Panel
5: North China Under Japanese Rule (1)
Professor
Hisashi Inoue
“CCP/Eighth Route Army’s Policies Toward POWs and the Japanese Anti-War
Movement in China”
Professor Inoue discussed the story of Japanese POWs captured by the CCP and its Eighth Route Army who participated in anti-Japanese activities. He discussed the Japanese Army’s policy toward being captured and the motivations of those who did agree to help the CCP. He rejects the way previous research describes this co-optation by the CCP as a “clever conspiracy,” and searches for a more compelling explanation.
He began by discussing the CCP and Eighth Route Army’s policy toward POWs. The policy was to treat POWs humanely and to return them to the Japanese side, even though it was not always implemented. In March 1940 Sanzo Nosaka came to Yan’an from Moscow. Nosaka was a member of the Comintern Executive Committee and was a renowned communist. After arriving in Yan’an he became an advisor to the General Political Department of the CCP Center Military Revolutionary Commission. Nosaka worked with Chinese who had studied in Japan, including Wang Shuren, The group worked to organize covert operations against Japan. The program they developed was reeducation of captured POWs who they deemed likely to cooperate. In May 1940 the Yan’an chapter of the Japanese Anti-War Alliance was established by three POWs. The Yan’an chapter grew in size as more POWs were captured, and in October 1940 Nosaka established the Japanese Workers and Farmers Group which led the POW reeducation campaign. Chapters were organized on every front by POWs.
Inoue then listed the three major reasons Japanese POWs decided to participate in anti-Japanese campaigns. First, the CCP actively tried to establish trust with the POWs. Second, the soldiers were moved when they learned of the terrible conditions of the War inflicted on China; this was a view of the War which they had not seen while fighting. Third, considering that Japan had a longstanding idea that its shoulders should never surrender, the soldiers were put in a difficult position. They had never received training about how to act as a POW; and at home they would have faced disgrace, punishment, and starvation. Many simply committed suicide, but of those who remained, many came to sympathize with the Chinese, fueled perhaps by their “reeducation” under the CCP. Moreover, toward the end of the War, Japan’s defeat appeared imminent. According to Inoue, this phenomenon caused the Japanese military great anxiety. In reality, their fears exceeded the real strength and threat of the POWs.
Inoue urged the audience to recognize that for the Japanese who joined, their POW status liberated them, allowing them to experience the War through the eyes of the Chinese people, with whom they cooperating and for whom they risked their lives. Calling this a “clever conspiracy” ignores the phenomenon on several levels. Other equally complex stories also give us pause, such as the Japanese who were members of the CCP and their influence in Japan post-War. In conclusion, Inoue said that these individuals had a great impact on Sino-Japanese relations, an impact that continued into the post-War period.
Commentator
Professor Mark Selden began his comments by relating how gratifying it was, after working so long on this area, to read a paper with such a fresh perspective. The paper explodes the notion that there was a Chinese or a Japanese perspective, and goes beyond any sort of nationalistic perspective. Selden summarized the paper’s findings, that as early as 1939 the CCP was developing a policy of appealing to POWs. However, the policy was only somewhat effective, because there continued to be killings of POWs and incidents where POWs were forced to kill their own officers and denounce their emperor.
Selden was fascinated by the role of Nosaka, who arrived in Yan’an in 1939 and started school of labor with about 500 troops. Selden added that he wondered how many had actually surrendered and how many had been captured; moreover, he wondered how important to Nosaka these numbers were in comparison to the size of the Japanese Army. Selden also asked about the degree of cooperation between the CCP and GMD setting up the Anti-Japanese League. Was this a dimension of United Front scholars had not noticed in the past?
He asked Inoue to elaborate on the numbers of those who surrendered and their motivations to do so. Selden suggested that the Japanese soldiers could not have expected treatment any better than what their army gave POWs. Did they leave, perhaps, because they were repelled by the atrocities committed by the Japanese army? Did most surrender during 1944-45, when Japanese were in trouble and war-weary? Selden asked if oral interviews corroborated these guesses and if any of the POWs still survive.
Selden then turned to Japan’s POW policy. At first, the “no surrender” policy applied only to officers but later to all enlisted men. What is the relation between their surrender and Japan’s own policies on surrender? Was the policy an obstacle or a reason for surrender?
Selden called Inoue’s statement that the POWs were “liberated from militaristic values of Japan” an important finding and a sound conclusion. And finally, he asked if there was any relationship between wartime and post-war treatment of prisoners by the CCP. He recalled that many Japanese continued to speak to Japanese audiences about the atrocities committed during the War; did any of these people come out of the ranks of the wartime POWs?
