WARTIME CHINA: REGIONAL REGIMES AND CONDITIONS, 1937–45

JOINT RESEARCH CONFERENCE

HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JUNE 27–29, 2002

 

Ezra Vogel, Harvard University, opening remarks.

 

Vogel opened the conference by commenting on the immense significance of its subject matter. He noted that: “No historical issue has greater impact on relations between Asian nations than the question of what happened as a result of the Japanese invasion of China in World War II. The war brought great tragedies as millions of Chinese died and many Japanese and Westerners also perished. No issue in East Asian history is now imbued with greater emotion, and yet no important issue in Asian history has received so little careful study by serious scholars. And for no issue does comprehensive understanding require more cooperation of scholars from China, Japan and the West.”

He pointed out that “scholars cannot resolve the political issues that divide countries that have fundamentally different historical memories of the same events.” However, scholars can do “careful research and forge common understandings of the historical record that will make it easier for political leaders, opinion leaders, and people of various nations who have the will, to heal the wounds of past history to live peacefully in our new century.”

Vogel noted that while one aim of the conference was to help people in the Asia-Pacific to live together harmoniously, this did not mean the conference should avoid disagreements. “On the contrary, it is our job as scholars to present the historical record as accurately as each of us can and when disagreements arise to sharpen our understanding of the disagreements, the evidence on which they were based, and on the links between the available evidence and the conclusions that we have drawn,” he said.

He noted that in contrast to their Western counterparts, for Chinese and Japanese scholars the objective study of China during World War II requires great courage. “Japanese scholars must not only come to terms with the horrors that were perpetrated by their countrymen but they must also risk the condemnation of fellow citizens who wish to forget or beautify the historical record,” he said. Meanwhile, “Chinese scholars who show the complexities of the war, the shades of gray, the extent of Chinese cooperation with Japanese authorities, are vulnerable to criticism from those who wish to strengthen nationalist feelings.”

Vogel said that this was the first time that leading scholars from China, Japan and the West had assembled to examine what happened in China during the Japanese occupation from 1937-1945 – and that the conference would be the first of a series.

 

  

In terms of format, the conference was organized by region. Vogel explained: “During World War II, China’s enormous regional diversity took on a new shape as a result of the uneven penetration of Japanese troops. In the Southwest, the Guomindang government under Chiang Kaishek continued to rule, but the GMD control over the rest of the country was very limited. In the Northeast, the Japanese had already established a presence along the Manchurian railroad even before they invaded in 1931. After 1931, Japan established an industrial and military base that they used when they extended the war into China after 1937. North China was therefore called upon to supply labor to the Northeast.”

Session 1: West China

Toru Ajioka, University of the Sacred Heart, Japan:
“Chiang Kaishek’s Campaign for Smaller Provincial Boundaries during the Sino-Japanese War”

 

Ajioka said that the Guomindang campaign to reduce the size of China’s provinces (Chiang Kaishek wanted to reduce the boundaries so there would be as many as 90 provinces) was part of an effort by the Nationalist government to deal with the problem of its lack of control over the localities. Ajioka focused on the issues of who led the campaign and how it was promoted – as well as why it ultimately failed. Another issue he addressed was why the campaign reemerged after the Sino-Japanese War.

 

Comments:

Stephen Mackinnon pointed out that the notes to Ajioka’s paper provided an excellent survey of the state-building issue, an issue running through Republican history back to the Qing dynasty. The concerns of Chiang Kaishek’s government with state-building were laid out for the war-time period using an incredibly wide range of sources – including the latest works in Chinese. Mackinnon called the paper an “exhaustive study in this respect.”

He also pointed to two contextual issues:

·      Firstly, the fact the paper put wartime China in the context of twentieth century Chinese history, dealing with both before and after the war. Mackinnon suggested that this context of larger themes is one that has been neglected in the past, though it comes up in a number of the conference papers (including on food, famine and on migration issues)

·      Secondly, he pointed out that in many ways discussions of the provincial boundary issue by the Nationalists was purely an exercise, because they didn’t rule all of China, or only in a “very spotty kind of way.” This raised the issue of fact versus fiction and pretending to rule versus actually ruling – also an issue for the Communists in Yenan and the Japanese occupiers.

 

 

Jui-te Chang, Academia Sinica, Taiwan: “Ruling from Afar: A New Look at the Wartime Directives of Chiang Kaishek.”

 

Based on his study of some 2,000 directives on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, Chang argued in his paper for a reassessment of the view of previous scholars that the use of personal directives was merely a reflection of Chiang Kaishek’s reliance on personal politics and that it seriously undermined the chain of command. Chang’s conclusions included that 1.) the large number of personal directives was largely a wartime expedient, and 2.) that the bulk of these directives dealt with military matters.

 

Comments:

Tatsuo Yamada pointed to three main contributions of Chang’s study.

·      Firstly, he noted that while the recent opening of Chiang Kaishek’s archives in Taiwan opened the possibility of more objective studies of Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang, it was not easy to analyze or understand personal directives because of their personal nature. Chang, however, was able to do this.

·      Secondly, Yamada said that the study of personal directives gave insight into the nature of Chiang Kaishek’s leadership. By bypassing the chain of command and cultivating personal ties with key figures in the bureaucracy, Chiang believed he could control the Party, government and nation as a whole – but he failed.

·      Lastly, Chang’s study showed that personal politics was not confined to Chiang Kaishek himself, but was characteristic of many high-ranking GMD officials. This helps explain the leadership structure of the GMD, and hence in part explains the failure of the GMD regime in China, especially during the war.

