theory against three other explanations of the pattern of Cold War defense procurement: a technological imperative, a bureaucratic-strategic perspective, and free market competition. The bureaucratic-strategic theory is most consistent with the case study evidence.

The Cold War Debate Continues: A Traditionalist View of Historical Writing on Domestic Communism and Anti-Communism
John Earl Haynes
This article reviews the huge Cold War-era and post-Cold War literature on American Communism and anti-Communism in the United States. These issues have long been the subject of heated scholarly debate. The recent opening of archives in Russia and other former Communist countries, and the release of translated Venona documents in the United States have shed new light on key aspects of the American Communist Party that were previously unknown or undocumented. The new evidence has underscored the Soviet Union's tight control over the party and the crucial role that American Communists played in Soviet espionage. The release of all this documentation has been an unwelcome development for scholars who have long been sympathetic to the Communist movement.

Could More Force Have Saved the Soviet System?
Walter C. Clemens, Jr.
One of the leading specialists on the Soviet Union, Jerry Hough, has published a lengthy book analyzing events in the late 1980s and early 1990s that brought about the disintegration of the Soviet state. This essay challenges Hough's interpretations. It finds shortcomings both in his general approach and in many of his specific claims.


Volume 1, Issue 3 (Fall 1999)

 
The Early Post-Stalin succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe:
Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy (Part III)

Mark Kramer
The East German uprising and the downfall of Lavrentii Beria had profound short-term and longer-term effects on Soviet policy toward Germany and on the political configuration of the Eastern bloc. This article, the final segment of a three-part analysis of Soviet-East European relations in the early post-Stalin era, discusses the changes in the Soviet bloc at some length. It then ties together the three parts of the analysis by exploring the theoretical implications of the linkages between internal and external events in the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe in 1953, drawing on recent theoretical literature about the connection between domestic and international politics.

Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction? U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s
Laszlo Borhi
This article discusses the Eisenhower administration's policy toward Eastern Europe in the years leading up to the 1956 Hungarian revolution. The article first considers the broader context of U.S. Cold War strategy in Eastern Europe, including policies of "economic warfare" and "psychological warfare," as well as covert operations and military supplies. It then examines U.S. policy toward Hungary, particularly during the events of October-November 1956, when the Eisenhower administration had to decide how to respond to the uprising. The article brings to light the Eisenhower administration's dual policy toward Hungary - a policy that attempted, on the one hand, to strike a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union, and, on the other hand, to promote instability within the Soviet bloc. An analysis of these contradictory approaches sheds broader light on the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s.

The Politics of Collective Inaction: NATO's Response to the Prague Spring
John G. McGinn
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) kept close track of developments in Czechoslovakia throughout 1968, but the alliance did not pursue a coherent policy toward the uprising. A close examination of NATO actions from January 1968 until the invasion on 20-21 August helps explain why a coordinated approach never materialized. Certain structural features of the alliance and a host of domestic and external distractions precluded a joint response. NATO members worked individually rather than collectively to avert Soviet military action through quiet diplomacy, but these efforts made almost no difference.

A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Max Holland
Documentation from unexpected sources sheds new light on a question that had seemed unresolvable: how Senator Kenneth Keating learned about the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba well before the Kennedy administration did. The new evidence not only reveals the intricacies of this long-standing mystery, but also provides valuable insights about U.S. intelligence operations, the making of U.S. foreign policy, and the rich opportunities for research about the Cold War in the 4 million pages of documents gathered under the Kennedy Records Collection Act of 1992.

Western Cold War Broadcasting
James B. Critchlow
In the 1940s and 1950s Western governments turned to radio as the most effective means of countering the Soviet information monopoly. U.S. and West European radio stations attempted to provide listeners with the kind of programs they might expect from their own radio stations if the latter were free of censorship. For most of these listeners in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the broadcasts were their only contact with the outside world. The importance of the foreign radio programs was confirmed not only by audience estimates, but also by the considerable efforts the Communist regimes made to jam the transmissions. Given the importance of foreign broadcasting for the political life of the Soviet bloc, it is remarkable that they have received scant scholarly attention in the Western countries that sponsored them. The three books reviewed here help to fill that gap.


