Session 5: Japanese and Chinese Operations in Central China and the Onset of Military Stalemate

Building on the first day's discussions, this panel moved ahead chronologically to describe the onset of military stalemate in the Sino-Japanese War by 1938. The central historical issue in this session centered on why, in the spring and summer of 1938, the Japanese army could not achieve a victory in China despite the repeated body blows it delivered to the Nationalist Army.

In his paper, Professor Stephen MACKINNON (Department of History, Arizona State university) dealt with the Chinese resistance during this period, focusing on the defense of Wuhan and on the role of Chinese military and political personalities involved in that defense. What became clear from the presentation by Professor TOBE Ryôichi (National Defense Academy, Yokosuka) and from the discussion that followed, is that, following the Chinese disasters of the lower Yangzi campaign in the fall of 1937, Nationalist Chinese forces put up far greater and more coordinated resistance than the Japanese had expected. Given the agency of popular nationalism in China and the demands of total war as conducted by the Japanese, both sides became aware of the importance of incremental dividends, such as the moral victory of Taierzhuang for the Chinese. Thus, the Japanese were able to "win" on the operational level, but they could not exploit these gains because of manpower and material constraints.

In the discussions that followed these papers the differences in focus between the Chinese and Japanese sides became clearer. The Chinese participants tended to emphasize the importance of certain Chinese victories, such as Taierzhuang and Pingxingguan in the stalemate (as well is in the larger dimensions of the ultimate Japanese defeat). The Japanese scholars were more interested in analyzing the operational conduct of Japanese ground forces in terms of tactics, logistics, equipment, and the like.

To this extent, the Chinese and Japanese participants seemed to be treating two entirely different sets of combat issues. Professor Douglas Porch suggested that one way to bring complementarity into the papers and to keep scholars from talking past each other was to introduce the general question of how well military organizations learn and adapt, not only from other militaries but also from their own mistakes. Pursuing such a question, he argued, would provide a broader military historical dimension to a study of the Sino-Japanese conflict than just a contested narrative in East Asian history.