Yamada noted that while Chang’s analysis did point out the limits of personal directives as a way of running the country, this is an issue that should be discussed further.

Yamada also pointed out that previous studies on the Sino-Japanese war period focus almost exclusively on the battlefield and decision-making process during the war. There hasn’t been much done on regional regimes, and the penetration of Chiang Kaishek and the GMD into society during the war. He argued that this also deserved further study.

 

Comments/questions from floor:

US: We also have to think about the bigger issue raised by the discussants – how the central authorities (the GMD, the Communists, the Japanese) tried to have their directives from headquarters obeyed and their links to the local levels. This was an era when communication was very limited, there were problems of dialect, there were problems of different customs and different understandings. Especially in wartime conditions – how does one talk with the center and how does the center try to get action at the lower levels? It’s easy to see why someone like Chiang should be tempted to use personal directives to try and break through these complications.

China: The paper is important because it bears on the leadership structure of the GMD and personal leadership style of Chiang Kaishek.

Question: what is the actual role personal directives played in the outcome of the Sino-Japanese war? Did Chiang have any success in using personal directives? Did he make any mistakes in commanding subordinates during wartime? Did Chiang’s remote control lead to a failure of the war? Was he a brilliant commander or just a mediocre one?

Chang: The impact of personal directives on the war was that there were successes and there were failures. The use of personal directives eliminated some problems, such as the danger of secrets leaking out to the Communists. But there were lots of mistakes made by Chiang in military campaigns.

China: The reason reducing provincial boundaries to exert greater power over the localities was such a long task and ultimately failed is because it affected vested interests. This was especially true at a time when control over the localities was weak. It was not an issue during the Qing dynasty – it only came into being when Yuan Shikai declared himself emperor and control over the warlords was weak. Chiang was very clear that he wanted to reduce the power of the localities, but the question was who was in power locally. Local leaders controlled every aspect of provincial government – and as long as there was no change in the balance of power, then it was destined to remain a policy on paper only.

US: Both papers reflect Chiang’s great frustration in asserting authority over the local provincial and military leaders. But in some administrative regions it was quite successful, for example in the area where Jiang Jingguo was in charge. Of course he had certain advantages vis à vis other leaders.

Question: If Chiang had succeeded in upping the number of provinces to 90 would that have changed things? With the directives, Chiang was trying to assert his authority. Would carrying out the orders have made any difference? What was the quality of the orders? What can we say about not only his style of leadership but also his military style, his view of war, his view of combat? One thing that is obvious from the paper is that he paid high priority to matters of spirit, and matters of will.

Japan: Chiang’s major goal was to turn the country into a modern one, controlled by the central government. During the Qing dynasty, with 500,000 soldiers, the government was in control, because of its military power. Chiang felt he couldn’t win military control so he tried to extend control through institutional change.

Ajioka: If the military option had been viable there would have been no need to make the provinces smaller. But Chiang had no way of reducing the military power of the provinces. The reduction in the size of provinces wasn’t the only way he tried to reduce local power – Chiang had high hopes that he could concentrate more power in the hands of the central government.

Chang: The reason Chiang used personal directives was partly that he felt his subordinates were incompetent, almost like kids. He thought he would be more effective, more efficient if they were responding to him personally.

Japan: There was much disdain towards Chiang from his subordinates. Many people took orders from him, pretending they would obey them, but then didn’t bother to carry them out. He meanwhile looked down on his subordinates who were always losing in battle. In these circumstances the creation of a modern state was impossible.

US: I encountered this issue of Chiang’s directives when reading through the Stillwell diaries. Stillwell severely criticized Chiang’s interference in the chain of command during the Burma campaign and was very bitter about it. In fact he also criticized Claire Chennault for back-channeling around the chain of command. I’d be interested in the evolution of Chiang’s style, if you compared what he did during the Northern expedition or the anti-Communist campaigns. Did he during the war of resistance period become more obsessed with using these personal directives? Was it an increasing characteristic?

Chang: Chiang had great disdain for the people who served him and vice versa – at least in military matters. When he was asked after 1950 why he lost China, his answer was that his subordinates had been disobeying him and that the loss was not his fault.

[There is ample evidence of mutual distrust between Chiang and his subordinates. For example Chiang’s chief of staff said that he couldn’t be blamed for losing battles because he was just carrying out Chiang’s orders. Equally Chiang in 1947 after several battles were lost in Shandong asked/told his top generals ‘why are we failing? You think I’m an old man and you’re not listening to me, that’s why.’]

China: There’s evidence from some battles that when Chiang was not personally involved, the GMD did better. For example, in 1927, when the Nationalist Army was fighting in the Southern Yangtze, Bai Chongxi’s attack on Zhejiang and also the attack on Fujian went well. There was no ‘remote control’ from Chiang on either of these, and they went very smoothly. If Chiang had left military command fully to able commanders he could have had success, whereas when he was personally involved it could lead to defeat.

Japan: There were limits to Chiang’s so-called dictatorship. As for the leadership style, personal directives were just one aspect of this, so the personal directives must be combined with other aspects of Chiang’s leadership style.

Chang: We can learn something about the decision-making process of the GMD, where the final decision lies. Some people have argued that all the power lay in the hands of Chiang and some military men. Others say it was in the hands of the central committee, or some other central body. But actually the decision-making depended on the issue. Military issues Chiang would discuss with military men; economic issues with people from the finance/economics ministry etc. Decision-making varied depending on what the issue was.

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