Volume 1, Issue 2 ( Spring 1999)

 
The Early Post-Stalin succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe:
Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy (Part II)

Mark Kramer
Part 2 of this three-part article discusses the aftermath of the June 1953 East German uprising, particularly the arrest on 26 June of Lavrentii Beria, who until then had been one of the most powerful figures in Moscow. Beria's arrest came not because of any high-level disagreements about policy, but simply because Beria's rivals wanted to remove him from the post-Stalin succession struggle. Newly released documents shed much greater light on the plot against Beria, which was intricate and extremely risky, yet ultimately successful.

A Certain Idea of Science: How International Relations Theory Avoids Reviewing the Cold War
William C. Wohlforth
So far, scholars of international politics have displayed relatively little inclination to use new evidence from Cold War-era archives to test their theories and generalizations. This reaction is misguided. The new archival evidence and memoirs can, and should, provide a reality check for theoretical debates. It is time for students of international relations to recognize the crucial link between historical explanation and theoretical propositions.

Mobilizing Europe's Stateless: America's Plan for a Cold War Army (download full-text)
James Jay Carafano
When World War II ended, millions of refugees were left in Europe, unable or unwilling to return to their former homes. A number of leading U.S. officials wanted to form an armed Volunteer Freedom Corps out of these displaced groups. The Corps would have supplemented, and perhaps eventually replaced, U.S. troops stationed in Europe. American officials favored the plan because they believed it would reduce the U.S. military burden, alleviate the refugee crisis, and provide a bulwark against Soviet expansion. The proposal was never implemented, however, because of objections from West European governments. The whole episode illustrated the tensions that often surfaced within NATO during the Cold War.

To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All': The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943-1947
Timothy Snyder
The complicated and violent interactions between Ukrainians and Poles during and after World War II have been the subject of competing Ukrainian and Polish historical interpretations. This article sifts through the historical evidence to determine why Ukrainian and Polish memories of that period are so much at odds. The fate of the contested territories of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia was decided ultimately by the Soviet Union, which imposed new borders on Poland. Once those borders had been established, the transfer of Poles from the newly enlarged Soviet Ukraine and the forced removal of Ukrainians from eastern Poland consolidated an "ethnically cleansed" postwar order.


Volume 1, Issue 1 ( Winter 1999)

 
The Early Post-Stalin succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe:
Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy (Part I)

Mark Kramer
The death of Josif Stalin was followed by momentous changes in the Soviet bloc. Part 1 of this two-part article considers how and why these changes came about, looking at the interaction between domestic and external events. It explores the nature of Soviet decision-making, the impact of events in East-Central Europe, the implementation of Moscow's new policy, and the use of Soviet troops to put down a large-scale uprising in East Germany.

Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950-1953 (download full-text)
Francis Gavin
Explanations that focus on norms, ideology, and domestic sources of foreign policy are increasingly popular in studies of international politics during the Cold War. This article finds that U.S. policy in the early 1950s was driven chiefly by structural factors, especially the changing balance of power. What appeared to be a radical shift in policy toward Iran initiated by Eisenhower was, in fact, largely a continuation of the policies of the Truman administration, with new options made possible by the huge U.S. military buildup of the early 1950s.

Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War
Nigel Gould-Davies
The partial opening of East-bloc archives has sparked renewed interest in the study of ideological influences in Soviet foreign policy. The task of assessing the relative weight of ideology is complicated, however, by the failure of most scholars to develop sound evaluative critera. This article discusses the shortcomings of previous analyses of Soviet ideology and puts forth a more theoretically coherent approach, based on three explicit criteria for assessing ideological and security-seeking goals.

A Few Unresolved Mysteries about Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: A Modest Agenda for Research
Adam Ulam
Despite the gradual release of once-classified documents in the former Soviet Union, numerous questions and problems about Stalin's role in the Cold War remain. Some tantalizing clues about Stalin's ambitious and motivations have emerged, but several key aspects of Soviet policy in East-Central Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s seem just as puzzling as they did before the archives were opened. The further declassification of materials may shed new light on these mysteries, enabling scholars to develop a better understanding of the first decade of the Cold War.