Professor Jianping Zhuang, “A General Outline on Japan’s Bureaucracy of Labor Exploitation in Qingdao”
Zhuang discussed the Japanese system of labor exploitation in Qingdao from 1932 to 1945, emphasizing the brutality of the exploitation and the strong documentary basis of his research. He discussed the planning and implementation of labor export to Manzhouguo and Japan, as well as its impact on the economy of North China.
Zhuang began by discussing his sources on the forced export of labor, which include Chinese and Japanese sources from the archives in Nanjing, Tianjin, and Qingdao. Many of the sources are unpublished, but because of their high historical value, he is now in the process of working in these locations to compile, edit, and publish a collection of the documents.
According to Zhuang, the export of labor took place at different times and places. However, Qingdao presents a microcosm of what happened, the brutality, and the consequences during and after the War in the area. From 1933 and particularly after October 1, 1938 when Japan invaded Qingdao, to when the city was recovered, Qingdao became a strategic focus of the War as a redistribution link and between China, Manzhouguo, and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Other than the Asia Development Board, there were many important tools of aggression for exporting Chinese labor resources.
Zhuang’s paper began from the establishment of the Dazheng Company, the first labor recruitment company. It continues by examining continental planning by the Japanese government and how their policies related to labor recruitment. He divided the period into three phases: 1) 1933-1937, a preparatory phase leading up to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident; 2) 1937-1941, an expansionary phase up to eve of the Pacific War; 3) 1941-1945, an unrestrained phase, when labor was being exploited ruthlessly.
In Qingdao, an important city, Japan set up a tight network for export of laborers to Japan and Manzhouguo. Millions were sent to be coolies, resulting in serious labor shortages in rural areas in Qingdao. Zhuang argued that this was a major reason why the economy of North China fell behind.
Commentator
Professor William Kirby began his comments by thanking all those participating in an important conference on a highly important topic. It is politically charged, materials are hard to find, and many are only now being uncovered. He lauded Zhuang for helping expand the archival base. (He added that in this case, even the archives leave some important questions unanswered, such as the role of family members in labor migration.)
Kirby urged all to consider the topic in a comparative context with imperialism and labor exploitation around the world. For example, what Zhuang described has continuities with labor migration patterns but is also emblematic of a period of decreased labor freedom and increased forced labor migrations; it was, indeed, a time when more people were on the move against their will than ever before.
In the realm of economic history, Kirby asked that Zhuang consider the relation between this migration and labor migration in North China before and after the period. Specifically, there was extensive illegal migration of farmers during the late Qing and after. This was one of the great migrations of modern Chinese history. Migration has a seasonal pattern, too. Before 1931, people went to Manchuria under all sorts of conditions, many certainly exploitative. Thus, Kirby urged care in making generalizations, particularly with statements that this labor export kept North China’s economy backward. In reality, there was a lot of exploitative labor migration, including to factories in Chinese city. Kirby urged Zhuang to compare his case study to exploitation in the 1920s or the 1950s. He added several questions: Was the policy intended to seduce Chinese labor, or to reduce Chinese labor, or to change its composition, or, in other words, monopolizing of what had been free?
Next, Kirby asked about periodization. He argued for seeing the entire period as one broad continuum of intensifying labor export. Still, there were breaks, in 1937 and 1942. In 1937 there was a sharp rise in demand for labor. The real break, though, was in 1942; it was then that the great crimes, forced migrations, and severe casualties occurred. It was in this last period that there are real parallels with Nazi Germany, Soviet Union, and China. Finally, Kirby stated that it was in Zhuang’s analysis of this third period, in particular, that his archival research has its most compelling conclusions.
Discussion
Addressing Zhuang’s paper, an American professor asked what kind of people were recruited. What were the connections between the migrants and their families back home? Were remittances possible?
Another American professor said that he was very happy to see the paper by Inoue. After calling Nosako “a slippery, evil man,” he added that the study group on Japanese problems noted on page 4 of Inoue’s paper was founded in Shanghai in the late 1920s; Wang Xuewen was sent with the explicit goal or finding sympathetic Japanese.
He then spoke to Zhuang’s paper. One reason, he said, that it became more difficult after 1943 for labor to migrate was that Manzhouguo, puppet or not, was a state that required passports and visits. He recalled that Nakanichi Tsutomu wrote in his memoirs that he was able to pass as Chinese until it came to showing his passport.
An American professor mentioned that in his readings of CCP and Eighth route documents, the policy for Japanese POWs was very similar to that for GMD POWs and bandits. He asked if these were different programs or part of a larger program to deal with captures.
A Canadian professor offered some answers to some of Kirby’s questions about migration. The earlier periods probably blended quite well with earlier patterns from 1920s of migration. With the establishment of Manzhouguo, the money laborers earned could no longer be spent in China or be exchanged. She emphasized that any work on migration has to deal with remittances. Regarding wages, she said that that after 1940 wages were reduced and eventually stopped; once Japanese employers felt their employees were captive they stopped paying. Regarding other migrations, she mentioned that there was a huge famine migration in 1941-42 due to droughts in North China. In addition to “forced recruits,” there were also many who went willingly to Dongbei. She related that one family migrated annually and made their living as sushi specialists. The problem was that after 1945 there was no demand for sushi. She thus urged that one of the best sources is oral history and that Shandong is especially rich in this respect.
A Chinese professor responded to Kirby’s comments. In the initial phase the Japanese recruited laborers by deception, but after 1941 it was exactly like Nazi Germany. Before 1933, there was a debate about whether the army’s security concerns would outweigh the Japanese companies’ need for labor in mines, railroads, and civil projects. With the establishment of Manzhouguo in 1933, they decided after heated discussion that security would be most important, that they would have to suppress communist activities and would have to restrict Han migration. The compromise was that they would build an infrastructure for controlling migration, the labor control bureau. Checkpoints were instructed not to allow new laborers in if they had have anti-Japanese sentiments or family in Manzhouguo who could help them. When it came to withheld pay, Japan did not consider these laborers as Manzhouguo citizens; they reasoned that if the laborers were willing to go so far they would be willing to endure bad conditions.
Next, a Canadian professor addressed Inoue regarding Japan’s policies about surrender. He asked about the transition from a permissive attitude toward POWs to the “no-surrender policy” of post-1941 Japan. After the Russo-Japanese War, returned POWs received the highest honors. Also, during the Siberian Intervention, many POWs received the emperor’s honors. He asked when and under what conditions did this change in consciousness took place. He suggested that it had to be during the fifteen year war with China, but was unsure exactly when.
A Japanese professor stepped in to answer the question, saying that policy started to change around the Siberian Intervention. At the time the government’s policy was to let returned soldiers alone and set them free. However, in their home villages they were blamed, and many people discriminated against them. Then, in 1939 by the time of the exchange of POWs at Nomunhan, Japanese POW officers were forced to commit suicide by the order of Matsubu. That was a significant turning point.
He then asked if Inoue researched Wang Shuwen’s activities in 1920s doing propaganda work towards the Japanese. Wang was so effective at that time, recruiting not only Nakanichi but also students at Todai. Several years ago when Wang passed away several of his students met to commemorate him. He asked Inoue for additional information about Wang.
An American scholar asked Inoue if the CCP also engaged in the GMD policy of psychological warfare. He recalled that the GMD lacked sufficient people fluent in Japanese to work with the POWs. He added that he had done some research on the Koreans who helped the GMD and CCP.
Again, on the topic of POWs, another American scholar asked Inoue to consider the changing Japanese policy toward foreign POWs. Specifically, by the time of the War, Japan did not consider of Chinese or other Asians as POWs with international protection. They were used as forced labor, if not killed.
Inoue responded to the comments as a whole, saying that what he reported was based upon the documents from various sources and on interviews with Japanese who were there and participated. He did interview Nosaka before he passed away 10 years ago. With regard to the Japanese army’s policy toward being captured, they educated soldiers to take death before capture. However, injured soldiers were easily captured, and they made up the bulk of the CCP’s POWs. They believed that they would be killed after becoming POWs. But they found that, instead of being killed, they were fed and clothed; they were surprised by this treatment, and gradually they began to form rapport and trust with the parties that caught them. That was the process through which the anti-war activists emerged. This is not to say that every POW became an activist.
Inoue added another practical reason for the Eighth Route Army’s lenient policy toward POWs. Initially, the army was a guerilla force without facilities for POWs. Their policy was to send prisoners back to the Japanese side after having interrogated them. When the Chinese found out that the Japanese were punishing returnees, the Chinese decided to retrain the soldiers. That practice started in 1940 after Nosaka arrived in China. In that sense Nosaka’s role was quite significant.
Nosaka lived more than 100 years, and towards the end of his life he was accused of being a spy of Stalin or the US; but at least the role he played at that time was significant, and without him there would have been no program like this. As to the study group, it was first created in Shanghai and after the War started it moved to Yan’an. In the Eighth Route Army, there were propaganda campaigns for Japanese, GMD, and bandits.
On the question of Japanese policy on surrender, Inoue said that he could not provide a precise answer but that it happened during the 1930s, most likely after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937. It went through several changes. This was the topic of a paper by a professor at Meiji University.
Due to time constraints, Professor Zhuang was only able to thank the audience for their valuable comments and say that he intends to follow up with more analysis of his documents.